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SUMMARY
Intergenerational fairness is an increasingly pressing concern for both policy 
makers and the public. It is exacerbated by an ageing population, the global 
financial crisis and successive government policies that have failed to consider 
generational issues. We believe the issue of intergenerational fairness needs to 
be addressed.
The relationship between older and younger generations is still defined by 
mutual support and affection. However, the action and inaction of successive 
governments risks undermining the foundation of this relationship. Many in 
younger generations are struggling to find secure, well-paid jobs and secure, 
affordable housing, while many in older generations risk not receiving the 
support they need because government after government has failed to plan for a 
long-term generational timescale.
Our report has reached six main conclusions:
(1) Lack of political will has meant that data is not published on 
generational differences in income and wealth, nor on the potential 
effects of policy on different generations at the time policy is being 
considered. Both the Government’s fiscal rules and the way it 
conducts spending reviews encourage an often damaging short-term 
approach. They need to be reformed with a new fiscal rule focused 
on the Government’s generational balance of debt and assets and 
a more transparent spending review process. There should be a 
broad equivalence, and a sense of equivalence and fairness, about 
what is contributed over a lifetime and what is received by successive 
generations.
(2) Many younger people are struggling to secure affordable housing. 
This is caused by the failure of successive governments to ensure a 
sufficient supply of affordable homes to buy and to rent. Although 
the Government states that housing supply is one of its priorities, it 
is still not doing enough to address this problem. It could go further 
by giving local authorities much stronger powers to develop housing 
on publicly owned land and to borrow to fund house building. It has 
also failed to ensure that the private rented sector is a viable tenure 
for people to live in for the long-term. Tenants in the private rented 
sector need much greater security and stability.
(3) Younger people are also disadvantaged by an education and training 
system that is ill equipped for the needs of the rapidly changing 
labour market and all generations will need support in adapting to 
technological change in the course of what will be longer working 
lives. Post-16 vocational education is underfunded and poorly 
managed. The Government’s apprenticeships strategy is confused 
and has not achieved the desired effect. In addition, the options 
to retrain and reskill in later life are incoherent and underfunded. 
Much more investment is needed in both vocational education and 
lifelong learning to prepare younger generations for a 100-year life.
(4) Pay progression has slowed for younger generations. They are 
unlikely to enjoy the same generation on generation income gains 
that their predecessors received. Younger generations are also more 
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likely to find themselves in insecure employment, without the rights 
that come with worker status. The Government should ensure that 
employment rights cover all those in genuine employment by ensuring 
that worker status is the default position. Longer working lives will 
require greater consideration for initiatives such as flexible working, 
mid-life career reviews and tackling ageism in the workforce.
(5) Active communities have a key role to play in meeting these 
generational challenges. Communities and a strong sense of place 
strengthen intergenerational bonds by bringing generations together 
and sustaining shared loyalties. Communities may also help to 
directly tackle skills, care and housing shortages through innovative 
local initiatives.
(6) The tax and spending policies of successive governments have 
failed to pay sufficient regard to longer term policy consequences. 
This is an endemic failure of policy making. It has undermined 
intergenerational fairness, including for generations yet to be born. 
Successive governments have failed to make proper provision for 
the costs of social care in old age for the large post war cohort who 
are now entering a lengthy retirement and who will rely on smaller, 
younger generations to pay for them. More recently, governments 
have prioritised social security spending for older people. This was 
originally justified. But now retired people have higher incomes on 
average than many younger groups. Changes are necessary to both 
age-related benefits and the taxation system to address these issues.
Tackling intergenerational 
unfairness
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Intergenerational fairness and provision
1. Previous work on intergenerational fairness has sought to define generations 
by year of birth. The Intergenerational Commission defined the post war 
generations as the Baby Boomers, born between 1946–65, Generation X, 
born 1966–80, Millennials, born 1981–2000, and the Latest Generation, 
born since the year 2000. Whilst these neat birth cohorts are useful for 
statistical analysis, they do not fit with the reality of people’s experience 
or changes in demography over time. They do not take account of recent 
or future improvements in life expectancy or changes in social and policy 
expectations. For example, young people are entering the workplace 
later and a generally healthier population is blurring the barrier between 
retirement and working life. This approach has led to a failure to appreciate 
the changing needs of the so-called 100-year life1 and to plan accordingly.
2. As a result, we take a broader definition of generations, grouping together 
people by their current stage in life and their common lived experience rather 
than by their year of birth. We define intergenerational fairness as the idea 
that each cohort should retain a fair expectation of social improvement and 
can have a fulfilling life without being unduly harmed by the actions of a 
previous or subsequent cohort.
3. Each generation contributes through the state and our communities, as well 
as having the opportunity to receive the benefits of state and community 
action. As the challenges faced by each generation change, the nature of 
this contribution and the benefits our collective institutions provide will 
necessarily change. But, to sustain a positive relationship between generations 
without animosity, there should be a broad equivalence, and a sense of 
equivalence, about what is contributed over a lifetime and what is received. 
This sense of fairness must also extend to generations just born, or about 
to be born, who have no voice to advocate for them. Policy based on the 
expectation that future generations will disproportionately pay for present or 
past consumption cannot be considered just or sustainable.
4. The good news from our inquiry is that a strong and positive relationship 
does exist between generations even though there are serious concerns about 
fairness in public policy. We found in our research little public support for 
1 The OnS suggests that one in three children born today will live to 100. Office for national 
Statistics, ‘What is my life expectancy and how might it change?’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulat ionandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/ar t icles /
whatismylifeexpectancyandhowmightitchange/2017–12-01 [accessed 15 January 2019]. Professor 
Andrew Scott told us that this means we have to think about our lives, especially our working lives, 
differently. Q 57 (Professor Andrew Scott)
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the idea that older people are to blame for the woes of younger generations or 
that one generation has wilfully robbed another. Such language is unhelpful.2
5. As part of our inquiry we brought together representatives from different 
ages to tell us how they felt about intergenerational fairness as part of 
a Contact Group. The message we heard was of strong bonds between 
people at different parts of their life. Young adults told us how much they 
appreciated the support that they received from their parents and how much 
they treasured their grandparents. Parents told us their concerns about their 
children’s futures. Older people expressed concern about the difficulties 
younger generations faced. no group that we heard from blamed other 
generations for the problems that they encountered in their own lives. The 
intergenerational compact flows from this positive feeling. We define that 
compact as each generation helping those that came before and those who 
follow after as they themselves are helped by other generations.
6. The strength of the intergenerational compact can also be seen in the 
vast amounts of practical, emotional and financial support passed within 
families. Research from the Social Market Foundation (SMF) finds 
that 27 per cent of parents with adult children provide them with regular 
financial help.3 nigel Keohane, SMF’s Director of Research, told us that 
most of this assistance is helping people cope day to day with rent, bills and 
other regular costs.4 Although many first time buyers are receiving help 
from the so-called ‘Bank of Mum and Dad’ to help them with deposits, this 
represents a minority of the cash support that individuals receive from other 
generations, with help to cover the general costs of living being substantially 
more common.
7. Alongside these cash transfers individuals also give a substantial amount of 
time to support other generations.5 The millennium cohort study found that 
grandparents provided at least some care for 42 per cent of families with a 
9 month old infant, rising to 71 per cent of families where the mother was 
in employment or studying.6 This informal care is not distributed evenly 
within families however, with women providing much of the effort that holds 
the intergenerational compact together. People commit so much time and 
money in helping other generations because they have strong bonds with 
them, within families, and, often, within communities. We have seen no 
2 Intergenerational Commission, The Millennial Bug: Public attitudes on the living standards of different 
generations (September 2017): https://www.intergencommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
The-Millennial-Bug.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019] and Britainthinks, Intergenerational Fairness: A 
citizens’ view (February 2016): https://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/Intergenerational-fairness-report-
with-britain-thinks.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
3 Social Market Foundation, Britain’s Family Bank: An examination of family financial support across the 
generations and its impact (September 2018) p 5: http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
Britains-Family-Bank-1.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
4 Q 152 (nigel Keohane)
5 Evidence to the House of Lords Affordable Childcare Select Committee suggested that grandparents 
contributed the equivalent of £7.3 billion in childcare in 2014 (Select Committee on Affordable Childcare, 
Affordable Childcare (Report of Session 2014–15, HL Paper 117)). Informal unpaid carers provide 
£57 billion worth of social care each year - Office for national Statistics, ‘Unpaid carers provide social 
care worth £57 billion’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/
healthandlifeexpectancies/articles/unpaidcarersprovidesocialcareworth57billion/2017–07-10 
[accessed 28 January 2019]. This figure includes individuals caring for others in their own generation 
as well as including intergenerational caring.
6 Government Office for Science, Future of an Ageing Population (July 2016), p 72: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/535187/gs-16-
10-future-of-an-ageing-population.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
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evidence of the desire to reach across generations diminishing. This is a 
social good which should be recognised, respected and sustained.
8. Whilst the spirit of intergenerational support is willing, the ability to 
provide this help is weakening for many. Members of our Contact Group 
told us that they worried about whether they would be able to help younger 
generations in the same way that they had been helped by their parents. 
The intergenerational compact is vulnerable if the needs of one generation 
are beyond the amount that can be supported by others. The needs and 
disappointed expectations of the current younger generations in housing and 
the workplace are the greatest near-term dangers to the intergenerational 
compact, with the looming costs of social care in old age a further danger, as 
generations move through their life.
9. Intergenerational fairness should offer the opportunity of a fulfilling life. 
This is based on the principles that each generation should be able to access 
a working life that offers fulfilment and can provide for their family, and a 
secure and affordable home in which to live. It is not the case that all younger 
people have a worse chance of achieving these aims than the generations 
before them but rather that the increasing proportion who are struggling 
to meet these aims may lead to intergenerational resentment if no action is 
taken.
10. We have been particularly concerned by the problems and perceptions of 
younger people. Younger generations worry that they are facing the end of 
generation on generation income progression and there is some evidence to 
suggest that they are right.7 Since the Second World War each generation that 
entered the labour market has seen higher real wages than those preceding it. 
However, young people who entered the labour market since the mid-2000s 
have seen similar wages to the generation before them. This may be a result 
of entering the workforce just before the financial crisis. However, there were 
some indicators of these problems before the crisis set in and generational 
wage progression has not resumed in the decade since.
11. Previous generational increases in wages were partly driven by increased 
educational attainment and skills development. Access to good education is 
the soundest basis for progress in life. We are concerned by the UK’s relative 
underperformance on many recent international measures. We consider that 
a failure to improve training for those who do not go to university is an 
endemic long-term policy failure, which would inevitably contribute to wage 
slow down in a more competitive and open world. That is why we focus in 
Chapter 4 on skills, training and technical education. In preparation for the 
world of work, Further and Higher Education are poorly balanced, student 
finance flawed and the apprenticeships system incoherent. The problems 
of an insufficiently skilled workforce risk being amplified by wider socio-
economic changes including increased global uncertainty and the decline of 
growth in western economies.
12. As well as experiencing a wage slowdown, younger generations also report 
increased insecurity in work. We heard concerns from our Contact Group 
and others that it is more difficult for young people to find permanent secure 
employment. We look at this aspect of the world of work in Chapter 5.
7 Intergenerational Commission, Stagnation Generation: The case for renewing the intergenerational 
contract (July 2016) p 25: https://www.intergencommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
Intergenerational-commission-launch-report.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
8 TACKLInG InTERGEnERATIOnAL UnFAIRnESS
13. The other pressure affecting younger people is the continuing decline in 
home ownership and the affordability of housing. Each generation born 
since the 1960s has spent more of their income on housing and is less likely 
to own their home than the generation born before them.8 The generation 
that has recently retired has had a mostly more benign experience of the 
housing market than generations currently in the labour force. They were 
more likely to achieve a secure home either through substantially higher 
home ownership rates or a much larger socially rented sector. Throughout 
their life, on average, they spent a smaller proportion of their income on 
housing costs than any generation since has at the same age. However, this 
positive experience of the housing market was not uniform within older 
generations, as many suffered from the effects of persistent high interest 
rates and inflation. Some experienced negative equity, a problem that could 
recur once the present policy of artificially depressed interest rates ends.
14. Younger generations are increasingly living in the private rental sector, 
which takes up more of their income and provides no long-term security. 
Short-term insecure tenancies are especially a problem for young families, 
as children are particularly affected by frequent moves. The private rented 
sector plays a valuable role, but poor standards and arbitrary treatment of 
tenants have resulted in insecurity for many. There has also been a large 
increase in the numbers of young people living with their parents either by 
choice or due to an inability to access a home of their own.9 The supply 
of local authority and other social housing has fallen dramatically. These 
concerns are discussed in Chapter 3. While some of these pressures are felt 
differently across the country, with London more acutely affected than other 
areas, these generational challenges pose problems for large numbers of 
young people.
15. Meanwhile, older generations face their own challenges in a society that is 
ill-prepared for their numbers and needs as they age. The generation born 
between 1946 and 1965 is substantially larger than subsequent or preceding 
ones. We have heard that there is an inadequate supply of housing that is 
adaptable or specialised to meet the needs of this larger cohort as their care 
needs increase. There also has been insufficient preparation to meet their 
social care needs. Social care for the ageing population is the current focus 
of an inquiry by the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee. We do 
not intrude on that inquiry. However, we recognise this is a vast issue, not 
only intergenerationally, but for each generation in its lifecourse. It requires a 
lifecourse approach, which focuses on an individual throughout the course of 
their life rather than looking only at specific points in time. Social care costs 
cannot unfairly be loaded on the young, or remitted, in public debt, to future 
generations. A balanced approach to meeting rising costs must be found in 
which all those receiving public support make a full and fair contribution.
16. Alongside these challenges to specific age groups the increased atomisation of 
our society also poses a threat to intergenerational fairness. The breakdown 
of common institutions has allowed loneliness to proliferate in both young 
and old people as well as creating a breeding ground for ill-informed 
8  Intergenerational Commission, Home Affront: Housing across the generations (September 2017): https://
www.intergencommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Home-Affront.pdf [accessed 28 January 
2019]
9 ESRC Centre for Population Change, The changing living arrangements of young adults in the UK, 
Briefing 7 (April 2012): http://www.cpc.ac.uk/docs/BP7_Living_Arrangements_of_Young_Adults_
in_the_UK.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
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stereotypes about other generations. Modern technologies and social media 
provide more ways to communicate than ever before. This is a major benefit, 
not enjoyed by past generations. However, thriving and attractive public 
space, a shared sense of place and physical daily contact will always remain 
a basis for healthy communities and positive contact across the generations. 
Community activity can help bring generations together to strengthen the 
bonds between groups and tackle loneliness. In addition, we heard examples 
of the ways in which communities can directly tackle the problems with 
housing and employment that afflict different generations. This is our focus 
in Chapter 6.
17. Government tax and benefit policies have an impact on intergenerational 
fairness. Some policies which specifically raise intergenerational questions 
are the focus of Chapter 7.
Looking forward and taking a lifecourse approach
18. Each of these individual problems can be viewed in isolation as problems in 
themselves. We have drawn on several recent Select Committee inquiries for 
analysis of specific issues.10 Others have looked at intergenerational issues, 
for example the House of Lords Select Committee on Public Service and 
Demographic Change11 and the House of Commons Work and Pensions 
Committee’s short inquiry into intergenerational fairness which focused on 
social security.12 Our work has also been informed by the work of several 
other organisations including the large amount of illuminating data and 
analysis produced by the Intergenerational Commission convened by the 
Resolution Foundation.
19. Where we hope to add value to this large volume of material is by taking a 
forward-looking approach that looks at fairness across the lifecourse for each 
generation. We look at what today’s young people can expect to experience 
as they become tomorrow’s old people. We recognise that financing present 
public expenditure through creating an unsustainable financial burden for 
future generations would damage the intergenerational compact. Taxation 
must be fair between different generations. Our goal is for the intergenerational 
compact to be as strong, if not stronger, in 20 years’ time as it is today.
20. We must anticipate the large scale social, economic and technological changes 
that will reshape our society in the coming decades. The UK population is 
getting older. This is not just a result of the uneven size of different generations 
but of recent increases in life expectancy. Old age has changed, both in the 
perception of who we see as old and in the fact that a boy born in 2015 will 
have the same chances of dying at 75 that a boy born in 1955 had of dying at 
10 Economic Affairs Committee, Building more homes (1st Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 20), 
Economic Affairs Committee, Treating Students Fairly: The Economics of Post-School Education (2nd 
Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 139), Work and Pensions and Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy Committees, A framework for modern employment (Second Report, Session 2017–19, HC 352), 
Work and Pensions Committee, Self-employment and the gig economy (Thirteenth Report, Session 2016–
17, HC 847), Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Private rented sector (Fourth 
Report, Session 2017–19, HC 440), Communities and Local Government Committee, Housing for 
older people (Second Report, Session 2017–19, HC 370), Women and Equalities Committee, Older 
people and employment (Fourth Report, Session 2017–19, HC 359)
11 Select Committee on Public Service and Demographic Change, Ready for Ageing? (Report of Session 
2012–13, HL Paper 140)
12 Work and Pensions Committee, Intergenerational fairness (Third Report, Session 2016–17, HC 59)
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65.13 Longer lives mean that we should rethink some of our expectations of 
what the lifecourse should look like. This potentially represents a large gain. 
More people enjoy varied career opportunities and more years of healthy 
living. A 100-year life will not resemble the same education, work, retirement 
pattern of recent decades. At the same time, technological change, including 
the growth of artificial intelligence, is reshaping what will be needed from 
the workforce. This technology has the potential to improve quality of life by 
providing new products and services. But it calls for lifelong education and 
training that can help all generations adapt to it, something on which we 
focus in Chapter 4.
21. The 100-year life also poses questions on how we combine longer working 
lives with support for different generations. Maintaining the intergenerational 
compact will call for increasing flexibility from employers to allow people to 
take time off for caring responsibilities, not only in the middle of their life as 
parents but in later careers when they may be caring for a partner or parent. 
This leads to our focus on the need for flexible working in Chapter 5.
22. Responsible government requires long-term vision and a clear assessment 
of how policy choices will affect different generations in the future, as well 
as today. As we discuss in Chapter 2, successive governments have failed to 
consider the needs of different generations and failed to plan for the long-
term. This lack of foresight lies behind many of the problems we see in 
housing, education and the workforce. We believe this is a fundamental and 
continuing failure in public policy-making and the process of government. It 
must be urgently addressed.
23. There is a structural shift taking place, with younger generations 
not seeing the increase in living standards enjoyed by previous 
generations. At the same time older generations face a society that 
is not prepared for their numbers or their needs as they age. Many 
young people, their parents and their grandparents worry about 
younger people being able to afford a home and achieve a secure 
well-paying job. This is not due to older generations deliberately 
or selfishly profiting at their expense but is instead a result of the 
failure of successive governments to plan for the future and prepare 
for social, economic and technological change.
24. If society continues on its current trajectory, and the Government takes no 
action, there could be a breakdown in the intergenerational compact. If no 
action is taken now, over the coming decades some young people could grow 
to resent older people for having the property security that they lack and 
having benefited from a lifetime of well-paid secure employment of which 
younger generations can only dream. Our recommendations will not fix 
all the problems we have outlined, but they point the Government in the 
right direction so that it has the tools necessary to keep our intergenerational 
compact strong by ensuring security for all generations.
25. Much of the evidence that we have received has stressed that each generation 
is not a homogenous group. We acknowledge the many intragenerational 
issues that exist. However, in accordance with our remit, we have had to 
focus on the areas where we believe the unfairness is between generations 
rather than within them and that remit has guided our inquiry.
13 ESRC Centre for Population Change, The changing meaning of old age, Briefing 31 (February 2016): 
http://www.cpc.ac.uk/docs/BP31_The_changing_meaning_of_old_age.pdf [accessed 20 March 2019]
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The Committee’s work and acknowledgements
26. Our Committee was appointed on 9 May 2018 with the broad remit “to 
consider the long-term implications of government policy on intergenerational 
fairness and provision”. In reply to our call for written evidence we received 
72 submissions. We heard oral evidence from 55 witnesses, and from some 
of them we received supplementary written evidence. The witnesses are 
listed in Appendix 2. We are most grateful to all of those who sent us their 
ideas or spoke to us in person. Their evidence was invaluable and forms the 
basis of our work. We are likewise deeply grateful to all of those who came 
to speak at two informal seminars, to the members of our Contact Group 
and the people who contributed to their discussions, and to those we visited 
in Doncaster. Full notes of those events are in the Appendices.14 We also 
tender our thanks to Professor Jane Falkingham, Professor of Demography 
and International Social Policy at the University of Southampton, who has 
been our specialist adviser, for her expert help and thoughtful input.
14 Appendix 4 to see more about our visit to Doncaster, Appendix 5 to see more about the Contact 
Group.
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CHAPTER 2: ACCOUNTING FOR THE FUTURE
27. To ensure that there is fairness between generations the Government must 
think on a generational scale. Successive governments have failed to do this. 
The Government must plan for the long-term, being transparent about what 
it believes the country’s needs will be and how it will meet them. It needs to 
model the effects of its policies on specific generations. In addition, far more 
data on different generations must be collected and published to ensure a 
high quality public debate and to hold the Government to account.
Improving governmental processes
28. One repeated criticism throughout this inquiry has been that successive 
governments have failed to plan ahead. This can be seen in the failures to 
ensure that there is affordable housing, to plan for an ageing population 
and to create an education and training system that can respond to coming 
technological change, as we will explain in the following chapters. A lack of 
preparation means that younger generations are unable to secure the jobs and 
housing they need whilst older generations suffer from inadequate support 
in old age. While there are areas where the Government could improve its 
analytical ability, Julian McCrae, Senior Adviser to the International School 
for Government at King’s College London, told us the UK Government 
compares favourably to other governments in terms of its analytical ability.15 
The problem lies in how that analytical ability is used. Government has the 
capability to model future needs. But Julian McCrae told us that government 
departments begin a spending review process with “quite reasonable 
assumptions” but these are then eroded during the process:
“we run an iterative decision-making process and there will be five or six 
iterations of, ‘This doesn’t quite balance with our political aspirations’. 
… you push assumptions and build in optimism bias as you go … and 
you end up with completely unreasonable assumptions.”16
29. Julian McCrae suggested that a positive alternative version of this was when 
in 2014 the nHS made a public bid for increased spending that “produced 
a model that linked potentials for efficiency and potentials for future tax 
funding to an estimate of how demand would move forward”. He stressed 
that whilst “no models are right and they cannot predict the future” this 
provided a basis for proper debate of what the needs of the health service 
were, what efficiencies can be made and how it can be funded. The ability 
to scrutinise the Government’s modelling of the future level of need would 
ensure greater transparency about how it will deal with that need and allow 
us to understand the assumptions behind government spending decisions. 
Julian McCrae suggested that these assumptions should be established as 
the parameters within which politicians make “the real decisions about what 
our tax and spend is going to look like”.17 By making the assumptions and 
the modelling behind them more transparent we can ascertain when the 
Government is making political choices with regard to tax and spend and 
where it is underestimating or overestimating the size of a future problem.
15 Q 172 (Julian McCrae)
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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30. The Institute for Government (IfG) has similarly criticised the lack of 
transparency of the spending review process.18 It also notes that spending 
plans tend toward optimism bias, fail to focus on risks and move costs 
between programmes. The IfG has found that there is currently little 
independent scrutiny of spending plans. It highlights that the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR), an organisation that provides this sort of 
scrutiny elsewhere, explicitly makes no judgement on whether policy 
objectives or programmes can be achieved for the funding allocated to 
them. Parliamentary scrutiny of spending plans is limited due to the fact 
that “published settlements include very little detail, and figures are often 
rounded.”19 The IfG recommends that the Government should publish 
a statement detailing planned spending and how changes are going to 
be achieved and that the national Audit Office (nAO) should be invited 
to comment on whether the modelling and assumptions on which these 
statements are based are robust.
31. The nAO is itself critical of the spending review process suggesting that it:
“creates a risk that departments and HM Treasury are complicit in 
agreeing over-optimistic delivery or spending reduction plans that have 
no realistic chance of being delivered. Departments have their short-
term funding needs met; and HM Treasury gets the savings it needs to 
meet its fiscal targets. Performance problems that begin to appear can 
be patched up with short-term funding boosts, when the fiscal position 
makes this possible. Meanwhile the long-standing lack of transparency 
around performance and value for money has made it extremely difficult 
for Parliament or citizens to hold government to account for failure to 
deliver.”20
32. Similar calls for transparency have been made of the government accounting 
process by the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional 
Affairs Committee.21 As the Government works on its 2019 spending review 
process this presents an opportunity to improve long-term planning in 
government and increase transparency.
33. Transparency alone will not improve how the Government plans for the 
future. Pressure from an independent source is needed in order to ensure 
that the Government’s modelling represents a fair and accurate picture. The 
IfG’s suggestion that the nAO be invited to comment on the modelling and 
assumptions could provide this independent voice. An alternative option 
put forward by Julian McCrae was for the Government to set up an “OBR 
for spend which can look at the spending and the forward projections 
quite seriously and develop some of the models.”22 The House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Long-term Sustainability of the nHS and Adult 
Social Care recommended the creation of an Office for Health and Care 
Sustainability which would monitor and publish data on demographic trends 
18 Institute for Government, The 2019 Spending Review: How to run it well (September 2018) p 4, p 21: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG_2019_%20spending_
review_web.pdf [accessed 18 January 2019]
19 Ibid.
20 national Audit Office, Improving government’s planning and spending framework (november 2018) 
p 62: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Improving-government%E2%80%99s-
planning-and-spending-framework.pdf [accessed 18 January 2019]
21 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Accounting for Democracy Revisited: The 
Government Response and Proposed Review (Sixth Report, Session 2017–19, HC 1197)
22 Q 176 (Julian McCrae)
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relating to health as well as looking at the workforce implications of these 
changes and the stability of funding relative to demand.23 Although focused 
on health, this model addresses the same concerns that we wish to raise. The 
Government’s response to the Committee’s recommendation suggested that 
this body would be replicating existing work done by other bodies like the 
OBR and the Office for national Statistics (OnS).24
34. As the Government is keen not to replicate existing work and not to create 
new bodies, it could begin by publishing its models for parliamentary scrutiny 
with a possible role for the nAO in assisting that scrutiny. If the Government 
is unable to publish models which can inform public debate, then this would 
strengthen the case for an Office for Spending Sustainability. Reform is also 
needed in the Treasury to ensure it is focused on long-term sustainability.
35. Successive governments’ short-termism has also caused intergenerational 
tensions through bad, politically driven accounting choices. One clear 
example has been the student loan system. Whilst student loans and the cost 
of a university education to students has caused concern (and will be discussed 
in Chapter 4) the cost of student loans to the Government has also been 
a source of intergenerational unfairness. The Chair of the House of Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee, the Rt Hon The Lord Forsyth of Drumlean 
told us that the current system of student loans was a “fiscal illusion”.25 
Higher Education is funded by students paying upfront fees financed by 
a student loan. However, most student loans will not be paid off in full, 
with anything remaining unpaid written off 30 years after they have been 
issued. Under the current system, only the write off after 30 years appears on 
the Government’s borrowing figures. This would effectively mean that the 
cost of educating today’s students would be paid by taxpayers 30 years from 
now. The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee concluded that it 
“is unacceptable to expect future taxpayers to bear the brunt for funding 
today’s students” and recommended that this should be changed so that 
current spending reflects the current investment in Higher Education.26 We 
strongly agree and note the previous flawed policy resulted from politically 
driven short-termism, enabled by the very lack of long-term transparency we 
have criticised.
36. Following this recommendation and reports from other committees, the OnS 
reclassified how student loans will be treated for the purposes of the national 
Accounts.27 It has stated that an estimate of the amount of student loan that 
it expects not to be paid off will be treated as current capital expenditure. 
This change will have a positive effect as it will no longer flatter government 
spending on Higher Education compared with Further Education (FE). 
This is a sensible change that we support.
23 Select Committee on the Long-term Sustainability of the nHS, The Long-term Sustainability of the 
NHS and Adult Social Care (Report of Session 2016–17, HL Paper 151)
24 Department of Health and Social Care, Government response to the Lords Select Committee report on Long-
term Sustainability of the NHS and Adult Social Care, Cm 9504, February 2018: https://www.parliament.
uk/documents/lords-committees/nHS-Sustainability/Gov-Resp-nHS-Social-Care.pdf [accessed 18 
January 2019]
25 Q 116 (Lord Forsyth of Drumlean)
26 Economic Affairs Committee, Treating Students Fairly: The Economics of Post-School Education (2nd 
Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 139)
27 Office for national Statistics, ‘New treatment of student loans in the public sector finances and national 
accounts’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/
articles/newtreatmentofstudentloansinthepublicsectorfinancesandnationalaccounts/2018–12-17 
[accessed 18 January 2019]
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37. The student loan system is not a unique area where government policy 
has failed to prioritise long-term considerations. The nAO’s report into 
improving the Government’s planning and spending framework highlighted 
several policy decisions where the Government appears to be sacrificing 
long-term value for money for short-term funding decisions.28 This includes 
capital spending for schools where there “is insufficient focus on routine 
maintenance to keep school buildings in good condition and prevent more 
costly problems in the future.” The nAO stated that “HM Treasury’s own 
success measures prioritise spending control over long-term value for money.”
38. One positive development in recent years has been the development of the 
Whole of Government Accounts. First published in 2011, these provide a 
more comprehensive view of the Government’s balance sheet, clearly showing 
its assets and liabilities, than the national Accounts, which are based on 
meeting an internationally agreed comparable accounting framework.29 
The Government is currently conducting a balance sheet review looking 
at how it minimises its liabilities and maximises the return from its assets. 
Julian McCrae told us that whilst this approach can generate some “sensible 
public policy” it can also generate some “very bad public policy”.30 He 
suggested that the Treasury were making short-term budgetary decisions to 
reduce contingent liabilities rather than planning for the future.
39. The contents of the Whole of Government Accounts are controversial. 
The line over whether something should be included as a liability or is just 
expected future expenditure is hard to draw. The clearest example of this 
is the State Pension. Whilst future spending on already promised public 
sector pensions is included in the Whole of Government Accounts, the State 
Pension is not. Michael Johnson, Associate Fellow at Bright Blue, argued 
that the State Pension should be included in the accounts as it should be 
treated as a right that is secured through national Insurance Contributions 
(nICs).31 However, currently nICs do not fund the State Pension. The 
State Pension is part of the social security system, along with other welfare 
payments, which are not included in the Whole of Government Accounts 
because it is ordinary government spending. Treating the State Pension as an 
acquired right and a liability for the Whole of Government Accounts would 
have implications both for the rate at which the State Pension is increased 
and who should face nICs. We discuss both these questions in more detail 
in Chapter 7.
40. Chris Giles, Economics Editor at the Financial Times, told us that successive 
UK governments had a very poor record of considering their assets and 
liabilities. He mentioned the student loan system and the recent sale of 
railway arches which he said were “almost certainly” sold too cheap.32 He 
suggested that one way to counteract this short-termism would be to have a 
fiscal rule that is specifically targeted at the balance sheet as is done in new 
Zealand.33
28 national Audit Office, Improving government’s planning and spending framework (november 2018) p 9, 
p 48: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Improving-government%E2%80%99s-
planning-and-spending-framework.pdf [accessed 18 January 2019]
29 national Audit Office, ‘Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General: Whole of Government 
Accounts 2015–16’: https://www.nao.org.uk/report/report-of-the-comptroller-and-auditor-general-
whole-of-government-accounts-2015–16/ [accessed 4 February 2019]
30 Q 171 (Julian McCrae)
31 Written evidence from Michael Johnson (IFP0074)
32 Q 173 (Chris Giles)
33 Q 176 (Chris Giles)
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41. Fiscal rules determine how governments write their budgets. In new Zealand 
the Public Finance Act sets out its fiscal rules which prescribe that the 
government must pursue its policy objectives in accordance with multiple 
principles including, “achieving and maintaining levels of total net worth 
that provide a buffer against factors that may impact adversely on total net 
worth in the future”, requiring the government to focus on its overall balance 
sheet in addition to current spending, and “when formulating fiscal strategy, 
having regard to its likely impact on present and future generations”.34This 
long-term approach contrasts sharply with the UK’s approach. The UK’s 
fiscal rules commit the Government to reducing the cyclically adjusted 
deficit to below two per cent of GDP by 2020–21 and having debt as a 
share of GDP falling in 2020–21.35 These both focus on the current levels of 
spending rather than the Government’s overall level of assets and liabilities. 
Chris Giles told us that although fiscal rules are “rules of thumb and are not 
perfect,” measuring them can make them “become more important within 
government.”36
42. When we raised the positive example set by new Zealand with John Glen MP, 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury and City Minister, he stated that new 
Zealand had a different scale of economy with less complexity than the 
UK.37 He claimed that the UK’s Whole of Government Accounts put us at 
the “forefront of financial reporting and transparency”. The work done on 
creating the Whole of Government Accounts and the Treasury’s balance 
sheet review means that the UK is well placed to manage its assets and 
liabilities for the long-term. It appears that what is missing is the political 
will to prioritise this. This would help ensure that the Government has 
productive assets to pass on to the next generation instead of only passing on 
expensive liabilities.
43. The Government must think better about the long-term in order 
to tackle intergenerational fairness. It should create a fiscal rule 
that addresses the whole of the Government balance sheet, in 
addition to that focusing on its current spending deficit. It should 
also improve transparency and accounting of the spending review 
process by publishing the analytical assumptions behind each 
department’s initial requests at the start of the spending review to 
show its perception of the country’s needs over the course of the next 
spending period. There should also be an independent validation of 
these assumptions, for example by the National Audit Office.
Data on intergenerational fairness
44. In order to tackle a problem properly, it is essential to understand it. However, 
there is too little data in the public domain to understand the state of 
intergenerational fairness fully. To foster a high quality public debate on this 
subject there should be data on the incomes and assets of each generation, 
estimates of the effects of current policy on each generation and models of 
the effects of policies across an individual’s lifecourse. This data should be 
presented both in terms of current age groups (for example 20–25 year olds 
34 Public Finance Act 1989, section 26(G)(1)
35 HM Treasury, Budget 2018 (October 2018) p 16: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752202/Budget_2018_red_web.pdf [accessed 18 
January 2019]
36 Q 176 (Chris Giles)
37 Q 233 (John Glen MP)
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have X income in 2017/18) and by birth cohorts (for example people born 
1980–1989 have seen their income grow by Y in the last decade). Presenting 
data like this would allow for discussion of how current age groups are 
affected, as well as allowing for comparisons of different birth cohorts over 
time. Currently, there are substantial gaps in the data. The data that does 
exist is available only to the Government or to researchers upon request.38
45. The OnS has told us that it has recently established a Centre for Inequalities 
and a Centre for Ageing and Demography, both of which are seeking to 
improve the amount and quality of data available in these areas. However, 
these initiatives are in their early stages and large gaps remain in the data 
available.
46. The lack of data on the intergenerational effects of policy was raised 
repeatedly during this inquiry. The Rt Hon Frank Field MP told us that 
the Government did not publish sufficient data on the intergenerational 
effects of its policies.39 The House of Commons Work and Pensions Select 
Committee’s inquiry into intergenerational fairness, which Frank Field 
chaired, recommended that the Government produce an assessment of the 
intergenerational distribution of private income and wealth as well as the 
fiscal contributions and withdrawals made by different generations.40
47. Chris Giles told us that whilst the Government published much data on 
the distribution of income, it did not publish data showing the generational 
distribution of income despite this being “where all the action in income 
distribution has been over the last decade.”41 He suggested that the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) should publish this breakdown. 
When we put this to Alok Sharma MP, Minister of State for Employment, he 
stated that the Department makes the relevant Households Below Average 
Income (HBAI) data set available to researchers.42 However, as Chris Giles 
told us, this data would “be much more powerful if it came in an official 
government report.”43 Iain Walsh, Director of Labour Market Strategy and 
International Affairs at DWP, informed us that the HBAI data set goes back 
to 1994 and that the Government could provide a breakdown of what has 
happened to different cohorts within those 20–25 years.44 He suggested that 
data from before 1994 was based on a different survey which had a lower 
sample size and therefore was not suitable for breaking down into age groups 
or birth cohorts. Given that the Government is able to publish a 20 year time 
series of the income distribution between birth cohorts and could publish 
this breakdown by cohorts alongside its other data on income distribution, it 
is unclear why it has yet to do so.
48. Chris Giles suggested that the Office for national Statistics should publish 
generational breakdowns of the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) in order 
to provide similar information on the wealth of different cohorts.45 WAS has 
substantially fewer previous releases than HBAI as it was launched in 2006 
38 The UK Data archive contains much of the data which we would like to see published but is only 
provided to registered researchers and requires specialised software and research expertise to use.
39 Q 104 (Frank Field MP)
40 Work and Pensions Committee, Intergenerational Fairness (Third Report, Session 2016–17, HC 59)
41 Q 172 (Chris Giles)
42 Q 214 (Alok Sharma MP)
43 Q 172 (Chris Giles)
44 Q 214 (Iain Walsh)
45 Q 172 (Chris Giles)
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and is a biennial rather than annual survey.46 This means that there would 
be limited use in a special release of a time series of the data to date, but a 
breakdown by age groups or birth cohort could be included alongside other 
breakdowns in future releases.
49. Both Chris Giles and Professor James Sefton, Chair in Economics at Imperial 
College London, suggested that the WAS’s coverage of gifts and transfers 
within families could be improved.47 Professor Sefton highlighted the lack 
of information on the socioeconomic group of those who give gifts. Another 
limitation of the WAS is that it only provides information on gifts and 
transfers over £500.48 An alternative source for data on intergenerational 
transfers is the Understanding Society survey which can provide data on 
smaller gifts49 and can, when combined with its predecessor the British 
Household Panel Survey, be used to create matched pairs of parents and 
children for information on who gives transfers.50 However, this survey is not 
as specialised as the WAS and cannot provide as detailed data on wealth.
50. As with income distribution and wealth distribution there is a relevant OnS 
data set which could provide more information on the generational effects of 
tax and benefits. Professor Sefton told us that the OnS’s Effects of Tax and 
Benefits on Household Income data set uses information from the Living 
Costs and Food Survey to allocate in-kind consumption and provide a “good 
picture of the intergenerational distribution of government resources.”51 This 
data estimates the amount of tax households pay across a variety of direct 
(income tax, national Insurance etc.) and indirect taxes (VAT, Council Tax 
etc.), the amount of social security payments households receive, as well as 
an estimate of the value of education, health and other support they receive 
from the Government.
51. The most recent release of the OnS’s Effects of Tax and Benefits on 
Household Income data provided a high-level breakdown of the overall 
level of total tax, benefits and various services different age groups receive.52 
However, it did not contain the detailed data on individual tax and benefits 
which the data set can produce. A time series breaking down the tax paid 
and benefits received by different birth cohorts would be a valuable resource 
in understanding the effect of government decisions on different generations.
52. The UK Statistics Authority should prioritise improving generational 
statistics. This work should begin by the Office for National 
Statistics introducing a generational breakdown of the Effects of 
Tax and Benefits on Household Income data set and releasing a 
46 Office for national Statistics, ‘Wealth and Assets survey QMI’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulat ionandcommunit y/persona landhousehold f inances /debt /methodolog ies /
wealthandassetssurveyqmi [accessed 18 January 2019]
47 Q 172 (Chris Giles, Professor James Sefton)
48 Office for national Statistics, ‘Intergenerational transfers: the distribution of 
inheritances, gifts and loans, Great Britain: 2014 to 2016’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdf inances/incomeandwealth/articles/
intergenerationaltransfersthedistributionofinheritancesgiftsandloans/2018–10-30 [accessed 18 
January 2019]
49 As seen in Social Market Foundation, Britain’s Family Bank (September 2018): http://www.smf.co.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Britains-Family-Bank-1.pdf [accessed 18 January 2019]
50 As seen in Resolution Foundation, House of the rising son (or daughter): The impact of parental wealth 
on their children’s homeownership (December 2018): https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/
uploads/2018/12/House-of-the-Rising-Son.pdf [accessed 18 January 2019]
51 Q 172 (Professor James Sefton)
52 This data is the basis for Figure 7 and Figure 8 in Chapter 7.
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backdated time-series of this data. The Office for National Statistics 
should also investigate ways to improve the Wealth and Assets 
Survey’s coverage of gifts and inheritances as well as publishing a 
generational breakdown of the survey’s findings in each release. In 
addition, the Department for Work and Pensions should introduce a 
generational breakdown of the Households Below Average Income 
data set in its annual release and publish a backdated time-series of 
this data.
53. Whilst the OnS and DWP’s survey-based data sets can provide a historical 
record of the effect of policy on different cohorts, there is a lack of information 
on the predicted future effects. Lindsey Whyte, Director of Personal Tax, 
Welfare and Pensions at the Treasury, told us that the Treasury tends to 
use static analysis looking at the effects of suggested policy on different age 
groups.53 She told us that the Treasury will “look at individual measures for 
a fiscal event, using, as far as we can, the micro-simulation model we have 
to look at tax and benefit reforms, which would give us a snapshot of the 
implications for different age groups.”54 However, whilst in each budget the 
Government publishes the results of these models in a distributional analysis 
for income, it does not provide a similar summary of the effects of the budget 
for each age group.55
54. More concerning is the lack of government analysis of the long-term effects 
of its policy on different cohorts as they age. Iain Walsh from DWP told us 
that the department has PEnSIM, a pension simulation model which looks 
at the effects that possible pension changes could have on future cohorts,56 
but no other examples were given of government departments using this 
sort of long-term cohort modelling. Lindsey Whyte told us that there is very 
limited data on people’s life cycle and that the Treasury does not look at 
whether a cohort has been or will be a net contributor to the Exchequer.57
55. One particular government weakness is a lack of work on generational 
accounts. Generational accounts are a way of measuring the financial 
sustainability of the Government’s tax and spending decisions. These 
accounts model current policy projected forward to see if future generations 
would have to pay more tax to finance the spending on current generations 
if nothing changed. Professor Sefton told us that “because of demographic 
ageing, it seems that current tax and spending plans are unsustainable and 
will have to be rebalanced—otherwise, current unborns will … inherit a 
large government debt from the older generations”.58 Lindsey Whyte stated 
that the Government does not undertake generational accounting analysis 
but instead monitors “the work that various think tanks, such as the IFS, are 
doing in developing that capability.”59
53 Q 39 (Lindsey Whyte)
54 Q 40 (Lindsey Whyte)
55 HM Treasury, Impact on households: distributional analysis to accompany Budget 2018 (October 2018): 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/752045/impact_on_households_distributional_analysis_to_accompany_budget_2018_web.pdf 
[accessed 18 January 2019]
56 Q 40 (Iain Walsh)
57 Q 40 (Lindsey Whyte)
58 Q 169 (Professor James Sefton)
59 Q 39 (Lindsey Whyte)
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56. Since 2001/02 government gross debt has risen from 33.7 per cent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 85.4 per cent of GDP in 2017/18.60 The 
Government has not quantified to what extent this additional spending is 
investment meant to benefit future generations. Investment in generational 
modelling of its policies would allow the Government to better differentiate 
where it is investing in the future and where it is unjustly passing on debt to 
future generations who will not benefit from its spending. Michael Johnson 
suggested that the Government should produce Intergenerational Impact 
Assessments to accompany draft legislation which “explicitly quantify the 
extent to which costs are being deferred” onto future taxpayers.61
57. Frank Field suggested that the reason for the lack of data on intergenerational 
fairness was a lack of political will.62 The reliance on external academics 
to analyse income and wealth distribution data, as well as a reluctance to 
publish existing Treasury analysis suggests that it is not a political priority. 
This low priority can also be seen in the Government’s reliance on external 
organisations to develop generational accounting rather than working to 
develop their own models.
58. The Treasury must do more to generate and publish data on 
intergenerational fairness. It can immediately begin by producing a 
distributional breakdown of the effects of each budget by age group 
using the static models it already has. It should invest in developing 
its capacity to model the generational effects of tax and benefits 
policies.
59. The Government should create Intergenerational Impact 
Assessments for all draft legislation indicating how it will affect 
different generations.
60 Office for national Statistics, ‘UK government debt and deficit: September 2018’: https://
www.ons.gov.uk /economy/governmentpubl icsectorandtaxes /publ icspending / bul let ins /
ukgovernmentdebtanddef icit foreurostatmaast /september2018#how-much-is-the-general-
government-gross-debt [accessed 14 February 2019]
61 Written evidence from Michael Johnson (IFP0074)
62 Q 109 (Frank Field MP)
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CHAPTER 3: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE
The rising cost of housing
60. One major pressure that younger generations are facing is increased housing 
costs. As Figure 1 shows, the two youngest generations are devoting a greater 
proportion of their overall income to housing than previous generations. 
People born between 1981 and 2000 appear to be spending over one and a 
half times more, as a proportion of their income, on housing at the age of 25 
than the generation born immediately after the Second World War spent at 
that age. For previous generations, housing costs as a proportion of income 
have declined as individuals enter their 30s, but it is unclear whether this 
latest generation will experience a similar decline.
Figure 1: Proportion of income spent on housing costs by generations: 
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Source: Intergenerational Commission, Home Affront: Housing across the generations (September 2017) p 31: 
https://www.intergencommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Home-Affront.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
61. This increase in housing costs as a proportion of income does not appear to 
be caused by younger generations choosing to spend more to prioritise living 
space. The amount of floor space per person for those under 45 has fallen 
63 note: Income and housing costs both include housing benefit. Incomes and housing costs are assumed 
to be shared equally within households. Figures for each generation are derived from a weighted 
average of estimates by single year of age for each single-year birth cohort within that generation, 
generations are included if at least given birth years are present in the data. The graph is formed of 
Resolution Foundation analysis of data from Institute for Fiscal Studies Households Below Average 
Income (Family Expenditure Survey), covering 1961 to 1991, and data from Department of Work 
and Pensions, Households Below Average Income (Family Resources Survey) covering 1994–95 to 
2015–16.
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over the last 20 years whilst the amount for those over 45 has risen. nor is it 
the case that younger generations are paying more to live closer to work. For 
the cohorts for which there are data, each cohort has had longer commutes 
than the generation before them had at their age.64
62. The relationship between generations and the proportion they spend on 
housing changes slightly if households are differentiated by tenure. In the 
private rented sector younger generations have a larger income gap with 
previous generations than the overall picture in Figure 1, with private renters 
born 1981–2000 paying 35 per cent of their income at 25 whilst private renters 
born just after the Second World War were paying just over 15 per cent of 
their income at 25. Mortgage holders in younger generations were paying 
similar amounts to mortgage holders born just after the Second World War 
at 25. This is mainly due to lower interest rates. This could change if interest 
rates rise.65 Older generations who owned at a young age had a more difficult 
experience than younger generations who own today. Owners from older 
generations faced higher interest rates and for some the experience of negative 
equity. However, there are fewer home owners in younger generations than 
those that came before, as seen from Figure 2.
Figure 2: Generational home ownership rates by age: UK66
(1926-1945)
(1966-1980)
(1981-2000)
(1946-1965)
(1911-1925)
(1896-1910)
(1881-1895)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Intergenerational Commission, Home Affront: Housing across the generations (September 2017) p 13: https://www.
intergencommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Home-Affront.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
64 Home Affront: Housing across the generations, p 48–52
65 Home Affront: Housing across the generations, p 33–37. The picture in the social rented sector is more 
complicated and depends on how housing benefit is treated.
66 note: figures for each generation are derived from a weighted average of estimates by single year of age 
for each single-year birth cohort within that generation, generations are included if at least five birth 
years are present in the data. The graph is formed of Resolution Foundation analysis of data from the 
Family Expenditure Survey covering 1961–1983 and data from the Labour Force Survey covering 
1984–2017.
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63. There have been many social and economic changes between generations 
that could delay buying a house. Younger generations are entering the labour 
market later, are less likely to live with a partner and are having children 
later, all of which could delay the decision to buy; conversely, they could 
themselves be delayed by housing costs. Adjusting for these demographic 
differences does account for some of the home ownership differences between 
generations, but there remains a large difference between home ownership 
rates.67
64. The Intergenerational Foundation highlighted that this difference in home 
ownership has “huge implications for intergenerational equity”. House price 
rises across the country, especially in London and the South East, benefited 
home owners whilst young adults “must either buy or rent their housing in 
an over-inflated housing market or live with their parents for much longer 
than was considered usual by previous generations.”68 There has been some 
innovation in offering new models to tackle the housing crisis, such as 
Homeshare and the rent a room scheme.69 Age UK told us that whilst these 
schemes may be helpful for some, they are small scale and should not be seen 
as comprehensive solutions.70
65. A decline in homeownership is partly due to house prices being inflated by 
monetary policy. Quantitative easing and low interest rates have reduced the 
returns to saving and have increased the price of assets like housing.71 This is 
a destabilising factor that will need careful attention. But, whilst a tightening 
of monetary policy might reduce house prices, it would not necessarily reduce 
the cost of housing (as mortgage costs would rise).
Housing supply
66. We heard compelling arguments that the rise in housing costs and 
the decline in ownership is caused by a reduction in housing supply. 
Dr Kristian niemietz told us that housing is the cause of many of the UK’s 
social and economic problems and this housing problem is caused by a lack 
of supply. He stated that since 1980 house prices in the UK have risen by a 
factor of 3.5 in real terms which makes the UK an outlier in international 
comparisons.72 Dr niemietz said that these price increases in the UK result 
from building fewer new homes than in comparable countries for four 
decades. Professor Christian Hilber, Professor of Economic Geography 
at the London School of Economics (LSE), told us that the underlying 
problem was that supply constraints “have become extremely binding 
over the last couple of decades.”73 The TaxPayers’ Alliance suggested that 
different balances in supply against demand explain the regional differences 
in housing affordability.74 It stated that in London, floor space per person is 
falling and the average number of people per dwelling is rising, whilst the 
opposite is happening in much of the country.
67 Home Affront: Housing across the generations, p 16–17
68 Written evidence from the Intergenerational Foundation (IFP0042)
69 HM Government, ‘Rent a room in your home’: https://www.gov.uk/rent-room-in-your-home/the-
rent-a-room-scheme [accessed 7 March 2019], written evidence from Shared Lives Plus (IFP0015)
70 Written evidence from Age UK (IFP0047)
71 Q 31 (Ian Mulheirn and Paul Johnson)
72 Written evidence from Dr Kristian niemietz (IFP0003)
73 Q 132 (Professor Christian Hilber)
74 Written evidence from the TaxPayers’ Alliance (IFP0069)
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67. The Rt Hon The Lord Forsyth, Chair of the House of Lords Economic 
Affairs Committee, told us that the principal issue that needed to be tackled 
in the housing market was the need to build more affordable, social homes 
and the lack of government action needed to ensure that this happens.75 
The Government’s evidence stated that “successive governments have not 
built enough homes, and the Government acknowledges that for many 
people today, the housing market does not work.”76 It has committed to 
delivering 300,000 homes a year by the middle of the next decade. However, 
as Lord Forsyth told us, it is not clear that the Government’s proposed 
measures will reach this target. Dr niemietz suggested that current house 
prices are “predicated on the (implicit) assumption that the Government 
will not address the causes of the housing crisis, and that house prices and 
rents will continue to rise.” He suggested that once this assumption is no 
longer held prices could begin to fall.77
Figure 3: Trends in tenure (proportions), 1980 to 2017–18
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68. Figure 3 shows the proportion of households living in different tenures. 
Whilst home ownership has declined over the last decade (falling from a 
peak of 70.7 per cent in 2005 to 63.5 per cent in 2017–18) and the private 
rental sector has increased in size (rising from a low of nine per cent in 1992 
to 19.5 per cent in 2017–18), the largest change has been the large fall in the 
number of social renters (falling from 31.7 per cent in 1981 to 17.0 per cent 
in 2017–18). A substantial part of this was the result of tenants in the 1980s 
exercising their right to buy their homes.
69. Dr Rory Coulter told us that in the long-term “there is a pressing need 
to build more housing for low-cost and secure social renting tenancies.”78 
The Peabody Trust stated that since 2010, the “construction rate on social 
75 Q 113 (Lord Forsyth of Drumlean)
76 Written evidence from HM Government (IFP0058)
77 Written evidence from Dr Kristian niemietz (IFP0003)
78 Written evidence from Dr Rory Coulter (IFP0019)
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housing has dropped by 97 per cent with projections estimating a loss of 
370,000 social homes over the next three years.” It suggested that social rented 
stock “is being sold off into the private rented sector and not being replaced 
like for like.”79 London Councils suggested that a “chronic undersupply of 
social housing is a key factor” in the housing crisis in London. It argued 
that the country has not built a substantial amount of social housing since 
the late 1960s, when social housing made up almost half of the total supply. 
London Councils argued that due to central government’s “erosion of local 
authority budgets, and the borrowing cap on housing revenue accounts 
(HRA), councils have little scope to invest in social housing on the scale 
required.”80 During the course of our inquiry the Government has made 
progress on this by abolishing the HRA cap that controls local authority 
borrowing for house building.81 However, this will not by itself solve this 
problem, and will not help those local authorities which do not have an HRA.
70. Age UK told us how the lack of adequate housing supply affected different 
age groups:
“The general lack of housing supply particularly affects younger people 
although there is also a need for a wider range of affordable housing 
options for older people. A major obstacle to downsizing (or ‘rightsizing’) 
is the lack of affordable, suitable housing options in preferred locations, 
with access to good transport links and key services. … However, despite 
housing policies that have benefited older owner-occupiers there is an 
uneven distribution of housing wealth within this population. Older 
people living in areas with high property values, especially in London, 
the South East, and larger cities have more options to either downsize or 
release home equity. Older people living in parts of the Midlands, north 
East, north West, Scotland and northern Ireland have fewer options 
because of lower property values”.82
71. The Centre for Ageing Better suggested that the problem of supply should 
not just be thought of as relating to young people. It states that “the biggest 
increase in demand for housing over the coming decades will be among older 
adults.” The Centre for Ageing Better suggested that as the proportion of 
older households increases, “so too will the proportion of the population 
with disability, accessibility and mobility requirements.” It highlights that 
most existing housing stock “does not meet the needs of people as they get 
frailer.”83
72. The supply of adequate housing is clearly a key issue for intergenerational 
fairness. This impacts young people through rising housing costs and 
impacts older people through a lack of suitable housing.84
73. The Government is not taking the action needed to ensure that there 
is a sufficient supply of affordable housing. In particular, action needs 
to be taken to substantially increase the supply of social housing. One 
means of doing this is to ease the ability of local authorities to borrow 
to fund housing building. This lack of action on housing is primarily 
79 Written evidence from the Peabody Trust (IFP0023)
80 Written evidence from London Councils (IFP0029)
81 Budget 2018, p 62
82 Written evidence from Age UK (IFP0047)
83 Written evidence from the Centre for Ageing Better (IFP0049)
84 The Government’s announcements in the Spring Statement do not alter this conclusion.
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hurting younger generations. However, younger generations can be 
helped by building more housing which is accessible and adaptable 
for older generations as part of a wider increase in supply.
The private rented sector
74. The private rented sector is growing but this is not necessarily by choice as 
most people still want to own their home. The Intergenerational Foundation 
told us that 79 per cent of non-home owners aged between 20 and 45 would 
like to own one day, although 39 per cent said that they did not think they 
would ever be able to afford it.85
75. We asked witnesses to name their top priority for government action to 
improve intergenerational fairness and a large number suggested improving 
conditions in the private rented sector. Ian Mulheirn, then Director of 
Consulting at Oxford Economics, suggested that the single biggest thing that 
the Government has the greatest power over is the difference of experience 
in renting against owning property. He stated that the “insecurity of tenure 
faced by younger people in the private rented sector is a world away from 
ownership”.86 Douglas McWilliams, Deputy Chairman of the Centre for 
Economics and Business Research (Cebr), told us that although people want 
flexibility when they rent, one of the biggest fears of young people is their 
uncertainty of tenure. He suggested that anything that could be done to 
increase their certainty without removing the rights of a landlord would be a 
good thing.87 Professor Sue Heath, Professor of Sociology at the University 
of Manchester, stated that the increasing pressure to move into owner-
occupation is partly driven by the conditions of insecurity experienced 
by younger adults. She said that improving the private rental sector was a 
priority for her students.88 Paul Broadhead, Head of Mortgage Policy at the 
Building Societies Association, suggested that the reason that people took 
out unwise interest-only mortgages without any way of securing repayments 
was because it “was the only way they could get security of tenure.”89
76. The Intergenerational Foundation told us that people in private renting 
move far more often than in other tenures. In 2013/14 one in four private 
renters moved home compared to only five per cent of social renters and 
three per cent of owner occupiers. This is a particular problem in London 
where 37 per cent of private renters had moved three or more times in the 
past five years.90
77. Professor Karen Rowlingson highlighted the effect that insecurity in the 
private rented sector has on younger generations, particularly those with 
families. She stated that families “can be asked to leave their homes with 
two months’ notice and have to move away from schools and friends to find 
alternative accommodation”.91 The Intergenerational Foundation told us 
that a quarter of families now live in the private rented sector.92 Children 
who move home more frequently do less well in school and if they move 
85 Written evidence from the Intergenerational Foundation (IFP0042)
86 Q 37 (Ian Mulheirn)
87 Q 159 (Douglas McWilliams)
88 Q 159 (Professor Sue Heath)
89 Q 159 (Paul Broadhead)
90 Written evidence from the Intergenerational Foundation (IFP0042)
91 Written evidence from Professor Karen Rowlingson (IFP0026)
92 Written evidence from the Intergenerational Foundation (IFP0042)
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often whilst very young can miss out on key vaccinations.93 Some adults 
are delaying the decision to have children due to living in the private rental 
sector. The Intergenerational Foundation stated that 47 per cent of 20–45 
year olds did not believe it was right to have children until they owned their 
own home. It suggested that:
“The reason why renting privately in England is so unstable is because 
tenants enjoy virtually zero legal protection from being evicted if they 
are renting under the Assured Shorthold Tenancy (AST) agreements 
which predominate within the private rented sector, which usually last 
for either 6 or 12 months. Landlords are free to increase the rent each 
time an AST gets renewed, and can seek a court order to have a tenant 
evicted for no legal reason (even if the tenant isn’t in rent arrears) as long 
as they have lived in the property for a total of more than six months. 
This is completely different to the situation in Ireland and most other 
European countries which have large private rented sectors, where 
tenants enjoy greater protection from eviction.”94
78. It found that 57 per cent of 20–45 year olds also believed that they would 
not be able to retire if they were still renting.95 Age UK told us that they are 
concerned about the increasing number of older people living in the private 
rented sector. It stated that nine per cent of households in the private rented 
sector are over 65 but that this could increase to a million households by 
2035–36.96 The Centre for Ageing Better told us that the private rented 
sector has the highest proportion of poor quality housing and this affects the 
wellbeing of older renters by increasing their risk of falls and exacerbating 
existing health conditions.97
79. Members of our Contact Group expressed many of the same concerns as 
in our formal evidence. They told us that they were faced with low quality 
housing that was often unaffordable and insecure, with the threat of possible 
eviction constantly hanging over them.
80. The Government is taking a number of steps to try and improve the private 
rented sector. It has supported the new creation of the new Tenant Fees Act 
2019, which bans letting fees paid by tenants, and the Fitness for Human 
Habitation Act 2018 which ensures minimum safety requirements.98 The 
Government recently consulted on the barriers to longer tenancies and 
proposed creating a new minimum three-year model tenancy but has yet to 
publish a response to this consultation.99
81. Increased regulation of the private rented sector could result in fewer 
landlords entering or remaining in the market. This is especially the case for 
small landlords who let only one property and may require greater flexibility. 
93 ‘Moving home can affect your children’s health and education’, The Conversation (26 August 2016): 
https://theconversation.com/moving-home-can-affect-your-childrens-health-and-education-62738 
[accessed 28 January 2019]
94 Written evidence from the Intergenerational Foundation (IFP0042)
95 Ibid.
96 Written evidence from Age UK (IFP0047)
97 Written evidence from the Centre for Ageing Better (IFP0049)
98 Written evidence from HM Government (IFP0058)
99 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Overcoming the Barriers to Longer Tenancies 
in the Private Rented Sector (July 2018): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/721556/PRS_Longer_Tenancies_Consultation.pdf [accessed 28 
January 2019]
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nonetheless, while policy needs to be sensitive to those risks, there is need 
for further reform.
82. The Government’s proposed reforms do not create a regulatory 
framework that will provide private tenants the security they need. 
This particularly affects young people who are unable to buy and 
becomes a greater problem as they age. Change is needed so that 
renters who want a long-term secure tenancy can find one.
Intergenerational transfers and financial products
83. Although younger generations have faced a more difficult housing market 
than previous generations, they are also receiving greater support from 
older generations. Douglas McWilliams told us that their survey found that 
increasing numbers of young people are receiving support from relatives in 
buying a house. Its research found that as of April 2018, 316,000 properties 
were purchased that year with help from an older generation, representing 27 
per cent of all purchases. The average contribution was between £5,000 and 
£6,000.100 Paul Broadhead told us that close to 60 per cent of first-time buyers 
expected to need some help from family members.101 nigel Keohane, SMF’s 
Director of Research, explained to us that whilst there was evidence that 
older generations were increasingly helping with deposits, intergenerational 
transfers often went beyond this:
“Most of the assistance is for helping people cope day to day. Some of 
that would be paying the rent, some would be paying the bills, some of it 
would be cash payments to the younger generation to help them get by. 
The second reason why that is important is because when we think about 
the bank of mum and dad we tend to think of quite affluent older people 
helping potentially reasonably affluent younger people. That is going 
on, but there is a lot of activity going on right across the socioeconomic 
spectrum. Looking at people in lower-skilled occupations, we did some 
analysis of government surveys and found about a third of those people 
there are giving regular financial support to the younger generation, to 
their children.”102
84. The SMF’s research finds that 23 per cent of familial financial assistance is 
to help cover the general costs of living, only seven per cent is to help buy 
a home and a similar proportion (six per cent) is to help pay for the costs 
of rent.103 Professor Karen Rowlingson told us that families are supporting 
each other by “giving significant financial gifts or loans; by providing 
accommodation directly; and/or helping with rent/mortgage payments”.104 
The national Pensioners Convention told us that some older members of 
working-class families were selling possessions or taking out loans to support 
younger generations.105
85. Another form that this financial support can take is through intergenerational 
financial products. Isobel Stephen, Housing Supply Director at the Ministry 
100 Q 152 (Douglas McWilliams)
101 Q 152 (Paul Broadhead)
102 Q 152 (nigel Keohane)
103 Social Market Foundation, Britain’s Family Bank: An examination of family financial support across the 
generations and its impact (September 2018) p 15: http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
Britains-Family-Bank-1.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
104 Written evidence from Professor Karen Rowlingson (IFP0026)
105 Written evidence from national Pensioners Convention (IFP0030)
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of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) explained the 
variety of products available. She told us that the market can be divided into 
three parts: equity release, interest-only mortgages and intergenerational 
mortgages. Equity release is where a relative can release some equity from 
their property which can be used to fund a deposit. no repayment is required 
until the property from which equity has been taken from is sold, but this 
tends to be expensive. Isobel Stephen stated that the “average amount of 
equity released is £60,000. There are about 37,000 of those mortgages taken 
out every year. The average age of the borrower is 70.”106 Equity release 
products are typically offered by insurance companies.
86. Interest-only mortgages for retired people were facilitated by a rule change 
by the Financial Conduct Authority last year. These allow the borrower to 
free up equity from their house that is repaid when the property is sold but 
in the intervening period the borrower makes monthly interest payments. 
However, Isobel Stephen told us that there “is a challenge for the lenders in 
pricing the risk in case somebody stops working or becomes ill and requires 
care.”107
87. An intergenerational mortgage is where a deposit is replaced or combined 
with a charge against a relative’s home or savings. Isobel Stephen gave the 
example of “a Barclays product where a first-time buyer can get 100 per cent 
loan to value on the property that they are buying if a relative deposits 10 
per cent of the value of the property in a Barclays bank account as collateral 
against the mortgage.”108
88. There is a growing market of intergenerational mortgage products in response 
to the increasing difficulty that younger generations face in accessing 
affordable housing. Paul Broadhead told us that the equity release market in 
2017 was approximately £3 billion with around a quarter of that being used 
to help family with housing, either to buy or rent.109 Douglas McWilliams 
told us that equity release is only 14 per cent of the funding from the so called 
“Bank of Mum and Dad” to help younger generations afford a deposit. He 
told us that seven per cent of the funding comes from re-mortgaging and 
six per cent from taking out a loan.110 Paul Broadhead explained to us that 
the increase in joint purchases with family members alongside guarantor 
mortgages were not necessarily helping those who would not otherwise be 
able to buy but were instead helping people to buy earlier than they otherwise 
would have been able to.111
89. Care & Repair England warned us that six per cent of older households 
rent privately and 18 per cent live in social housing, so reliance on older 
generations to help younger generations to owner occupation would exacerbate 
inequalities between families and others.112 nigel Keohane suggested to us 
the role that intergenerational financial products could play:
“It seems to me from a societal perspective we are not worried about 
people who do not own homes because they do not have that equity to 
release; we are not really worried about the people who have got a lot a 
106 Q 96 (Isobel Stephen)
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Q 153 (Paul Broadhead)
110 Q 153 (Douglas McWilliams)
111 Q 154 (Paul Broadhead)
112 Written evidence from Care & Repair England (IFP0020)
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financial wealth because they can give cash. We are worried about the 
middle section of the population who may have housing wealth, but only 
a modest amount of financial wealth. It probably would not be in their 
interests for them to dispense with all their financial wealth because 
that would potentially cause them problems further down the line. That 
seems to be the target group.”113
90. nigel Keohane suggested that this target group could be helped by a guarantor 
mortgage to use their own property as collateral for younger generations. He 
suggested that equity release was a less desirable product as it has substantially 
higher interest rates than mortgage products.114 Paul Broadhead explained 
that another reason why there was increasing innovation within financial 
products was that the sector was entering a better regulatory environment. 
He told us that between the financial crisis in 2007/08 and 2015 the sector 
had been using the money it would usually invest in innovation on complying 
with new regulation. There was more innovation taking place now.
91. Intergenerational transfers play an important role in housing 
affordability for many members of younger generations. There is a 
need for innovative, flexible products which can help address this 
issue. The Government and the Financial Conduct Authority have a 
key role to play in ensuring a regulatory framework that encourages 
new challenger entrants to these markets, who can shake up the 
existing playing field.
92. Paul Broadhead suggested that one thing holding back the ability of younger 
generations to obtain mortgages was the Bank of England’s requirements on 
mortgage providers. He told us that the Bank of England’s rules effectively 
mean that “mortgage lenders stress-test that people can afford mortgages at 
around seven per cent to eight per cent over five years.” He argued that we 
are unlikely to see interest rates that high in the near future and that people 
were stuck living in rented accommodation because of the way the stress 
test is done.115 However, careful consideration would have to be given as to 
what level of financial risk it is wise to expose younger generations and the 
economy as a whole to.
93. Ian Mulheirn told us policymakers can trade financial stability for higher 
home ownership rates by allowing for very high loan-to-value rates at scale, 
but that this was not a good idea.116 In the absence of financial instability he 
suggested that direct government support is necessary to increase the supply 
of affordable housing.
Development of public sector land
94. One way in which the Government can support increasing supply of 
affordable housing is by making better use of the land that it already owns. 
This was one of the issues addressed in the House of Lords Economic Affairs 
Committee’s report on Building more homes.117 It recommended that a senior 
cabinet minister should be responsible for identifying and coordinating the 
release of public land for housing, with a particular focus on providing low 
cost homes. The evidence we received also suggested that the use of public 
113 Q 154 (nigel Keohane)
114 Ibid.
115 Q 158 (Paul Broadhead)
116 Q 31 (Ian Mulheirn)
117 Economic Affairs Committee, Building more homes (1st Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 20)
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land is an under-used lever in providing more affordable homes. We heard 
that the lack of competence within Government to manage the land it owns 
undermines its ability to make the best use of it to tackle the housing crisis.
95. Julian McCrae, Senior Adviser to the International School for Government 
at King’s College London, told us that the idea of using public land “was 
an old perennial of what Governments try to look at and find value from.” 
He said that civil servants had been asked to do this since at least the 1970s 
but there had been little progress from these efforts. The one area that he 
identified where progress had been made was in the management of the part 
of the government estate on and around Whitehall since 2010. He told us 
that the difference was that there had been a much more information-led 
approach looking at utilisation rates to understand what property was needed 
and what could be disposed of. The key to this approach was investment in 
acquiring the knowledge and the capability to use that knowledge. He told us 
that in “that relatively small part … of the government property [port]folio, 
we have the capability to manage things properly.”118 When we questioned 
Kit Malthouse MP, the Minister of State for Housing, we were not persuaded 
that the Government had that capability to manage public land. He stated 
that although all departments should have a list of the land that they own 
or is owned by subsidiaries, he could not “speak for all departments as to 
whether it is completely accurate or not”.119
96. There is some evidence of government activity to improve this capability. 
The Government’s public sector land disposal programme had sold land 
with capacity for 13,817 homes by September 2016 and had identified land 
for disposal for a further 131,675 homes.120 It released a new Government 
Estate Strategy in July 2018121 and has developed an online government 
property and land finder tool122 which allows the public to find public land 
to rent, buy or to contest its current use. However, this tool does not include 
all public land and is symptomatic of the Government’s approach. It has the 
right idea in wishing to use public land to help tackle the housing crisis but 
is not investing enough to be most effective. It is inadequate to the pace and 
level needed and the scale of publicly owned land.
97. The Government has failed to manage properly the land which it 
owns. It should invest in developing a central government capability 
to understand fully what land public bodies own, how public sector 
bodies use that land and where it can be disposed of.
98. A further limitation on the use of public land is the requirement that it must be 
disposed of at market value. Tom Kenny, the Acting Deputy Head of Policy 
and Research from the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) told us that 
this could be a key way in which local authorities can meet social needs in 
their area.123 The Government recently consulted on giving local authorities 
broader powers to dispose of local authority land at less than market value 
118 Q 173 (Julian McCrae)
119 Q 204 (Kit Malthouse MP)
120 Supplementary written evidence from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 
(IFP0066)
121 Cabinet Office, Government Estate Strategy (July 2018): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/738217/Government_Strategy_Final_
AW_v2.pdf [accessed 28 January 2019]
122 HM Government, ‘Find government property and land to rent or buy’: https://www.gov.uk/find-
government-property [accessed 28 January 2019]
123 Q 124 (Tom Kenny)
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when there are wider public benefits, without seeking specific consent from 
the Secretary of State. However, this would still not dramatically alter the 
balance of power and force more public land to be used to provide affordable 
housing and would not affect public land owned by any public body other 
than local authorities. We asked witnesses about radically shifting the balance 
of power so that local authorities lead the process and the onus would shift 
onto public bodies to object or develop the land themselves. Tom Kenny told 
us that the RTPI “would certainly welcome local authorities taking a bigger 
role in proactively planning to meet the needs in their areas.”124
99. When we put this suggestion to the Minister, he suggested that a negotiated 
outcome between local authorities and other bodies would be more 
productive but failed to provide any reason why this would be the case.125 
This negotiated approach has not produced stellar results to date; it is 
time to think more radically about public land. This failure should be seen 
within the wider context of other land with planning permission not being 
developed. The Government should look more widely at how to ensure land 
with planning permission is built on and brought to market more quickly, 
but specific action is needed on public land. Local authorities already have 
the ability to apply for planning permission on public land, but they lack the 
power to ensure that development takes place.
100. In order to increase housing supply, local authorities should be given 
a presumption to develop on land owned by public sector bodies. 
Local authorities should be empowered to ensure that development 
on public land takes place.
Box 1: Proposed reform of public land development
If a local authority includes public land within its local plan or in a supplementary 
planning document, then the public authority which owns that land should have 
six months to submit plans for developing it. In the absence of a response, the 
local authority should be able to grant itself planning permission in the normal 
way, where the landowner would have the opportunity to make representations 
at the Planning Committee.
If permission is granted, then the matter should be remitted directly to the 
Secretary of State, who would only be able to decline on the basis of non-
planning concerns, such as national security or public health and would be 
obliged to lay a report before Parliament stating the details of these concerns. 
If the Secretary of State upholds the permission, then the public land owner 
should have a limited period in which to show a clear intent to execute on the 
plan. In the absence of this clear intent then the local authority may appoint 
developers to deliver the plan.
The capacity of local authorities to deal with planning issues
101. Much of the Government’s strategy for delivering more houses relies on 
local authorities’ ability to plan effectively for their local areas. The Minister 
told us that he did not believe central government should develop housing 
forecasting capacity for the future needs of different generations. He 
suggested that local authorities “are best placed to be able to make decisions 
124 Q 125 (Tom Kenny)
125 Q 204 (Kit Malthouse MP)
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about the formulation of housing in their area … and deciding through their 
plans what type of housing they think they need in their particular area.”126
102. Whilst the Minister acknowledged that forecasting would be “quite difficult” 
for central government, he expected local authorities to be able to do so. 
Given central government’s difficulties in developing robust modelling 
for future generations (as discussed in Chapter 2) this seems to be overly 
optimistic. When the Minister was pressed on how the Government was 
ensuring there was sufficient suitable housing for older generations, he 
told us that there was “a plan-led approach from local authorities.”127 He 
expected local authorities to develop a land supply that could be used for the 
following 10 years in order to be able to remove planning permission from 
uncooperative developers.128
103. Alongside this the Government has made it more difficult for local authorities 
to plan for their local area by introducing additional permitted development 
rights, where developers can bypass part or all of the planning permission 
processes in certain circumstances such as converting office space into 
housing.129 Setting aside the economic impact of lost office space in some 
areas, the inability of councils to control the use of such developments means 
that there is no way in which they can be made to comply with local need, for 
example, in new appropriate, affordable housing for younger people or older 
people.
104. Tom Kenny told us that local authorities were struggling to deliver the 
housing that their local area wanted. He suggested that a lack of resources 
and expertise were a problem for local authorities. Tom Kenny said that 
local authorities were losing through attrition by not being able to compete 
with the resources that developers could put in to viability negotiations.130 
The Government nationally set limits on the basic fee for planning services, 
but local authorities can perform additional fee-generating activity. Between 
2010/11 and 2017/18, there was a 37.9 per cent fall in net current real 
expenditure in real terms on planning functions by local authorities. However, 
once income generated from sales, fees and charges or transfers from other 
public authorities are included, the fall in spending was 14.6 per cent from 
£1.125 billion to £961 million.131 The Minister told us that planning fees 
had increased by 20 per cent but did suggest that “if it becomes clear that 
capacity in planning departments is a brake on development, we will have to 
look at that again.” The nAO has reported that:
“The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (the 
Department) has little oversight of how local authorities generate income 
from planning. It does not collect information on the extent of planning 
performance agreements, or how much income they are generating 
… The Department required local authorities to commit to spend the 
additional resource within their planning teams, but the Department 
126 Q 193 (Kit Malthouse MP)
127 Q 196 (Kit Malthouse MP)
128 Q 199 (Kit Malthouse MP)
129 The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 
(SI 2015/596)
130 Q 129 (Tom Kenny)
131 national Audit Office, Planning for new homes (February 2019) p 11: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/Planning-for-new-homes.pdf [accessed 11 February 2019]
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has not performed detailed checks as to whether local authorities have 
spent the additional income generated on planning.”132
105. The Minister also raised the fact that capacity could be a problem for local 
authorities as they may occasionally need “a level of expertise and a senior 
planner which it would not necessarily have on a day-to-day basis.” His 
preferred solution for this was to pool that central expertise so that it could 
be shared between local authorities.133 The nAO’s investigation into the 
planning system found that the Department did not understand the extent 
of the skills shortages and only has “patchy” data on staff numbers.134
106. The Government should give powers to local authorities to set their 
own planning fees up to cost. Local authorities should ensure that 
additional fees are retained by planning departments.
Housing for older generations
107. Gareth Lyon, Head of Policy and Communications at the 
Associated Retirement Community Operators (ARCO) told us that the 
UK had much lower levels of people living in retirement communities than 
comparable countries. He stated that in “Australia, new Zealand and the 
US, between five per cent and six per cent of older people live in retirement 
communities. In the UK, that figure is 0.5 per cent to 0.6 per cent.”135 One 
positive feature of retirement communities is that they reduce overall care 
costs:
“The cost of providing lower level social care in a Retirement Community 
has been found to be £1,222 (17.8 per cent) less per person per year 
than providing the same level of care in the wider community. The cost 
of providing higher level social care has been found to be £4,556 (26 
per cent) less per person per year. nHS costs reduce by 38 per cent 
for those moving into Retirement Communities, an average saving of 
£1,114.94 per person per year. This relates to GP visits, nurse visits, and 
hospital visits.”136
108. One problem that stops more retirement communities from being created 
is the inconsistency of planning use class assigned to them. Care homes 
are classified as C2 whilst regular houses are classified as C3. Properties 
classified as C2 can face fewer planning restrictions as to where they are 
built and have fees waived.137 ARCO states:
“There is a large body of case law and precedent confirming that genuine 
housing-with-care schemes often fall within the C2 use class, as they 
are capable of delivering high levels of care to older people. However, 
there is much confusion and inconsistency between different councils’ 
approaches to specialist older people’s housing-with care in terms of 
what Use Class such specialist accommodation falls within.”138
132 Planning for new homes, p 39
133 Q 201 (Kit Malthouse MP)
134 Planning for new homes, p 41
135 Q 122 (Gareth Lyon)
136 Written evidence from ARCO (IFP0014)
137 Harrison Clark Rickerbys Solicitors, ‘C3 or not C3? Planning use classes for retirement housing’ 
(november 2016): https://www.hcrlaw.com/blog/c3-not-c3-planning-use-classes-retirement-housing/ 
[accessed 28 January 2019]
138 Written evidence from ARCO (IFP0014)
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109. Age UK presented a slightly different case, stating that “the debate around 
whether there should be reforms to planning gain rules to incentivise 
retirement developments is finely balanced, and it can be argued they should 
make a reasonable contribution to affordable homes for lower income groups 
and community infrastructure costs, especially developments at the top end 
of the market.” It suggests instead that there should be a focus on a wider 
range of housing options for older people, including properties built to higher 
accessibility standards and encouraging the development of integrated age 
friendly homes and communities that bring younger and older generations 
together.139 On our visit to Doncaster we saw the positive effect that extra 
care housing can have by offering somewhere that can provide care whilst 
still helping residents remain part of the local community. As these facilities 
can provide care it is not clear why they are not more consistently classified 
for the basis of planning in the same use case as care providers. In the long-
term, as ARCO recommends,140 it may make sense for them to have their 
own specialised planning use case.
110. The Government should issue guidance clarifying that extra care 
retirement communities fall within the C2 use class as they are 
capable of delivering high levels of care to older people and so should 
be treated as the same planning use class as care homes.
Planning for each generation
111. Different age groups can have differing housing needs and it is important for 
these to be considered. ARCO told us that currently only 11 per cent of Local 
Plans in England and Wales have specific policies to address older people’s 
housing needs, with only four per cent of plans including land allocations 
for housing for older people. This is despite the expectation that 30 per cent 
of the population will be over 65 by 2036.141 The Minister told us that two 
thirds of local planning authorities have no older people’s accommodation in 
their local plan. However, he stated that under the national Planning Policy 
Framework, local authorities are supposed to consider the needs of older 
people in their area and that this had not happened yet because we “are in a 
transition phase on planning.”142 The national Planning Policy Framework 
specifies that:
“the size, type and tenure of housing needed for different groups in 
the community should be assessed and reflected in planning policies 
(including, but not limited to, those who require affordable housing, 
families with children, older people, students, people with disabilities, 
service families, travellers, people who rent their homes and people 
wishing to commission or build their own homes).”143
112. The Minister suggested that as plans are submitted to inspectors they will 
be assessed on whether they have a sound evidence base.144 However, he 
did not state that a failure to consider the needs of older people would lead 
to inspectors rejecting the local plan. It is too early to say whether the new 
139 Written evidence from Age UK (IFP0047)
140 Written evidence from ARCO (IFP0014)
141 Ibid.
142 Q 196 (Kit Malthouse MP)
143 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, National Planning Policy Framework, CP 48, 
February 2019, p 17: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/779764/nPPF_Feb_2019_web.pdf [accessed 4 April 2019]
144 Q 196 (Kit Malthouse MP)
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national Planning Policy Framework, updated in February 2019, with 
new guidance on this subject, will change this.145 Care & Repair England 
summarised the current state: “Planning policy and Building Regulations 
are currently failing to systematically address population ageing through 
building better homes that meet people’s needs across the lifecourse.”146 
Younger people’s needs are not currently explicitly considered as part of the 
framework.
113. Whilst it is important for the housing needs of different age groups to be 
considered, we do not believe that this should be done by creating separated 
housing for each group, but instead by creating mixed communities with 
housing that is appropriate for different ages. We heard from Simon Gallagher, 
Planning Director at MHCLG, that the Government is looking at how good 
design can help create mixed communities that will survive in the long-term 
because it generates engaged communities.147 Tom Kenny told us that by 
designing places that are suitable for older people, planners can create places 
that work better for people with young children and for disabled people as 
the same features help each group. He stated that:
“If we are going to create compact, appropriate-density mixed-use 
developments with good links to public transport, we need to make 
them adaptable so that they can be converted if need be. If we are going 
to build this type of housing, we should try to build it everywhere, and 
for everyone, because it is just better.”148
Planning for all ages requires including attractive and accessible public space 
and facilities, the importance of which we discuss in Chapter 6.
114. The Government should issue planning guidance to recommend 
that local plans consider the needs of younger people alongside the 
existing specified demographics.
115. The Government should ensure that local plans have specific policies 
to address the needs of younger and older people. If the new National 
Planning Policy Framework’s requirement that local authorities 
consider these issues does not achieve this, then the Government 
must take more direct action.
145 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, ‘Housing and economic needs assessment’: 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/housing-and-economic-development-needs-assessments [accessed 4 
April 2019]
146 Written evidence from Care & Repair England (IFP0020)
147 Q 99 (Simon Gallagher)
148 Q 127 (Tom Kenny)
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CHAPTER 4: EDUCATING GENERATIONS FOR THE 100-YEAR 
LIFE
116. One in three of today’s babies will live to see their 100th birthday.149 This 
stark demographic fact, whilst being a positive reflection of modern lifestyles 
and technology, has profound implications for our working lives. The 
three-stage model of life created in the 20th century of ‘education, work, 
retirement’ is no longer suitable with the prospect of careers that may span 
over 60 years.150 We need to think in much more multifaceted terms: more 
of us will have a multistage career, where we will need to frequently update 
what we are learning to make this possible. We are not adequately educating 
today’s young people for their longer working lives. Access is scarce to 
quality education and adequate funding outside of full-time undergraduate 
university education up to age 21. In the current system, too many young 
people do not get the right skills to start with and then, as they grow older, 
do not have access to the skills training they need to stay employable in a 
changing workplace. The Economist Intelligence Unit rated the UK tenth 
out of 50 economies in its ‘Worldwide Educating for the Future Index’, 
behind countries such as Canada, the netherlands, Germany and France.151
Education in schools
117. Young people face a range of financial decisions early on in life, for which 
they need to be adequately prepared. This matters on both a personal and 
societal scale: better informed citizens would be able to make informed 
financial decisions that support the functioning of the economy. Participants 
in our Contact Group also expressed a desire for a broader education for 
young people, including the non-academic skills they would need after 
leaving school. These concerns came from across the age ranges. We heard 
from Lewis Addlington-Lee, Deputy Chair of the British Youth Council, 
that young people want:
“a proper curriculum for life, by which I mean a curriculum that not 
only provides people with learning around the core subjects but teaches 
young people about things like mortgages and taxation and first aid.”152
118. The provision of financial education has been the source of much attention 
in recent years.153 It is not our wish to overburden schools, many of whose 
resources are already stretched to breaking point. Universities might seem 
149 Office for national Statistics, ‘What is my life expectancy and how might it change?’: https://www.
ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/articles/
whatismylifeexpectancyandhowmightitchange/2017–12-01 [accessed 15 January 2019]
150 Q 57 (Professor Andrew Scott)
151 The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The Worldwide Educating for the Future Index 2018: Building 
tomorrow’s global citizens’: https://educatingforthefuture.economist.com/ [accessed 20 March 2019]
152 Q 163 (Lewis Addlington-Lee)
153 The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Financial Education for Young People recommended 
strengthening school provision of financial education (APPG on Financial Education for Young 
People, Financial Education in Schools: Two Years On: Job Done? (May 2016) p 9: https://www.young-
enterprise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/APPG-on-Financial-Education-for-Young-People-
Final-Report-May-2016.pdf [accessed 3 April 2019]). The House of Lords Select Committee on 
Financial Exclusion devoted their attention to the issue of financial education in schools, and found it 
wanting. (Select Committee on Financial Exclusion, Tackling financial exclusion: A country that works 
for everyone? (Report of Session 2016–17, HL Paper 132). In november 2018, Martin Lewis OBE 
and the financial education charity Young Money published the first curriculum-mapped financial 
education textbook. This was supported, but not funded by the Government. All 3,400 state-funded 
schools in England received 100 free copies of the textbook.
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an obvious point in the lifecourse for this financial education, given that 
they already provide much practical careers advice and some pastoral care. 
However, this would exclude the 50 per cent of young people who do not go to 
university,154 whose routes through life immediately after leaving school are 
less clear. We believe that all young people should have some basic financial 
understanding before leaving school at age 16.
119. On our visit to Doncaster, we heard from young apprentices working 
with St Leger Homes that one of their key concerns was housing and 
homelessness. They told us that after leaving school they felt they did not 
know enough about how social renting and the private rental sector worked, 
or the options available if they had trouble affording housing. One of their 
key recommendations was that schools should do a better job of preparing 
young people to deal with the issue of housing when they enter the world 
of work. The Peabody Trust recommended “more housing education and 
awareness of welfare benefits and budgeting should be delivered within 
schools.” It suggested this could be designed by housing providers.155 Local 
authorities may also be well placed to follow best practice in distributing 
information about local services that can provide help should young people 
find themselves in an uncertain financial or housing situation.
120. The Minister of State for Apprenticeship and Skills, the Rt Hon 
Anne Milton MP, stated that some provision, both compulsory and optional, 
of financial education was available for schools, saying:
“Financial literacy is compulsory in schools … Schools can include 
teaching financial education in Personal, Social and Health Education 
(PSHE) if they want to. There are a number of online tools … ”156
121. Anne Milton’s statement that financial literacy is compulsory in schools needs 
some clarification. Financial education is currently split across the Maths 
and Citizenship curriculums, as well as within the non-statutory element 
of Personal, Social, Health and Economic (PSHE) education. Financial 
education is not compulsory in schools, but rather forms part of the national 
Curriculum as part of the non-statutory citizenship education taught in local 
authority-maintained schools, but not free schools or academies. Housing 
education could come within PSHE. However, the Government provides no 
standardised frameworks or programmes of study for PSHE and only sex 
and relationship education within the subject are statutory. We believe the 
financial aspects to be important, but we understand the risks of overload 
and that when there is resource pressure, the non-statutory elements are 
dropped first.
122. Anne Milton also told us that while Ofsted does not have to report on 
Citizenship, it does report on teaching and that Citizenship “is treated 
as equal to, the same as, any other subject in school.”157 A previous select 
committee found that subjects on which Ofsted do not report and are 
154 Department for Education, Participation Rates in Higher Education: Academic Years 2006/07–
2016/17 (September 2018) p 3: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/744087/Main_text_participation_rates_in_higher_education_2006_
to_2017_.pdf [accessed 4 January 2019]. The Higher Education Initial Participation Rate for 2016/17 
was 49.8 per cent.
155 Written evidence from Peabody Trust (IFP0023)
156 Q 220 (Anne Milton MP)
157 Q 221 (Anne Milton MP)
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not prioritised in school league tables tend to be neglected by schools.158 
Citizenship is therefore not treated in the same way as other subjects that are 
in the English Baccalaureate or subjects which Ofsted has a statutory duty 
to inspect, as the Minister suggested. Further to this, the House of Lords 
Communications Committee, in its report Growing up with the Internet, 
recommended “that the Government should make PSHE a statutory subject, 
inspected by Ofsted.”159 We endorse this recommendation.
123. Anne Milton told us she was more concerned about the number of young 
people leaving school without basic numeracy or literacy skills and that “29 
per cent of young people leave school without a good pass in English and 
Maths. Financial literacy only works if you can do a certain basic level of 
Maths.”160 Such longstanding failure to deliver basic skills does not excuse 
sending young people into an independent life improperly equipped.
124. Our intention is not to blame schools or overburden them with preparing 
students with a financial education. Qualifications in English and Maths 
must take precedence. However, we must not shy away from empowering 
young people to feel able to support themselves and their families by 
equipping them with financial and housing knowledge. Young people need 
to be able to make sound financial judgements and must have access to good, 
impartial advice. Otherwise, we risk raising generations of young people who 
do not understand basic financial processes, particularly those relating to 
housing and debt.
125. We understand that financial education may be a source of anxiety for 
teachers, who may not feel they have sufficient expertise in the subject to 
teach it adequately. The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Financial 
Education for Young People found that only 17 per cent of secondary school 
teachers have personally received, or are aware that a colleague has received, 
training or advice on teaching financial education, yet 58 per cent would like 
to receive more training in this area.161 Efforts need to be made to improve 
teacher confidence and skills in this area. Schools might look to the wider 
community to aid them with this. Organisations such as Citizens Advice, 
local employers and older volunteers may be well placed to engage with 
young people in schools. Where schools do not have the resources to train 
teachers in this area, local authorities might be well placed to provide them 
with information to signpost students to relevant advisory bodies.
126. The Government should ensure that young people are provided 
with sufficient education about housing and other practical finance 
matters before leaving school. The Government should make 
PSHE a statutory subject inspected by Ofsted. Increased housing 
and financial education within PSHE would be helpful. Local 
organisations should, where possible, be brought into schools to 
signpost young people to suitable financial education resources, 
including relevant advisory bodies.
158 Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement, The Ties that Bind: Citizenship and Civic 
Engagement in the 21st Century (Report of Session 2017–19, HL Paper 118)
159 Communications Committee, Growing up with the internet (2nd Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 
130)
160 Q 221 (Anne Milton MP)
161 APPG on Financial Education for Young People, Financial Education in Schools: Two Years On: Job 
Done? (May 2016) p 8: https://www.young-enterprise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/APPG-on-
Financial-Education-for-Young-People-Final-Report-May-2016.pdf [accessed 28 March 2019]
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Further Education
127. After school, the choices young people make about their education 
have a profound impact on the path their lifecourse will take. The 
Association of Colleges commented that spending is falling as a share of 
GDP and that “the root of the problem in state-funded education is public 
spending restraint at a time when demand and need is rising.”162 Research 
from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) concurs with this assessment on 
Further Education. They find that school sixth forms have faced budget cuts 
of 21 per cent per student since their peak in 2010/11 and Further Education 
colleges have seen a cut of eight per cent per student. They highlight that 
by 2019/20, funding per young person in Further Education will be around 
the same as in 2006/07: only 10 per cent higher than it was 30 years earlier 
in 1989/90. Spending per student in school sixth forms will be lower than 
at any one point since at least 2002. They also report that total funding for 
adult education and apprenticeships has fallen by 45 per cent since 2009/10.163 
Julian Gravatt, Deputy Chief Executive of the Association of Colleges, told 
us that the people losing out most as a result of these cuts are those “young 
adults who do not go to Higher Education, because the Government have 
found a solution to the funding of Higher Education, which is not really 
quite there for the other 50 per cent of the age group.”164
128. We have heard that undergraduate degrees have been allowed to dominate 
post-18 education. This might not be in students’ or the country’s best 
interest, and it has failed to create an effective market.165 Simon Kelleher, 
Head of Education and Skills at Policy gave young people who leave school 
with very few qualifications at a low level as an example of a challenge facing 
a particular group, where age intersects with other issues to compound 
damage.166
129. The complexity of Further Education pathways and funding demonstrates, 
at a practical level, the undervaluing of the sector compared with Higher 
Education. University students have a single point of access via the UCAS 
process, while Further Education students and apprentices must seek out 
and apply to several individual providers. Matthew Percival, Head of Group, 
Employment and Employee Relations at the CBI said that, “One of the 
main things that makes it difficult for people to progress and move up in the 
labour market is the absence of a ladder of the same strength on technical 
education as there is on academic qualifications.”167 Paul Johnson, Director 
at the IFS told us that his one recommendation to the Government would 
be looking at:
“ … young people going into the labour market who are not going 
through Higher Education. The more I look at this, the more angry 
it makes me. There is no clear route through, there are tiny numbers 
of higher-level apprenticeships for 18 year olds … A lot of them are 
funnelled into Higher Education where, actually, they may not get very 
162 Written evidence from Association of Colleges (IFP0044)
163 Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England (September 2018) 
pp 46–47: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/comms/R150.pdf [accessed 28 March 2019]
164 Q 57 (Julian Gravatt)
165 Written evidence from Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (IFP0061)
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much benefit, and a lot of them find it much easier to get a very low-
skilled job rather than to go into a career with appropriate training.”168
130. The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee’s Report, Treating Students 
Fairly: The Economics of Post-School Education, concluded that “Further 
Education is the poor relation to Higher Education and its position has 
been weakened and undermined by reductions to its budgets and a complex 
funding structure.”169 The Minister of State for Apprenticeships and Skills 
agreed that there is a long-enduring “intellectual snobbery” surrounding 
Further Education. We concur with the Minister’s and the House of Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee’s assessment that Further Education is 
undervalued by society; greater social value and respect should be accorded 
to those with practical skills. In Doncaster we spoke to young apprentices 
and participants on the St Leger Homes World of Work (WoW) programme, 
who had faced stiff competition in applying for their apprenticeships and were 
learning specialist trades such as roofing and engineering. They stressed the 
opportunity and self-esteem gained by having these skills. The value of such 
technical and craft skills cannot be overstated.
131. One specific form of Further Education is apprenticeships. There have been 
many changes in apprenticeship policy since 2015. The Association of Colleges 
stated that there “are good reasons for each individual change though 
negative consequences from some. Implementing several big changes at 
the same time has a disruptive impact in a cumulative way.”170 In 2015, 
the Government created a 2020 vision strategy for apprenticeships. This 
included the aspiration that apprenticeships would become “a high quality 
and prestigious route path to a successful career”171 available in all parts of 
the country, in all sectors and at all levels. These policy changes are detailed 
in Box 2 below.
168 Q 27 (Paul Johnson)
169 Q 59 (Julian Gravatt)
170 Written evidence from Association of Colleges (IFP0044)
171 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, English apprenticeships: Our 2020 vision (December 
2015) p 10: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/482754/BIS-15-604-english-apprenticeships-our-2020-vision.pdf [accessed 29 March 2019]
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Box 2: Changes in apprenticeship policy since 2015
The Apprenticeship Levy (2015)
Around 20,000 employers with payrolls above £3 million pay £2.6 billion a year 
to HMRC. This means that public spending on apprenticeships is now funded 
by a tax on employers rather than from general taxation.
Digital Apprenticeship Service (2016)
Levy paying employers can register on the Digital Apprenticeship Service 
(DAS) and access an account which allows them to allocate up to 110% of their 
levy payments and use these to commission apprenticeship training. Levy funds 
expire after 24 months. From April 2018, levy paying employers can transfer 
10% of their levy funds to another employer under certain conditions.
New apprenticeship funding system
The Education and Skills Funding Agency introduces a new funding formula, 
a new register and a new rulebook for training including requirements for 20 
per cent off-the-job training for all apprenticeships and a minimum 10 per cent 
fee for apprentices in smaller non-levy paying employers.
Training content
A new regulator, the Institute for Apprenticeships oversees a programme to 
introduce new apprenticeship standards to replace all existing frameworks. 
There are 562 apprenticeship standards in development, 277 of which are 
approved for delivery. All new apprenticeships involve end-point assessment by 
external organisations.
Source: Written evidence from the Association of Colleges (IFP0044)
132. We have heard of the difficulty that employers, particularly SMEs, face in 
navigating this system. The Chairman of the House of Lords Economic 
Affairs Committee, Lord Forsyth, suggested that smaller businesses face 
difficulty in taking on apprentices because “they need to be provided with 
the means—with local colleges—so that they can do this, knowing what they 
have to do and how to do it, and be given advice.”172 Lina Bourdon, Chair of 
the Diversity Policy Unit at the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) told us 
that 25 per cent of small businesses would consider taking an apprentice on 
board, but they are deterred by “complexity, paperwork, a lack of clarity on 
how to approach it and cost.”173 We also heard from Matthew Percival that 
the apprenticeship levy has restricted the budget flexibility that businesses 
have in hiring apprentices, meaning fewer are hired.
133. The Government announced a number of reforms to apprenticeship funding 
in the 2018 Budget. These included £695 million to support apprenticeships, 
increases in the apprentice minimum wage and the transfer cap and a decrease 
in small business’ apprenticeship fees, from 10 per cent to five per cent.174 
The Government has also announced the creation of T-levels, which will 
be taught from September 2020 and are designed to provide a technical 
education equivalent to A-levels. A report by Policy Exchange on the 
introduction of T-levels is sceptical, however, that the lessons have been learnt 
from previous attempts at introducing technical education qualifications, 
172 Q 118 (Lord Forsyth of Drumlean)
173 Q 87 (Lina Bourdon)
174 Budget 2018, p 36, p 61, p 79
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particularly in how T-levels are supposed to link to apprenticeships.175 In 
2018 the Government announced the ‘Augar Review’ of post-18 education 
and funding. This is due to report in ‘early 2019’. We look forward to the 
results of the review and hope that they will address the clearly inadequate 
funding of vocational and Further Education.
134. In its 2019 report on the apprenticeships programme, the nAO found that 
recent reforms in the apprenticeship programme mean that the Department 
for Education “now has a better, more holistic approach to assessing the 
benefits of the programme.”176 However, it finds that the Government is very 
unlikely to meet its target of three million apprenticeship starts by 2020. 
Most worryingly, one third of apprentices covered by inspections in 2017/18 
were being trained by providers rated by Ofsted as ‘inadequate’ or ‘requires 
improvement’. This does a disservice to those young people entering the 
world of work, or those apprentices who are reskilling for a longer working 
life.
135. The apprenticeship system is confused. It is not adequately serving 
young people or apprentices retraining later in life. Apprenticeships 
should develop skills for those who need them, including routes to 
technical and craft careers. Resources raised via the levy should not 
be used to rebadge training that would occur anyway. There is too 
little monitoring and too little focus on quality and outcomes. We 
note the number of changes in the system in recent years, but do not 
believe failed experiments should be used as a pretext for deferring 
effective reform. The Government must improve the quality of 
apprenticeships to deliver real skills for lifelong and fulfilling 
careers and ensure they are focussed on those young people, and re-
trainers, who are not well served by other education routes. It must 
review and remove reported bureaucratic barriers to the provision 
of apprenticeships by employers.
136. The Government should substantially increase funding for Further 
Education and vocational qualifications. Many students would be 
better served by pursuing vocational educational pathways. The 
current system of funding and access is inefficient, complex and 
risks perpetuating unfairness between those who access Higher 
Education and those who do not. We must rebalance the value 
attributed to Higher Education and Further Education.
Higher Education
137. The introduction of high tuition fees for those who choose to pursue Higher 
Education at universities has put another strain on the intergenerational 
compact. The first generation of young people who have had to pay for their 
full-time undergraduate education is entering the workforce having amassed 
large debts. The participants from our Contact Group who were students, 
or had children or grandchildren who were students, were especially worried 
about this. However, tuition fee debt does not function in the same way as 
175 Policy Exchange, A Qualified Success: An investigation into T-levels and the wider vocational system 
(February 2019): https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/A-Qualified-Success.
pdf [accessed 6 March 2019]
176 national Audit Office, The apprenticeships programme (March 2019) p 11: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/The-apprenticeships-programme-Summary.pdf [accessed 6 March 2019]
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other debt and is written off 30 years after the loan is taken out. We heard 
that mortgage providers treat tuition fee debt more like a tax than a debt.177
138. Most graduates will not pay off the full debt they take on. This is due to 
two of the elements of the loan system. Graduates only pay contributions 
on earnings in excess of £25,000. This protects people on low incomes and 
ensures that those on wages close to the UK average pay the least. However, 
throughout the loan period, interest accrues at the unacceptably high rate 
of RPI plus zero to three per cent. This has a regressive effect as individuals 
with the highest incomes who pay off all their debt quickly will pay less than 
many of the others who contribute for the full 30 years.
139. We must ask if these debts are always incurred to practical personal benefit. 
What particularly concerned the young participants of the Contact Group 
was the insufficiency of a degree alone in finding employment. There was 
a mismatch between the jobs they had been expecting and the jobs that 
were available. newcastle University Institute of Health and Society also 
found that young graduates perceived a mismatch between the jobs they 
were expecting and the low-skill, low paid jobs they were finding.178 Higher 
Education had been presented to our young Contact Group participants 
as the only viable route to a good job. Yet it was felt that better available 
jobs were needed to justify going to university and incurring large debts. 
The issue of unpaid internships and the ‘extras’ necessary to find a job was 
brought up, due to the crowding of graduate markets. This perspective of the 
qualified utility of the university path for many was corroborated by many 
pieces of written evidence that we received.179
140. Research conducted by the IFS finds that the relative labour market returns 
for graduates vary significantly depending on course and institution. It finds 
that graduates from Russell Group universities have earnings 10 per cent 
higher on average for women and 13 per cent higher on average for men 
than graduates of other institutions with the same observable characteristics. 
The highest performing courses also offer earning returns of around double 
the average degree, while the lowest performing courses offer returns 
around 40 per cent below the average degree for women and 50 per cent 
below the average for men.180 The think tank Onward similarly found that 
“university represents extremely poor value for money for some graduates”, 
with 40.6 per cent of graduates in 2016–17 studying subjects with expected 
median earnings of less than £25,000 (the repayment earnings threshold) 
after five years.181 In a 2017 report, the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
and Development (CIPD) concluded that for graduates outside of vocational 
subjects such as medicine, dentistry and veterinary studies, and STEM 
subjects, it is questionable whether the benefits of getting a degree outweigh 
the costs.182
177 Q 12 (Lord Willetts)
178 Written evidence from newcastle University Institute of Health and Society (IFP0024)
179 Written evidence from Graduate Fog (IFP0027), Older Feminists network (IFP0032), Young Fabians 
(IFP0045) and newcastle University Institute of Health and Society (IFP0024)
180 Institute for Fiscal Studies, The relative labour market returns to different degrees (June 2018) p 38, 
p 39, p 47: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/research%20summaries/Graduate%20
earnings%20summary.pdff [accessed 22 January 2019]
181 Onward, A Question of Degree (January 2019) p 12: https://www.ukonward.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/J6493-OnW-A-Question-Of-Degree-190104.pdf [accessed 7 January 2019]
182 CIPD, The graduate employment gap: expectations versus reality (november 2017) p 7: https://www.cipd.
co.uk/Images/the-graduate-employment-gap_2017-expectations-versus-reality_tcm18-29592.pdf 
[accessed 7 January 2019]
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141. nevertheless, we accept that the value of Higher Education is not easily 
quantifiable. A liberal, open-minded education should produce intelligent 
graduates with the necessary enterprising and creative skills to make a 
success of employment and to deal with complexity, diversity and change. 
Our serious concern is that the potentially higher value of alternative 
pathways for many individuals, and access to the wider labour market, is not 
sufficiently recognised, or supported.
142. The qualifications that young people leave education with do not 
always match the needs of the labour market. Post 16 educational 
providers and the bodies that regulate them should seek to link 
educational outcomes more closely to the labour market.
Lifelong learning
143. Concern over poor vocational education is not restricted to young people. 
There are fewer people involved in continuing education, a recognised 
key pathway to help adults retrain,183 and part-time Higher Education 
participation is plummeting. The concept of lifelong learning is regressing at 
a time when we need skilled people of all ages to gain employment, a situation 
that is made even more pressing when considered in the context of the 100-
year life. We heard from Dr Eliza Filby, Visiting Fellow at King’s College 
London, that the education received at age 21 is insufficient in equipping 
people for a working life that may span over 65 years.184 The evidence we 
heard from Professor Andrew Scott, Professor of Economics of London 
Business School, supported this, stating that:
“I cannot think of anything that I can learn at 20 that will probably 
still be relevant when I am 70. We will have to think about a multistage 
career, where people need to continually change what they are doing 
and what they are learning. If you impose technological change on this 
longevity, you can see that the implications for the skills provision are 
pretty extensive.
There are two main challenges: what do we teach young people if they 
are going to be working into their 70s, and how do we create a system 
where people can continually learn and update their skills throughout 
their life?”185
144. We have heard from young people that they feel insecure because they have 
not left school with the skills needed for the labour market,186 and employers 
have painted a similar picture.187 Similarly, older people may feel insecure 
in the labour market as their skills become outdated without retraining.188 
According to the CIPD, the proportion of employees who undergo job-
183 Written evidence from Association of Colleges (IFP0044)
184 Q 161 (Dr Eliza Filby)
185 Q 57 (Professor Andrew Scott)
186 Q 163 (Lewis Addlington-Lee). Written evidence from Healthwatch Essex (IFP0011) and Alison Peel 
(IFP0009). The directors at Doncaster Council and the younger participants in our contact group 
were concerned about the mismatch in skills obtained in education and those required by the job 
market.
187 CBI, Skills needs in England: The employer perspective (October 2018): https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/
policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2018/skills-needs-in-england-the-employer-perspective.pdf 
[accessed 3 April 2019]
188 Centre for Ageing Better, A silver lining for the UK economy? The intergenerational case for supporting longer 
working lives (February 2018) p 32: https://www.ageing-better.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018–02/
Silver-lining-UK-economy-crucial.pdf [accessed 7 January 2019]
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related education or training drops off among employees aged 60 or over.189 
Lifelong learning and training may be important in improving productivity, 
particularly as older people stay in the workforce for longer and become a 
greater proportion of the workforce.
145. The Government claims it has prioritised reskilling the workforce.190 Yet 
spending on adult education, outside apprenticeships and offender learning, 
fell from £2.8 billion in 2010–2011 to below £1.4 billion in 2015–2016.191 In 
the 2015 spending review, the Government promised to protect the budget 
at £1.5 billion until 2020, but this is a cut in real terms. Depending on 
provision level and employment status, many people over the age of 23 have 
to co-fund their education192 and the funding structure of adult education 
is set to become more complex, with the Department for Education (DfE) 
to devolve around £700 million (about 50 per cent of the adult education 
budget) in 2019–2020 to six Mayoral Combined Authorities and Greater 
London Authority.193
146. The national Retraining Scheme (nRS) is the Government’s flagship 
lifelong learning scheme. In the autumn 2018 Budget, the Chancellor pledged 
£100 million for its first phase, which aims to help adults access lifelong 
learning and obtain the skills they need for new careers.194 Sinead O’Sullivan, 
Director of Career Learning, Analysis, Skills and Student Choice from 
the DfE told us that the scheme is “targeted ideally at adults already in 
employment who are potentially at risk because they are in a sector that is 
declining.”195 These sectors are the construction industry and digital sector. 
Julian Gravatt suggested that adult education was a “very confusing picture” 
and pointed out that the nRS, which is a DfE-led initiative, works separately 
to the DWP and that these different programmes are not completely joined 
up, and are hard for people to access.196
147. The Scheme has been criticised because of the lack of clarity as to whether 
it is employer led, or participant led. Dr Susan Pember assessed the nRS 
in March 2018 and concluded that an employer-led nRS would exclude 
millions of adults who are not employees, including workers on zero-hours 
contracts, agency and temporary staff.197 Lina Bourdon warned us that 
those who are self-employed are often an afterthought of policymakers.198 
Similarly, the Government’s Fuller Working Lives strategy is employer-
189 Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Personnel & Development (IFP0050)
190 HM Government, Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain fit for the future (november 2017) p 11: https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664563/
industrial-strategy-white-paper-web-ready-version.pdf [accessed 1 February 2019]. In its 2017 
Industrial Strategy White Paper, the Government declared one of its key policies to be reskilling 
people and “harnessing the power of innovation to help meet the needs of an ageing society”.
191 House of Commons Library, Adult further education funding in England since 2010, Briefing Paper 
number 7708, March 2019
192 Education & Skills Funding Agency, Adult education budget: funding and performance management 
rules (July 2018) p 23: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/733335/2018–19_AEB_funding_pm_rules_July.pdf [accessed 30 January 2019]
193 Written evidence from Association of Colleges (IFP0044). HM Government, Adult education budget 
(AEB) devolution (november 2018): https://www.gov.uk/guidance/adult-education-budget-aeb-
devolution [accessed 29 March 2019]
194 Budget 2018, p 61
195 Q 46 (Sinead O’Sullivan)
196 Q 61 (Julian Gravatt)
197 Dr Susan Pember, Shaping the new National Retraining Scheme (March 2018) p 3: https://www.
campaign-for-learning.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=c072b847-c124-4f37-a670-
de7d989b1cb9 [accessed 17 January 2019]
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led. The Fuller Working Lives strategy profiles the demographic change 
facing the UK and presents the opportunities and challenges that an ageing 
workforce has on employers. We strongly believe that the nRS should be 
able to meet the needs of all adults, regardless of labour market status.
148. Dr Pember’s report concludes that, “the nRS has yet to be assigned a role or 
its position in the existing 18+ education and training landscape.”199 Both the 
Minister and Sinead O’Sullivan were unable to give us specific information 
about the nRS, other than that it was to be ‘bespoke’ and was still in 
development. We were surprised that the Minister of State for Apprenticeships 
and Skills remarked that the concept of lifelong learning “strikes fear in my 
heart and always has done. It does for a lot of people.”200 We disagree.
149. The Government must incentivise people to participate in lifelong learning. 
How it intends to do this is, like much of the scheme, as yet unclear. Other 
countries use credit-based systems that allow individuals to use their credits 
to access training. We believe this may be an option to explore. We were 
cautioned to be realistic about what employers could do. Other witnesses said 
that it is important for state-run institutions to be run alongside employer 
training.201 The Rt Hon The Lord Willetts suggested that Universal Credit 
provided an opportunity for a monitoring system to target retraining at those 
who are not in employment and that local jobcentres could run such schemes.202 
The Centre for Ageing Better told us that the nRS is a “welcome first step” 
which should be extended to other sector deals and should also be aligned 
with funding streams with work and health, to support those facing health-
related challenges to working longer to retrain into new, more suitable roles.203
150. The upcoming government review of post-18 education provides an 
opportunity for the Government to take a wide definition of post-18 education 
outside of undergraduate degrees. We trust that the Government will use 
this moment to consider seriously a coherent lifelong learning strategy, of 
which the national Retraining Scheme may be part.
151. Lifelong learning is a cause for serious concern. We are concerned that 
existing policy is inadequate and will not meet the need for growth. 
Lifelong learning over the lifecourse will become more important as 
more people lead longer working lives. The Government is failing to 
grasp the scale of lifelong learning required to cater for people living 
longer and for technological change.
152. The Government’s National Retraining Scheme should be extended 
and scaled up to prepare for the challenges of an ageing workforce and 
technological development. This should be targeted throughout the 
lifecourse and must adequately reach those who are not employees.
153. The Government should consider new incentives to encourage 
people in lifelong learning. The National Retraining Scheme alone 
will not suffice. The Government should implement a cohesive 
lifelong learning strategy following on from the results of the review 
of post-18 education.
199 Shaping the new National Retraining Scheme, p 6
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CHAPTER 5: WORKING IN THE 100-YEAR LIFE
154. The three-stage model of life created in the 20th century of ‘education, 
work, retirement’ is no longer suitable with the prospect of careers that may 
span over 60 years.204 We need to think in much more multifaceted terms: 
more of us will have a multistage career, where we will need frequently to 
change what we are doing and what we are learning to make this possible. 
This need for a shift in thinking becomes more profound in the context of 
technological change and advancement, the total impact of which we cannot 
yet precisely predict. We have received evidence that showed while both 
employers and employees recognise the benefits of having age-diverse teams, 
most employers are failing to plan for an ageing population.205 We therefore 
turn our attention to how a new, multistage model might be conducted.
Pay progression
155. By historic standards, youth unemployment is low. The UK’s youth 
unemployment rate of 11.2 per cent in July to September 2018 was lower 
than the rate of 15.1 per cent for the European Union as a whole, although 
this ranges from 6.2 per cent in the Czech Republic and Germany to 37.5 per 
cent in Greece.206 However, many young people face worrying problems with 
pay progression. The incomes of younger people have fallen more than for 
other age groups since the financial crisis a decade ago.207 Research from the 
Intergenerational Commission suggests that cohort-on-cohort pay progress 
has stalled, with the oldest cohort of millennials recording earnings at age 
30 only slightly higher than the cohort born 15 years before them.208 It states 
that pay progress was declining even before the crisis, and that one of the 
roots of the decline is a slowdown in the rate of skills improvement.
156. Despite the public perception that young people move around frequently 
between jobs, this is not borne out by the data. Kate Bell, Head of Rights, 
International, Social and Economics Department at the TUC, suggested that 
one of the reasons young people’s pay progression is so poor is that job-to-
job moves have diminished substantially, even though “moving job can often 
be the best way to increase”209 pay. She also stated that a lack of a sense of 
security in their current living situation, such as the inability to get onto the 
property market, might be holding young people’s progression back. Other 
potential reasons for this lack of pay progression that have been suggested 
are the concentration of young workers in low paying jobs, a lack of access 
to skills development and that young people are particularly vulnerable to 
insecure work.210
204 Q 57 (Professor Andrew Scott)
205 Written evidence from CIPD (IFP0050) and Centre for Ageing Better (IFP0049)
206 House of Commons Library, Youth Unemployment Statistics, Briefing Paper number 5871, March 
2019
207 Written evidence from Intergenerational Foundation (IFP0042) and TUC (IFP0046)
208 The Intergenerational Commission, A new Generational Contract: The final report of the 
Intergenerational Commission (May 2018) p 10: https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/
uploads/2018/05/A-new-Generational-Contract-Full-PDF.pdf [accessed 15 January 2019]
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Figure 4: Median real weekly employee pay (CPIH-adjusted to 2017 
prices), by age and cohort: UK, 1975–2017
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Source: The Intergenerational Commission, A New Generational Contract: The final report of the Intergenerational 
Commission (May 2018): https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/advanced/a-new-generational-contract/ [accessed 
30 January 2019]
157. It is not clear whether—or indeed, how—policy should seek to encourage 
young people to change jobs more often. These are questions of personal 
choice. However, low paid workers should have opportunities to progress 
into higher-paying roles without having to leave their employer. This re-
emphasises the importance of in-work training and continuing education. 
In their 2014 Policy Report, the CIPD recommended that employers should 
increase opportunities for progression by ensuring that people on low pay 
know who to have meaningful discussions with about pay progression, and 
by routinely asking employees if they want to progress and setting up skills 
packages to enable progression with an organisation.211
158. We have also received evidence that older workers had experienced a lack of 
pay progression; we heard from Age UK that low- to middle- income older 
workers have also seen poor income growth in the last eight years.212
159. We do not doubt that stagnant pay progression presents a worry at every age, 
but we have seen that slow pay progression is a particularly acute concern 
for young people, and that this might have serious consequences for their 
progression through life. YouGov conducted a survey of 1,422 young workers 
aged 21–30 for the TUC in May 2018.213 They found that in the preceding 
year alone, 41 per cent had to ask their family or friends for financial help 
due to a shortage of money. More than one fifth of respondents had put 
off starting a family, and over a quarter had put off changing careers again 
211 CIPD, Pay progression: Understanding the barriers for the lowest paid (October 2014) p 31: https://www.
cipd.co.uk/Images/pay-progression_2014-understanding-the-barriers-for-the-lowest-paid_tcm18-
10970.pdf [accessed 15 January 2019]
212 Written evidence from Age UK (IFP0047)
213 TUC, Stuck at the start: young workers’ impressions of pay and progression (June 2018) p 5: https://www.
tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/Stuck%20at%20the%20start-%20young%20workers%20progress%20
and%20pay.pdf [accessed 14 February 2019]
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due to a shortage of money.214 The nature and quality of work is important 
throughout the lifecourse, not least to ensure good outcomes for people later 
in life, both in terms of financial security and health.
160. The evidence we received from the Government acknowledged that younger 
generations are not experiencing the same earnings progression as seen by 
previous generations. It does not suggest any particular policy response to 
this trend, although it does mention that the DWP has a large randomised 
control trial on how to support those in low-paid work to progress through 
Universal Credit. This report has since been published and found mostly 
small or insignificant effects in earnings progression.215
161. Slow pay progression is a particularly acute concern for young people. 
This is a real challenge, as slow pay progression can have serious 
consequences for progression through life. Business’ best practice 
for encouraging pay progression should be shared. Acting on the 
recommendations proposed for lifelong learning will aid progression 
through the lifecourse.
Insecurity of the job market
162. We heard numerous times about worries that the labour market was becoming 
less secure. It is helpful, when thinking about insecure labour conditions, to 
define and differentiate between commonly used terms.
Box 3: Common job market terms
Flexible working: A way of working that suits an employee’s needs, for example 
having flexible start and finish times, or working from home.216
Insecure employment: Includes low-paid self-employment, workers on zero-
hours contracts and insecure temporary work, for example agency, casual or 
seasonal work. Sometimes referred to as atypical employment.
Gig economy: A labour market characterised by the prevalence of short-term 
contracts or freelance work, as opposed to permanent jobs. Instead of a regular 
wage, workers get paid for the ‘gigs’ they do, such as a food delivery or car 
journey. Workers in the gig economy are not entitled to sick pay.
 216
163. There was a widespread feeling among the Contact Group participants that 
zero- and low-hours contracts created a problem of insecurity. Younger 
people are disproportionately affected by insecure work, such as zero-hours 
contracts. There are an estimated 3.7 million people in the labour market in 
some form of insecure work.217 15–24 year olds are substantially more likely 
to be in temporary work than other age groups218 and 36 per cent of people 
214 Stuck at the start: young workers’ impressions of pay and progression, p 4
215 Department for Work and Pensions, Universal Credit: In-Work Progression Randomised Controlled 
Trial (September 2018), p 9: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/739766/summary-universal-credit-in-work-progression-randomised-
controlled-trial.pdf [accessed 22 January 2019]
216  HM Government, ‘Flexible working’: https://www.gov.uk/flexible-working [accessed 31 January 
2019]
217  Q 85 (Kate Bell)
218 OECD, ‘Data: Temporary employment’: https://data.oecd.org/emp/temporary-employment.
htm#indicator-chart [accessed 6 March 2019]
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on zero-hours contracts are aged 16 to 24 years, compared to 11.4 per cent 
for all people in employment.219
164. Zero-hours contracts might work well for some young people, such as students 
who want part-time work. We heard that there is a lack of quantitative evidence 
surrounding those who want or are forced into zero-hours contracts. This is 
partly because it is a relatively new form of employment, but also because it 
is very hard to track people down.220 Ian Brinkley, Interim Chief Economist 
at the CIPD, suggested that “probably both” business’ and employees’ 
desire for flexibility has driven the growth of zero-hours contracts and that 
in averaging out four surveys on zero-hours contracts, “you probably have 
something close to a third saying that they do not want to be on them, and 
two-thirds who say they are indifferent or suit them very well.”221
165. Certainly, the flexibility that such atypical employment offers is attractive to 
some, and therefore we should not look to abolish such contracts completely. 
19 per cent of those on a zero-hours contract are in full-time education and 
around 63 per cent of workers on zero-hours contracts do not want to work 
more hours.222 Yet we have heard that young people often want much the same 
outcomes as other workers.223 Our concern is the implications they might 
have on some young people’s progression through the lifecourse. Research 
submitted to us by the Young Women’s Trust highlighted the potential 
suitability of this work in addition to other vocations, such as studying, but 
that this type of employment was not as secure as a full-time career.224 The 
lack of security offered by this type of employment on a sustained basis 
means that people have less access to training and development and there is 
no steady source of income. This last consequence results in limited access 
to mortgages, and difficulty in getting into the private rental sector market.
166. Insecure employment is concentrated in the younger part of the 
age spectrum. While this may not be a problem if insecure work is 
performed alongside studies, it poses a problem when it accounts for 
a young person’s only source of employment.
167. We heard that workers currently in the ‘gig economy’ are often compulsorily 
pushed into self-employment. Professor Stephen Machin, Director at Centre 
for Economic Performance, LSE, suggested that one striking feature of the 
good employment performance since 2008 had been “that almost all of the 
increase in the number of jobs has been in self-employment positions” and 
told us that:
“Part of that is the increase in the number of people in the gig economy 
in, if you like, this hinterland between self-employment and employment, 
this independent contractor status, which has become increasingly hazy. 
This is a very important feature of the way the labour market has been 
evolving over time, with lots of people now classified as self-employed 
who may not have been classified as self-employed in the past.”225
219  Office for national Statistics, ‘Contracts that do not guarantee a minimum number of hours: April 2018’: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/
articles/contractsthatdonotguaranteeaminimumnumberofhours/april2018 [accessed 6 March 2019]
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168. The House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee completed two 
inquiries in 2017 on ‘atypical’ work. The Committee concluded that many 
companies in the gig economy were using existing laws to “propagate a myth 
of self-employment”, and that the “apparent freedom companies enjoy to deny 
workers the rights that come with employee or worker status fails to protect 
workers from exploitation and poor working conditions.”226 The Committee 
suggested that there should be an assumption of the employment status 
of ‘worker’ by default, meaning the rights and protections that come with 
this status could be enforced. These rights include receiving the national 
Minimum Wage and the statutory minimum level of paid holiday.
169. We endorse this recommendation, from the perspective that it will particularly 
benefit young people. Looking across the lifecourse, insecure work means 
that young people cannot benefit from employee contributions towards 
their pensions. Young people would also miss out on pension contributions 
obtained through auto-enrolment on pension schemes with an employer. 
This poses the risk of long-term insecurity: today’s young workers will be 
tomorrow’s retirees. This is but one of the negative consequences of such 
workers being given ‘self-employment’ status.
170. Denying workers the rights that come with worker status fails 
to protect them from exploitation and poor working conditions. 
This disproportionately affects younger people. There should be 
an assumption of the employment status of ‘worker’ by default, 
in order to make the rights and protections that come with this 
status enforceable, without interfering with the rights of those who 
genuinely wish for self-employed status to adopt it.
171. On 17 December 2018 the Government published its Good Work Plan, 
following up on the work of the Taylor review and responding to the 
consultation the Government conducted on employment status. Following 
the consultation, the Government has taken up many of the recommendations 
and has committed to bring appropriate legislation forward. The Government 
has said that it has also commissioned independent research to find out 
more about those with uncertain employment status, which will help us to 
understand how best to support them when bringing forward legislation.227 
However, the Good Work Plan does not include any timetable setting out 
when this research will be conducted and when they plan to bring forward 
legislation.
172. non-standard, insecure work has become more common since the financial 
crisis in many countries. The Resolution Foundation conducted a cross-
country comparison of policy responses to an increase in insecure work. 
Some countries act to minimise either the existence of insecure work or 
the negative consequences; thus, France and norway have implemented 
restrictions on non-guaranteed hours, while Australia has increased the 
cost of such work. The Resolution Foundation concluded that “specific 
226 Work and Pensions Select Committee, Self-employment and the gig economy (Thirteenth Report, Session 
2016–17, HC 847)
227 HM Government, Good Work Plan, Cm 9755, December 2018, p 10: https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766167/good-work-plan-
command-paper.pdf [accessed 21 January 2019]
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employment restrictions appear the most common and straightforward way 
of limiting non-standard work.”228
173. The timetable should be released for when the research commissioned 
into those workers with uncertain employment status will be published 
and when it will make a decision on bringing forward legislation.
Flexible working and mid-life career reviews
174. In Box 3, we distinguished insecure, atypical working from flexible working. 
Several written submissions suggested that longer working lives would 
only be possible if there were more flexible and part-time opportunities 
for people.229 Increased provision of flexible working is important for 
intergenerational fairness for a number of reasons. Firstly, as the length 
of people’s working lives increases, strategic workforce planning through 
flexible working arrangements can help older workers stay in the workforce 
for longer.230 Secondly, as older generations age, middle generations may 
find themselves as ‘sandwich carers’, with caring responsibilities for both 
older and younger generations necessitating flexible working patterns.231 
Thirdly, as a new generation of workers enter the labour force with increased 
technological knowledge, flexible-working arrangements may become the 
norm. Quality part time or flexible work is in high demand, 232 but there is a 
lack of understanding surrounding flexible working by both employers and 
employees.
175. Kate Bell from the TUC told us that it is not only the existence of rights to 
request flexible arrangements that is important, but rather whether people 
are aware that such rights are “a reality in their workplace and how they 
can be empowered to actually ask for them.”233 Lina Bourdon from the FSB 
suggested flexibility is more widely accepted and offered by small businesses.234 
Their informal arrangements often work well and in some cases are necessary 
for the viability of such small businesses. The CBI told us that there is greater 
awareness among employers, but for many it remains “quite scary” and that 
because of the variations in flexible working requests, “there is a bit of myth 
busting and awareness raising”235 to do. More managers need to develop the 
ability to consider flexible working arrangements. We heard that many CBI 
members are taking action as a direct consequence of gender pay reporting.236 
If so, a similar measure could be introduced for flexible working, in order to 
raise awareness amongst employees and reassure employers.
228 Resolution Foundation, Atypical approaches: Options to support workers with insecure incomes (January 
2019) p 7: https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2019/01/Atypical-approaches-report.
pdf [accessed 21 January 2019]
229 Written evidence from United for All Ages (IFP0018), Centre for Ageing Better (IFP0049), CIPD 
(IFP0050), International Longevity Centre (IFP0051)
230 Q 67 (Dr Anna Dixon)
231 Q 78 (Professor Athina Vlachantoni)
232 Q 75 (Emma Stewart MBE). Emma Stewart MBE, CEO and Co-Founder of Timewise, told us that 
of the six million job vacancies that Timewise track every quarter, only 11 per cent are advertised as 
flexible.
233 Q 86 (Kate Bell)
234 Q 86 (Lina Bourdon)
235 Q 184 (Matthew Percival)
236  Ibid.
54 TACKLInG InTERGEnERATIOnAL UnFAIRnESS
176. The right to request flexible working was introduced in the Employment 
Act 2002237 and expanded in the Children and Families Act 2014.238 The 
statutory right to request flexible working entitles employees who have been 
continuously employed for 26 weeks to apply for a change relating to their 
hours, times or location of work. The Prime Minister has asked employers 
to “make flexible working a reality for all employees by advertising all jobs 
as flexible from Day 1, unless there are solid business reasons not to.”239 We 
also heard from civil servants that the Government has convened a flexible 
working task force that takes as its starting point “to look at recruitment and 
then follow on with other aspects of the employment life cycle.”240 On 14 
January, the task force launched its campaign to encourage UK employers 
to advertise jobs as flexible by using the strapline “Happy to talk flexible 
working” in job advertisements, regardless of level or pay grade.241
177. The Government should work with employers to ensure that more 
jobs are advertised as flexible. The public sector is leading the way 
in flexible working. Wherever possible, public sector jobs should be 
advertised as flexible.
178. We have heard support for the idea of a ‘mid-life MoT’ at the age of 50 as 
an opportunity to receive guidance ahead of retirement.242 John Cridland’s 
Review of the State Pension Age recommended a ‘mid-life MoT’ in people’s 
late 50s and 60s to support the gradual transition to retirement. This would 
act as a trigger to encourage people to take stock, provide holistic advice to 
prepare for the transition and help workers to make realistic choices about 
work, health and retirement.243 Specifically, the review recommended that 
the national Careers Service should develop, test and implement a national 
mid-life MoT programme and that the devolved administrations should 
consider similar arrangements. The Government stated that at present 
“DWP are only at the stage of considering the [MoT] policy and possible 
delivery implication of the mid-life MoT recommendation” and that work 
was happening cross-departmentally.244 The national Careers Service 
currently delivers mid-life career reviews via employers, but this relies on 
employers taking up the offer.
179. Dr Anna Dixon, Chief Executive of the Centre for Ageing Better, said that 
in very early case studies of the mid-life MoT, most employers who offered 
such support were larger employers who had the capacity to provide such a 
service. She highlighted that these organisations will reach their employees, 
but “the question is how we ensure that the people who are most likely to 
benefit from that sort of conversation get access to it.”245 Mid-life MoTs must 
237 Employment Act 2002, section 47(1)(a)
238 Children and Families Act 2014, Part 9
239 HM Government, ‘Prime Minister announces new drive to end the gender pay gap’ (October 2017): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-announces-new-drive-to-end-the-gender-pay-
gap [accessed 1 February 2019]
240 Q 45 (Mark Holmes)
241 CIPD, ‘Government and employers unite to kick-start flexible working’: https://www.cipd.co.uk/
about/media/press/flexible-working-taskforce [accessed 11 March 2019]
242 Written evidence from Age UK (IFP0047) and Centre for Ageing Better (IFP0049) 
243 Department for Work and Pensions, Independent Review of the State Pension Age, Smoothing the Transition: 
Final Report (March 2017) p 17: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/611460/independent-review-of-the-state-pension-age-smoothing-the-
transition.pdf [accessed 18 January 2019]
244 Written evidence from HM Government (IFP0058)
245 Q 68 (Dr Anna Dixon)
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engage with people whose employer would not offer a mid-life review. This 
might be achieved through contacts such as the nHS health check.
180. We also heard that such initiatives were most successful when they were part 
of an ongoing process, rather than a substitute for regular career reviews. 
We concur with Emma Stewart MBE, Chief Executive and Co-Founder of 
Timewise, who told us that mid-life MoTs were “really about trying to instil 
the culture within an organisation that goes beyond any specific legislative 
requirement, in order to make sure those conversations can be had on a 
regular basis.”246 Reviews should be part of a continuous responsibility of the 
employer, rather than a one-off event. The Independent Review of the State 
Pension Age final report remarked that there is often no natural trigger point 
which encourages people to think about the sorts of questions which need to 
be answered in mid-life.247 A mid-life MoT might provide this.
181. Earlier in this report we recommended that financial education was important 
to equip young people with sufficient financial knowledge to make informed 
decisions. Maintaining this financial knowledge is important at all stages of 
the lifecourse. Age UK reported that the MoT presents an opportunity for 
discussions on pensions and saving provision, to ensure a secure retirement.248 
In a similar manner to teachers’ signposting students to sources of financial 
advice, employers might point participants to further sources of information 
such as Pension Wise.
182. Mid-life MoTs can play an important role in preparing people for 
a longer working life. Mid-life MoTs cannot be a one-off, discrete 
event, and are most effective when viewed as part of a process of good 
management. The Government’s efforts to encourage mid-life MoTs 
are in danger of missing those most in need of support, including 
individuals who work for employers that lack the capacity to provide 
mid-life MoTs and those outside the workforce. On the other hand, 
providing a single statutory MoT at a fixed age to every employee 
would lack flexibility and might lead to waste. If MoTs are to be 
introduced effectively, the Government needs to give a good deal 
more thought to how they should operate.
Ageism
183. There are an increasing number of older workers in employment; over the 
past three decades, employment rates among those ages 50 to 64 have risen 
from 66 per cent of men and 47 per cent of women in 1992, to 76 per cent of 
men and 68 per cent of women in 2018.249 Moreover, as Figure 5 shows the 
increasing UK employment rate for those over 65. Whilst this is still low, at a 
little over 10 per cent, it has doubled in the last quarter century. This rise in 
employment rate is undoubtedly a positive, as employment brings with it many 
246 Q 80 (Emma Stewart MBE)
247 Independent Review of the State Pension Age, Smoothing the Transition: Final Report, p 100
248 Age UK, Creating a ‘Career MOT at 50’: Helping people keep working and save for later life (October 
2017): https://www.ageuk.org.uk/globalassets/age-uk/documents/reports-and-publications/reports-
and-briefings/active-communities/rb_oct17_creating_a_career_mot_at_50.pdf [accessed 21 January 
2019]
249  Office for national Statistics, ‘Dataset: A05 nSA: Employment, unemployment and 
economic inactivity by age group (not seasonally adjusted)’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
employ mentand labour market /people inwork /employ mentandemployeet y pes /datasets /
employmentunemploymentandeconomicinactivitybyagegroupnotseasonallyadjusteda05nsa [accessed 
26 March 2019]
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social and economic benefits. Yet, we have heard much evidence to suggest 
that ageism is still rife in the labour market, particularly in hiring decisions, 
and that this is a barrier to greater numbers of older people remaining in or 
seeking to re-join the labour market. The DWP found that there were almost 
one million individuals aged 50–64 that are not in employment but state that 
they are willing to, or would like to, work.250
Figure 5: Age 65+ UK Employment Rate, 1992–2018
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Source: Office for National Statistics, ‘Dataset: A05 NSA: Employment, unemployment 
and economic inactivity by age group (not seasonally adjusted)’: https://www.ons.gov.
uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/datasets/
employmentunemploymentandeconomicinactivitybyagegroupnotseasonallyadjusteda05nsa [accessed 30 January 
2019]
184. Research by Professor Dominic Abrams, Dr Libby Drury and Dr Hannah 
Swift for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) showed 
that “ageism is the most commonly experienced form of prejudice in the 
UK, with almost one in three people (26 per cent) reporting being unfairly 
treated because of their age.”251 Age UK found that approximately one third 
of workers over 55 have experienced discrimination at some point.252 This is 
borne out by several personal written submissions which contained personal 
experience of people over the age of 50 struggling to find work and facing 
what they perceived as ageism in doing so.253 The Centre for Ageing Better 
identified that older workers are more likely to stay unemployed for the 
long-term, and in response called on the Government to do more to tailor 
employment support to older people.254 Care England suggested that “one 
of the biggest challenges of this era is to move to a system that is age neutral 
250 Department for Work and Pensions, Fuller Working Lives: Evidence Base 2017 (February 2017), p 7: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/648979/fuller-working-lives-evidence-base-2017.pdf [accessed 20 March 2019]
251 Written evidence from Professor Dominic Abrams, Dr Libby Drury and Dr Hannah Swift (IFP0038)
252 Written evidence from Age UK (IFP0047)
253 Written evidence from Catherine Harris (IFP0001), Christine Williams (IFP0005), Alison Peel 
(IFP0009)
254 Written evidence from Centre for Ageing Better (IFP0049)
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and where ageism is seen to be as unacceptable as racism, homophobia or 
any of the other equality categories” and that the EHRC was not countering 
ageism sufficiently.255
Box 4: EHRC definition of ageism
Age Discrimination
Age is one of the nine protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010. 
Under the Equality Act, ageism is therefore being treated differently because of 
your age in one of the following situations:
• when you are in the workplace (including in recruitment)
• when you use public services like healthcare (for example, visiting your 
doctor or local hospital) or education (for example, at your school or 
college)
• when you use businesses and other organisations that provide services and 
goods (like shops, restaurants, and cinemas)
• when you use transport
• when you join a club or association (for example, your local tennis club)
• when you have contact with public bodies like your local council or 
government departments
ECHR guidance says that an employer can make a decision based on a person’s 
age, if they can show that it is objectively justified. In order to show that a 
decision is objectively justified, an employer must be able to show that there is 
a good reason for doing what they are doing, and that what they are doing is 
proportionate.
Stereotyping about a person’s age to make a judgement about their fitness or 
ability to do a job is illegal.
Source: Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Age discrimination’: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/
advice-and-guidance/age-discrimination [accessed 30 January 2019], Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
What Equality Law Means for You as an Employer: When You Recruit Someone to Work For You (April 2014) 
p 15: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/what_equality_law_means_for_you_as_an_
employer_-_recruitment.pdf [accessed 20 March 2019]
185. Some of our Contact Group members felt that older people staying in work 
reduced the number of jobs on offer for younger people. However, we have 
received evidence that there is no fixed number of jobs and that older people 
working longer did not reduce the number of jobs for young people.256 This 
is the so-called ‘‘lump of labour fallacy’. We heard that remaining in the 
workforce helped older workers by maintaining confidence and preventing 
loneliness. The difference between the perception of members of the public 
and the statistical reality might play a part in fuelling the ageism that exists 
in the workplace. Research into ageism shows that it can also affect younger 
people,257 but it tends to be in areas other than hiring decisions.
186. Professor Abrams, Dr Swift and Dr Drury concluded that ageism in the 
workplace can be a substantial barrier to individuals’ propensity to live long 
255 Written evidence from Care England (IFP0013)
256 Q 71 (Dr Brian Beach, Dr Anna Dixon, Professor Jacqueline O’Reilly), Written evidence from Centre 
for Ageing Better (IFP0049)
257 Written evidence from Professor Dominic Abrams, Dr Hannah Swift and Dr Libby Drury (IFP0038)
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and full working lives.258 The Women and Equalities Committee’s report on 
Older people and employment concluded that:
“Ageism remains a significant problem within British society and is 
affecting the ability of people to continue working into later life, despite 
long-standing laws against age discrimination. Discrimination in 
recruitment is a significant problem and the public sector is not leading 
the way in the retention of older workers when it should be.”259
We endorse this conclusion.
187. The Women and Equalities Committee’s report also concluded that the 
EHRC are failing to enforce the law on age discrimination and must be 
clearer that prejudice, unconscious bias and casual ageism in the workplace 
are all unlawful under the Equality Act 2010.
188. We have heard various positive examples of businesses that champion the 
inclusion of older workers, through conversations about flexibility and 
adaptation. Professor Abrams, Dr Swift and Dr Drury’s research suggested 
that age discrimination can be reduced through increased contact between 
generations.260 The workplace is a potential space for such intergenerational 
contact, featuring working towards common goals and cooperation. Positive 
contact in the workforce and beyond can help to reduce ageism in society 
more widely.
189. Notwithstanding the increase in employment of older people, ageism 
remains a problem within British society and is affecting the ability of 
some people to continue working into later life, despite long-standing 
laws against age discrimination. Discrimination in recruitment is a 
particular problem. More should be done to recruit and retain older 
workers.
258 Ibid.
259 Women and Equalities Committee, Older people and employment (Fourth Report, Session 2017–19, HC 
359)
260 Written evidence from Professor Dominic Abrams, Dr Hannah Swift and Dr Libby Drury (IFP0038)
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CHAPTER 6: ALL-AGE COMMUNITIES AS DRIVERS OF 
INTERGENERATIONAL FAIRNESS
190. Contrary to a divisive narrative that is often pushed about a gulf between 
older and younger generations, we have heard messages of strong bonds 
between people across the lifecourse, and particularly within families. 
Much of the evidence we have heard has focussed on the importance 
and strength of intergenerational contact, which in turn strengthens the 
intergenerational compact. Yet the increased atomisation of our society 
poses a threat to intergenerational fairness. Loneliness is increasing at all 
stages of the lifecourse, which allows negative age stereotypes to proliferate. 
The most common response to the questions on community activity in our 
call for evidence was support for greater efforts to bring generations together 
and encourage contact. We believe that age diverse communities can provide 
a regeneration of intergenerational connection outside of the family setting 
and can play a crucial role in directly tackling the causes of intergenerational 
unfairness. At a time when investment in the public sector is in major decline, 
the potential of communities to support themselves should be enhanced by 
government. The potential that exists within communities to sustain activity 
needs to be liberated and the Government must ensure that it incentivises, 
rather than stifles this community activity. This would benefit all generations.
The negative social consequences of age segregation
191. In Chapter 3, we discussed the need to create mixed age communities 
through thoughtful and long-term planning of housing provision. Research 
conducted by the Intergenerational Foundation found that age segregation 
is increasing; rural areas have aged nearly twice as rapidly as urban ones 
over the past 25 years and for the typical child in the 25 largest cities, only 
five per cent of their neighbours are now over 65.261 We heard that this could 
have serious social consequences. Professor Elspeth Graham, Professor of 
Geography at the University of St Andrews, suggested that at the extreme, 
this segregation could threaten social cohesion, because people might vote 
for different self-interests, or age-related interests.262 David Kingman, Senior 
Researcher at the Intergenerational Foundation, added that a political 
system based on age-segregated geographical representation would be likely 
to contribute towards political polarisation, given that age is now the most 
accurate demographic predictor of which way someone will vote.263
192. The rise in the private rental sector might also have contributed to a decrease 
in high quality intergenerational contact. Our Contact Group participants 
reported that opportunities for intergenerational contact were lessening due 
to the transience of neighbourhoods, which diminished opportunities to 
build relationships and networks. Where people cannot settle in a stable, 
long-term home, they are less able to forge meaningful connections. This 
may have a disproportionate impact on young people, who are most likely 
to be renting. Research by the OnS has found that renters reported feeling 
261 Intergenerational Foundation, Generations Apart? The growth of age segregation in England and Wales 
(September 2016) p 4: http://www.if.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Generations-Apart_
Report_Final_Web-Version-1.pdf [accessed 22 January 2019]
262 Q 133 (Professor Elspeth Graham)
263 Q 133 (David Kingman). In 2017, YouGov conducted analysis of over 12,000 people and found that 
age is the new key predictor of voting intention in British politics. YouGov, ‘The demographics dividing 
Britain’ (April 2017): https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-
dividing-britain [accessed 7 March 2019]
60 TACKLInG InTERGEnERATIOnAL UnFAIRnESS
more lonely more often than home owners. People who feel they belong less 
strongly to their neighbourhood and people who have little trust of others 
in their local area also reported feeling lonely more often. There is an 
intergenerational disparity here; as we saw in Figure 2 and 3 in Chapter 3, 
young people are much less likely to own their home and cannot easily access 
social housing, so are left in the private rented sector. The OnS’s research 
also found that young renters with little trust and sense of belonging to their 
area are at particular risk from loneliness.264
Figure 6: Reported frequency of loneliness by tenure (proportion)
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Source: Office for National Statistics, ‘Loneliness - What characteristics and circumstances are associated 
with feeling lonely?’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/
lonelinesswhatcharacteristicsandcircumstancesareassociatedwithfeelinglonely/2018–04-10 [accessed 23 January 
2019]
193. One diminishing source of intergenerational contact is found in the decline 
of the high street. According to analysis from The Telegraph in January 2019, 
1,267 shops had been closed or earmarked for closure since January 2018.265 
A report on loneliness by the Co-op and British Red Cross concluded that 
the disappearance of social spaces, such as squares where people tend to 
congregate, can contribute to feelings of disconnection.266 Given that many 
older people rely on accessing the high street as a source of maintaining 
contact with their community, which in turn prevents loneliness, this 
decline might disproportionately affect older people. In October 2018 the 
Government announced the establishment of a new £675 million Future 
264 Office for national Statistics, ‘Loneliness—What characteristics and circumstances are associated 
with feeling lonely?’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/
lonelinesswhatcharacteristicsandcircumstancesareassociatedwithfeelinglonely/2018–04-10 [accessed 
23 January 2019]
265 Josh Wilson and Patrick Scott, ‘1,267 retail store closures and counting: tracking the high street’s 
miserable 2018’, The Telegraph (10 January 2019): https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/0/1300-retail-
store-closures-counting-tracking-high-streets-miserable/ [accessed 11 January 2019]
266 Co-op and British Red Cross, Trapped in a bubble: An investigation into 
triggers for loneliness in the UK (December 2016) p 7: https://assets.ctfassets.
net/5ywmq66472jr/5tKumBSlO0suKwiWO6KmaM/230366b0171541781a0cd98fa80fdc6e/Coop_
Trapped_in_a_bubble_report.pdf [accessed 11 January 2019] 
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High Streets Fund to help local areas respond and adapt to changes.267 The 
Campaign to End Loneliness has welcomed recent government investment 
in reviving the high street as an important step “towards keeping people 
connected to their communities.”268
194. The OnS finds that loneliness decreases with age, with younger people (16–
24 year olds) significantly more likely to say that they are often or always lonely 
than older people (75+).269 Rebecca Carter, Director of Strategy, Planning 
and Communications at The Challenge told us that from The Challenge’s 
experience of running programmes where younger and older people connect, 
“it is those two age groups who experience loneliness the most who may gain 
the most from it.”270
195. Research from Age UK shows that people are more likely to view older 
people as stereotypically warm or friendly rather than competent.271 These 
patronising stereotypes of older people may undermine their opportunities. 
We also heard from our younger Contact Group participants that they are 
concerned about age stereotypes about younger people. They said they are 
often treated badly by older generations who either stereotype them as being 
‘trouble’ or as being ‘soft’ and ill-equipped for reality. This was reflected 
in the evidence we collected from older people that our Contact Group 
participants spoke to, who said that younger generations are unprepared to 
sacrifice and save in order to plan for the future. Research conducted by 
Demos has found that false stereotyping of young people in the media and 
wider society has a negative effect on both their self-esteem and employment 
opportunities.272
196. Meaningful contact between members of different social groups can 
reduce age prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination. 273 Dr Libby Drury, 
Lecturer in Organisational Psychology at Birkbeck University of London, 
told us that segregation “can create a psychological barrier between younger 
and older people, and the more segregation that develops, the fewer skills 
that younger and older people have at interacting together.”274 Un-nuanced 
and poorly designed opportunities for intergenerational contact might 
confirm such stereotypes, for example contact in a care home might confirm 
negative stereotypes of older people being dependent. Examples of positive 
meaningful contact were provided by witnesses, such as Iona Lawrence 
from the Cares Family, who explained the work of the Cares Family to 
bring generations together as equals to participate in activities and create 
267 HM Treasury and MHCLG, ‘Future High Streets Fund’ (29 October 2018): https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/future-high-streets-fund/future-high-street-fund [accessed 29 March 2019]
268 Campaign to End Loneliness, ‘Response to Autumn Budget 2018’ (October 2018): https://www.
campaigntoendloneliness.org/press-release/campaign-to-end-loneliness-response-to-autumn-
budget-2018/ [accessed 29 March 2019]
269 Office for national Statistics, ‘Loneliness—What characteristics and circumstances are associated 
with feeling lonely?’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/
lonelinesswhatcharacteristicsandcircumstancesareassociatedwithfeelinglonely/2018–04-10 [accessed 
23 January 2019]
270 Q 145 (Rebecca Carter). The Challenge currently runs programmes such as the national Citizen 
Service, HeadStart and Step Forward.
271 Age UK, Ageism in Europe: Findings from the European Social Survey (June 2011) p 7: https://www.
ageuk.org.uk/Documents/En-GB/For-professionals/ageism_across_europe_report_interactive.
pdf?dtrk=true [accessed 23 January 2019]
272 Demos, Introducing Generation Citizen (February 2014) p 46: https://demosuk.wpengine.com/files/
Generation_Citizen_-_web.pdf?1392764120 [accessed 23 January 2019]
273 Written evidence from Professor Dominic Abrams, Dr Libby Drury and Dr Hannah Swift (IFP0038)
274 Q 147 (Dr Libby Drury)
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connections.275 The Challenge also highlighted the work that they do through 
the national Citizens Service to generate meaningful interactions through 
social action.276 Further examples of specific initiatives that aim to sustain 
communities to the benefit of young and old are detailed in Box 5 below.
The power of community action
197. Local communities are best placed to tackle social problems in their area. 
They can find innovative solutions that are specifically tailored to tackle local 
issues. This can range from tackling loneliness in older people to providing 
the skills that younger people need.
Box 5: Innovative ways community run activities are tackling 
intergenerational divides
Alive told us how their work to bring children in local schools and older people 
living in care homes together had resulted in positive outcomes for both groups. 
They told us that visits from children lift the spirits of socially isolated residents, 
improving their mental health and general wellbeing, and that children learn 
about many different aspects from the past.277
Participants in our Contact Group from Tower Hamlets praised the Bromley-
By-Bow Centre, a project that combines a neighbourhood hub with a medical 
practice and a community research project. The participants felt that it was 
directed at all-ages of the community, rather than being a youth centre, and 
particularly praised the hub’s ability to reduce the isolation of young mothers.
Local pubs are often the cornerstone of community activity. The Pub is the 
Hub campaign encourages rural pub owners, licensees and local communities 
to work together. It aims to support and retain essential local services, which, 
wherever possible, can be located within the pub itself, such as Post Offices and 
activities for older people.278
 277 278
198. On 15 October 2018, the Prime Minister launched the Government’s 
strategy to tackle loneliness, which set out a series of commitments to help 
all age groups build connections, including pledging £20 million of funding 
to support organisations that tackle loneliness. The strategy also encourages 
GPs to prescribe community activities to patients, provides funding for 
research into community-led housing projects and offer £1.8 million 
of funding to help local communities build social connections through 
community spaces.279 The Government currently has a Cross Governmental 
Ministerial Group on Loneliness. This is chaired by the Minister for Sport 
and Civil Society. Part of delivering on the government strategy has been 
the creation and delivery of the £11.5 million Building Connections Fund, 
which has both a Main and Youth Strand.
199. We are encouraged that there has been a recognition of youth loneliness 
but are eager that there should be more focus on forging intergenerational 
connections. Our request to hear from a Department for Digital, Culture, 
275 Q 145 (Iona Lawrence)
276 Written evidence from The Challenge (IFP0067)
277  Written evidence from Alive (IFP0036)
278  Written evidence from HM Government (IFP0058)
279 HM Government, A connected society: A strategy for tackling loneliness—laying the foundations for change 
(October 2018) p 11: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/750909/6.4882_DCMS_Loneliness_Strategy_web_Update.pdf [accessed 23 
January 2019]
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Media & Sport (DCMS) Minister on this and other intergenerational 
issues was rejected, despite the ministerial lead on the loneliness strategy 
being located in that department. When we questioned Ministers from 
MHCLG, DWP and DfE, none of them were able to answer questions on 
the Government’s loneliness strategy, other than stating that there would be 
cross-departmental working. They were also not aware, until we prompted 
them, who was the lead on delivering the loneliness strategy since the previous 
Minister for Loneliness resigned. The current ministerial responsibility lies 
with the Minister for Civil Society, who at the time this report was published 
was Mims Davies MP. This suggests, despite the Government’s written 
evidence stating, “Central government will provide national leadership on 
this [loneliness] agenda”,280 it is not a priority for the Government and cross-
departmental working has not been successfully achieved.
200. The Government’s written evidence suggested that the Loneliness Strategy 
is a foundation for a “generation of policy work”. It pledges that the cross-
government ministerial group will publish an annual progress report 
on the agenda, and that the Government will explore ways to embed 
consideration of loneliness as a factor when making new policies. It stated 
that the Government’s intention is to “embed consideration of loneliness 
and relationships throughout the policy-making process.”281 All of this 
sounds encouraging but, given the poor quality of ministerial response we 
received, we remain sceptical and await further progress on the strategy to 
see if the Government is serious about tackling the intergenerational issue of 
loneliness.
201. Community initiatives that bring generations together are an 
important way of cementing intergenerational bonds. These bonds 
provide support to both young and old members of communities 
where needed.
Facilitating community activity
202. The Government’s Civil Society strategy recognises that “Government 
alone cannot solve the complex challenges facing society, such as loneliness, 
rough-sleeping, healthy ageing or online safety.”282 The Government will 
have to work with Civil Society groups to encourage active communities to 
address such issues. In practice, this means giving communities enough space 
and resources to support themselves. We believe that active communities 
are the best way of encouraging intergenerational contact and ameliorating 
loneliness, which affects both young and old alike. Beyond this, community 
activity can also directly address the intergenerational skills and housing 
issues we have raised in this report. In order for communities to be active, 
government at all levels should be permissive and supportive.
203. The way we connect to each other has fundamentally changed in recent years. 
We were frequently told of the potential that social media held to connect 
families and neighbourhoods.283 Any concern about technology’s impact lay 
280 Supplementary written evidence from HM Government (IFP0062)
281 Ibid.
282 HM Government, Civil Society Strategy: Building a future that works for everyone (August 2018), p 12: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/732765/Civil_Society_Strategy_-_building_a_future_that_works_for_everyone.pdf [accessed 23 
January 2019]
283 Written evidence from Alive (IFP0036), Age UK (IFP0047), Professor Irene Hardill (IFP0028)
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mainly in the ability to access technologies, particularly for older people.284 
The importance of a shared physical space was stressed by the participants 
in the Contact Group, who told us that a shared technological space was 
a supplementary, not substitute, setting for intergenerational contact. This 
perspective was supported by the evidence we received from Alison Bailey.285
204. We heard many examples and proposals for the innovative use of existing 
spaces for community purposes. We heard that retirement communities could 
generate contact between generations by providing communal facilities for 
the wider community.286 On our visit to Doncaster we heard from the staff 
of the Swallowdale Extra Care Facility that it was important to brand the 
facility as a housing scheme, rather than a retirement community or nursing 
home, in order to view the facility as part of the wider community. We heard 
from members of the Contact Group that school premises could be used 
outside opening hours as a site of community activity.
205. There could also be consideration given to alternative use of empty property 
that previously housed high street bank branches. Kit Malthouse MP told us 
that MHCLG has announced a new ‘Open Doors’ initiative in november 
2018, which aims to facilitate landlords offering vacant high street properties 
for temporary community use.287 We believe that empty publicly-owned bank 
branches, which are frequently landmark buildings on high streets, market 
squares and street corners, should be used as part of this initiative, to turn 
declining high streets into vibrant community hubs. Such buildings, by their 
nature secure and conveniently located, could offer a range of advice and 
services, including cash machines and points of contact for all banks, which 
otherwise are progressively deserting the public space frequented by the 
very people they are paid to serve. This has the potential to bring different 
generations together and alleviate loneliness.
206. The Government’s supplementary written evidence stated that DCMS 
will devote up to £1.8 million in funding to help local people maximise the 
potential of underutilised community spaces “in innovative and creative 
ways.”288 It stated that this could include bringing existing space that is 
not currently available into use and piloting extended opening hours. The 
Government’s supplementary written evidence said that the Government 
“believes schools should support maximum use of their premises and facilities 
by the local community for meetings and events in the evenings, at weekends 
and during the school holidays”289 and pledged that the Department for 
Education will also collect data on which schools already allow use of their 
premises, in order to understand how best to support other schools to do so. 
This advice was due to be updated in late 2018,290 but no update has yet been 
published. The northern Ireland Government Department of Education 
currently encourages schools to build stronger links with the communities 
they serve, by allowing their premises to be used by the community outside 
school hours.291
284 Written evidence from Catherine Harris (IFP0001), Centre for Ageing Better (IFP0049)
285 Written evidence from Alison Bailey (IFP0034)
286 Written evidence from ARCO (IFP0014)
287 Supplementary written evidence from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 
(IFP0075)
288 Supplementary written evidence from HM Government (IFP0062)
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 northern Ireland Government Department of Education, ‘Community use of school premises’: 
https://www.education-ni.gov.uk/articles/community-use-school-premises [accessed 14 January 2019]
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207. The Government’s evidence provided examples of funding and support for 
community activity.292 However, Ailbhe Mcnabola, Head of Research and 
Policy at Power to Change, suggested that, while government policy and 
existing legislation is supportive, “quite a lot rests with local government” 
because there lies much of the relationship between government and 
community organisations. 293 Dr Tom Archer, Research Fellow at Sheffield 
Hallam University, informed us that the community development function 
of local authorities had substantially decreased in recent years and that this 
decreased the ability to have community activity.
208. The Government’s evidence suggested that its policy on Assets of 
Community Value could bring communities together. Hardip Begol, 
Director of Integration and Communities at MHCLG informed us that best 
practice is shared using the mycommunity.org.uk website, where voluntary 
organisations can go to find information “about the rights community 
organisations have in relation to their assets, good practice and case studies.”294 
However, Stephen Rolph, Head of Community Assets and Enterprise at 
Locality, told us that there is not enough learning from what already exists. 
He stated that there is a need for ‘myth-busting’ with local authorities so that 
they can know how successful activity has been.295
Box 6: Community assets
The Localism Act 2011 provides communities (defined as a group of 21 or 
more people within one locality) and parish councils with the right to register 
a building or piece of land as an ‘Asset of Community Value’, if the asset’s 
principal use furthers their community’s social wellbeing or social interests and 
is likely to do so in the future. This is known as the ‘Right to Bid’.
Community assets can provide a suitable location for such community activity 
to take place, in accordance with the belief that community should revolve 
around a sense of place. The Government’s evidence stated that, “Enabling 
more community ownership of assets has the potential for initiating more 
intergenerational connections.”
Source: Localism Act 2011, Part 5
209. We heard that there was little reliable data on community assets, but that the 
situation was gradually improving. Dr Archer told us that the last large study 
of community assets took place in 2011.296 Ailbhe Mcnabola stated that this 
was because approved community assets are published on local authorities’ 
website, rather than the national website. Power to Change are working on 
a platform called Keep it in the Community, as “it is very difficult to find 
what assets have been listed in your area and what other people in your area 
are trying to energise around.”297 Only around 5,000 community assets are 
registered on the Keep it in the Community website thus far.298 We believe 
that the accumulation of data on existing community assets is necessary to 
publicise good practice.
292 Written evidence from HM Government (IFP0058)
293 Q 141 (Ailbhe Mcnabola)
294 Q 102 (Hardip Begol)
295 Q 143 (Stephen Rolph)
296 Q 139 (Dr Tom Archer)
297 Q 138 (Ailbhe Mcnabola)
298 Ibid.
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210. Local authorities should share intergenerational best practice and 
publish practical examples and information relating to community-
run services and community assets.
Box 7: Community libraries
Throughout our inquiry, we have been informed of numerous examples 
of community engagement with community-run services. On our visit to 
Doncaster, we heard how Doncaster Council previously ran 24 council-owned 
libraries; now only four of these libraries were council-owned, and the rest were 
run by communities. This means that facilities and activities will be different 
across community libraries because they could be adapted to meet the needs of 
the local area.
In 2017, DCMS conducted research and analysis of the effectiveness and 
sustainability of community managed libraries in England but were unable to 
reach any firm conclusions299 because of a lack of information on the quantity 
and quality of community libraries. In moving forward with their strategies 
on loneliness and civil society, the Government should consider harnessing 
the innovation seen in community run libraries and support such community 
activity.
 299
211. Many of these community-owned libraries described in Box 7 have developed 
out of local authority budget cuts. However, we have been impressed by the 
innovative community-centred and intergenerational manner in which they 
are run. The Government provides a good practice guide for community 
managed libraries, produced by the Libraries Taskforce, for people who 
run or are considering establishing community libraries.300 We believe 
that community libraries provide an exemplary space for intergenerational 
activity; libraries are welcoming spaces that offer a safe, trusted and creative 
environment.
212. The Commission on the Future of Localism, a project run in partnership 
between Locality and Power to Change, suggests that there are a number of 
ways that government can act as a barrier to more community activity and 
that there are therefore ways they could improve. The Commission criticises 
top-down decision making when things are ‘done to’ communities which 
“reinforces a paternalistic relationship between citizens and the state.”301 It 
also suggested that the Localism Act, followed by devolution deals across the 
country, helped bring greater control and involvement to communities but this 
was dependent on the co-operation of the local authorities involved. It stated 
that where councils are unsupportive, the Right to Challenge is insufficient 
to overcome the hurdles. The Minister for Housing was appreciative of this 
299  Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Research and Analysis to Explore the Service Effectiveness 
and Sustainability of Community Managed Libraries in England (May 2017): https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/631715/Research_and_
Analysis_to_Explore_the_Service_Effectiveness_and_Sustainability_of_Community_Managed_
Libraries_in_England_-_May_2017.pdf [accessed 31 January 2019]
300 HM Government, ‘Community managed libraries: good practice toolkit’: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/community-libraries-good-practice-toolkit/community-libraries-good-
practice-toolkit [accessed 19 March 2019]
301 Locality, People Power: Findings from the Commission on the Future of Localism (January 2018) p 16: 
https://locality.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/LOCALITY-LOCALISM-REPORT-1.pdf 
[accessed 1 February 2019]
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point and said that while the Government “can provide assistance and gentle 
coaxing, we have to be careful not to be too assertive.”302
213. Dr Thomas Moore, Lecturer in Planning at the University of Liverpool 
suggested that the main way in which the Government could support 
community activity was by providing long-term secure funding. He told 
us about the role of community housing organisations which provide 
affordable housing for young people and housing for older people that can 
alleviate loneliness. He criticised the Government’s existing community 
housing fund for only lasting until 2020 and suggested longer horizons were 
necessary. Dr Moore stated that if “we are serious about trying to help and 
support a thriving community housing sector, or more broadly a community 
asset sector, we have to make the resources available.”303 The Minister was 
unable to answer if there was any prospect of the community housing fund 
running past 2020.304 Rebecca Carter told us that one specific way that local 
government could help bring generations together would be not to allocate 
their funding by age group. She suggested that “rather than having a young 
person pot and an old person pot, why is there not a pot for activities that 
have mutual benefit across generations.”305 Locality has called upon the 
Government to kick-start a community ownership fund, looking specifically 
at the dormant assets fund to provide for this306 and we believe that this is a 
sensible resource on which to draw.
214. Initiatives such as community assets can provide innovative solutions to 
issues faced by communities. However, these initiatives are of little value 
in themselves without an active community to support and maintain them. 
There is some effort being made by the Government to facilitate community 
activity, yet much of this has not been seen through, or is not known about 
by the public. Many of these initiatives are small scale and do not represent a 
clear government strategy, especially for the most disadvantaged areas.
215. One of the messages our Contact Group requested we pass onto Ministers was 
that a more permissive environment should be created for local communities 
to organise activities. In the present situation, it was felt that such activity was 
often hindered by local authorities, who in turn were restricted by national 
government. This sentiment was best encapsulated on our visit to Doncaster. 
There was a strong belief from the people we met that the people within a 
community know that community better than people externally, and that 
this local knowledge should be harnessed wherever possible. We appreciate 
that striking a balance between support and the risk of paternalism is not 
always easy, yet it is one the Government must make, for the sake of the 
health of the intergenerational compact.
216. At all levels, government should be an enabler of community activity. 
Both central and local government should concentrate on permitting 
and facilitating community activity, rather than strictly policing 
when and where it takes place.
217. The Government must ensure that there are long-term sources of 
funding available for community activity.
302 Q 208 (Kit Malthouse MP)
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CHAPTER 7: INTERGENERATIONAL TAXATION
Distribution of income and wealth
218. The tax and benefit system has the potential to shape fairness between 
generations by ensuring that generations do not pay in far less than they 
receive. In Chapter 2 we discussed the limitations of the published data 
on how the tax and benefit system affects different age groups. The OnS 
does not publish the effects of each tax and spending measure on different 
age groups. nor does it publish longitudinal analysis to show how this has 
changed over time. It does, however, publish an overall summary of the effects 
of tax and benefits on households broken down by the age of a household 
representative307 as set out in Figure 7. Figure 7 shows that broadly the tax 
system takes more than it gives throughout a working lifetime and reverses 
that trend once a person retires and is supported by the State Pension and 
receives more support from the national Health Service.
Figure 7: Average net effect of the tax and spending by age of household 
representative
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Source: Office for National Statistics, ‘Effects of taxes and benefits on UK household income: financial year ending 
2017’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/
bulletins/theeffectsoftaxesandbenefitsonhouseholdincome/financialyearending2017 [accessed 31 January 2019]
219. Figure 8 shows how tax alone is split between different age groups. 
Individuals pay the most tax as they enter the later part of their working lives 
in their 50s and then once retired pay less tax than they paid in their working 
lives. The purpose of the social insurance system as designed by William 
Beveridge was that income from paid work would be taken through taxation 
and then paid out when that person was unable to work. As Professor Sir 
John Hills, Chair of Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion and Richard 
Titmuss Professor of Social Policy at LSE, describes it, “Much of what social 
policy does is still motivated by such life cycle variations in resources and 
307 The Household Representative Person (HRP) is the owner of the accommodation in which the 
household lives, the person legally responsible for that accommodation or if this responsibility is held 
jointly the individual with the highest income. If the accommodation is held jointly and incomes are 
equal then it is the older of the individuals who is the HRP.
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needs.”308 Although it may not be as well adapted to perform this function in 
the context of the 100-year life.
Figure 8: Total direct and indirect taxation by age of household 
representative
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Source: Office for National Statistics, ‘Effects of taxes and benefits on UK household income: financial year ending 
2017’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/
bulletins/theeffectsoftaxesandbenefitsonhouseholdincome/financialyearending2017 [accessed 31 January 2019]
220. After taxes and benefits have been applied to a household’s income and 
after housing costs are applied, the final distribution for different family 
types is described in Table 1.309 The results are clear. Households over the 
State Pension age have higher incomes than those below State Pension age 
with children but lower levels of income than those without children. This 
represents a profound change in recent decades. In the late 90s,310 those 
over the State Pension age were the group with the lowest incomes apart 
from single parents.311 However, an increased generosity of age-related 
benefits, increased private pension savings and an increase in the number 
of people over State Pension age in employment has changed this picture. 
The Rt Hon Frank Field MP, Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee, 
told us that if we were discussing intergenerational fairness a decade ago 
the agenda would have been dominated by pensioner poverty but due to 
the introduction of pension credit this changed so that poverty now “wears 
a younger face.”312
308 John Hills, Good Times Bad Times: The Welfare myth of them and us, Revised edition, (Policy Press, 
2017), p 49–51
309 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Households Below Average Income (HBAI) does not breakdown 
income by age of the Household Representative Person (HRP), so here we are using household type.
310 1996/97–1998/99
311 Department for Work and Pensions, ‘national Statistics Households below average income: 1994/95 
to 2017/18’ (28 March 2019): https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/households-below-average-
income-199495-to-201718 [accessed 28 March 2019]
312 Q 105 (Frank Field MP)
70 TACKLInG InTERGEnERATIOnAL UnFAIRnESS
Table 1: Median income after housing costs by household type adjusted 
for household size (2015/16–2017/18)
Couple without children £587
Pensioner couple £463
Single male without children £434
Single female without children £424
Couple with children £415
Single male pensioner £408
Single female pensioner £377
Single with children £271
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, ‘National Statistics Households below average income: 1994/95 to 
2017/18’ (28 March 2019): https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/households-below-average-income-199495-
to-201718 [accessed 28 March 2019]
221. The difference between people over and under the State Pension age is much 
larger in terms of wealth than income. As is to be expected, over the course 
of a person’s life they build up wealth. This saving is primarily in housing 
and pension wealth.313 This is desirable as it acts as a foundation for long-
term personal and family security and supports them through retirement. 
The natural effect of this is that people over the State Pension age have 
substantially more wealth than people under it. Table 2 shows that to be the 
case and also shows families with children have less wealth than equivalent 
families without (as was the case with income). As this wealth is mostly in 
housing and pension wealth it is not easily accessible.
Table 2: Median total household wealth by household type 2014 to 2016
Couple 1 over/ 1 under SPA, no children £703,000
Couple both over SPA, no children £618,400
Couple, non-dependent children £573,500
Couple both under SPA, no children £331,000
Couple, dependent children £238,900
Single household, over SPA £232,000
2 + households/other household type £163,700
Lone parent, non-dependent children £154,400
Single household, under SPA £95,000
Lone parent, dependent children £28,900
Source: Office for National Statistics, ‘Total Wealth: Wealth in Great Britain’: https://www.ons.
gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/datasets/
totalwealthwealthingreatbritain [accessed 29 March 2019]
222. The tax and spending system operates on a pay as you go basis, where, for 
example individuals who have received an education pay for the costs of 
313 Office for national Statistics, ‘Wealth in Great Britain Wave 5: 2014 to 2016’: https://www.ons.gov.
uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/bulletins/
wealthingreatbritainwave5/2014to2016 [accessed 28 January 2019]
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the education of the children of others, and current generations of working 
individuals pay for spending on current older individuals. This means that 
the post-war generation paid for the pensions, health and care of the previous 
smaller generation rather than paying ahead for themselves. The large size 
of the post-war baby boom compared to subsequent birth cohorts will pose 
challenges to the intergenerational compact implicit in our tax and spending 
system in the coming years. The relative difference in size of the generations 
means that the country is under threat of increasingly living beyond its 
means.
223. The number of retired people who receive more from the state than they pay 
in taxes will grow as this age group draws State Pensions and increasingly 
requires medical treatment and social care. If the increased costs of later 
life for a growing older population were to be paid for simply by increasing 
the rates of existing taxes then, as to be expected from Figure 8, it would be 
primarily paid for by working age households. If no action is taken, then the 
costs of this spending will be added to the national debt, greatly increasing 
its size from its already enlarged state. This is not sustainable and the costs 
of servicing and repaying this debt will be borne by younger generations and 
the unborn.
224. In addition to the current offering of the nHS and social security support for 
older generations which struggle to be financed from existing tax revenue, 
longer life also creates the risk of large social care costs for a proportion of 
the population. There have been a number of recent attempts to review and 
reform the finance of long-term social care to ensure those claiming bear a 
higher proportion of the burden. Such reform is in our judgment necessary. 
The last proposal by the Conservative Government at the 2017 General 
Election was widely criticised as a ‘dementia tax’ and, in the climate of an 
election, was abandoned. However, the challenge of future social care costs 
deserves mature cross-party reflection–and, ideally, political consensus.
225. There is currently a lottery whereby if a person is incapacitated and requires 
full-time residential care, then the largest part of their personal wealth, 
including their home, is ultimately forfeit and if they require only continuing 
healthcare they keep the entirety of their savings. However, if an incapacitated 
person can remain at home, the value of their home is not included in the 
calculation of their contribution toward the costs of their care. There are 
also variations in approach across the country, which renders the whole 
system difficult—and often frightening—for the public to understand. We 
believe that those who sustain high costs in social care and who have the 
ability to pay should make a larger contribution and do so on an equitable 
basis. There is currently an investigation into paying for social care by the 
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee.314 The Government is also 
due to release a long-awaited Social Care Green Paper. We have not therefore 
sought evidence here. nor do we make recommendations beyond noting that 
while every person may at some point need social care due to the uneven size 
of generations, it is a concern for intergenerational fairness and is not a cost 
that can simply be pushed onto younger generations and those just being 
born.
314 House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, ‘Social care funding in England inquiry’: https://
www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-affairs-committee/
inquiries/parliament-2017/social-care-funding-in-england/ [accessed 14 February 2019]
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226. In relation to national Insurance, respect should be paid to the widely held 
view dating back to the origins of the Welfare state—that it is by national 
Insurance Contributions individuals have paid toward their security in 
their old age. This concept may well have assisted in securing consent for 
taxation. But in reality the principle no longer holds as national Insurance 
Contributions are not linked to future spending on health, social care or 
the State Pension in retirement. The changes that are needed to the tax 
and benefit system are not about redistributing from old to the young but 
are instead a necessary part of ensuring that each generation contribute 
adequately toward the costs of the payments and services they receive.
227. If this does not happen the agreement between generations may degrade as 
the unborn are saddled with debt to pay for the costs of generations before 
them. The challenge of dealing with the costs of a larger generation has been 
apparent for decades but subsequent governments have failed to tackle it. 
now is the time for action to ensure that government policy is sustainable for 
generations to come.
Age-related benefits
228. There is a case to be made that the relative enhancement of the incomes of 
those over the State Pension age in recent years and its effect on the relative 
incomes of different age groups is an issue of intergenerational fairness. 
Social security payments to those over the State Pension age have been 
protected from cuts to the social security budget since 2010. Frank Field told 
us that cuts to social security spending had focused on households of people 
under the State Pension age, whilst protecting the incomes of those over the 
State Pension age. He submitted House of Commons Library research to us 
which showed that social security and tax credit spending for those under 
the State Pension age would be cut by £37 billion per year by 2020–21 from 
previously projected spending, if there was no policy change.315 Since this 
analysis was conducted, a small portion of these cuts had been reversed but 
the large majority remain in place.
229. These changes to the social security system have entirely focused on reducing 
intra-generational transfers and have failed to consider the larger generational 
challenge. Instead, changes to the social security system have increased the 
size of the generational challenge. The State Pension has seen real terms 
increases as a result of the “triple lock” which was included in the Coalition 
Government’s Programme for Government in 2010. This triple lock means 
that the State Pension is uprated according to whichever is highest of wages, 
inflation or 2.5 per cent.
230. Between the Social Security Act of 1980 and 2010 the State Pension was 
only uprated with inflation and did not keep up with earnings increases 
during this period. The House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee 
inquiry into intergenerational fairness concluded that the triple lock had 
succeeded in restoring the value of the State Pension, but that provided “the 
new state pension is maintained at this proportion of earnings the work of 
the triple lock, to secure a decent minimum income for people in retirement 
to underpin private saving, will have been achieved.”316 It also suggested that 
maintaining the triple lock indefinitely would be unsustainable. Frank Field 
315 Written Evidence from Frank Field MP (IFP0060)
316 Work and Pensions Committee, Intergenerational fairness (Third Report, Session 2016–17, HC 59)
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told us that he still supported this conclusion but was worried about its 
political ramifications.317
231. The TaxPayers’ Alliance told us that it was “egregiously unfair” that at a time 
of spending restrictions on young people that the State Pension was rising at 
such a high rate. It also suggested that as there was a public spending deficit 
the cost of these rises was being paid by future generations. It recommended 
that the State Pension should be frozen.318 Whilst there is a case for spending 
restraint it does not seem fair for people reliant on the State Pension to fall 
behind working people. nor on the other hand is it fair for them to have their 
incomes lifted at a faster rate than that experienced by working people.
232. The triple lock for the State Pension should be removed. The State 
Pension should be uprated in line with average earnings to ensure 
parity with working people. However, there should be protection 
against any unusually high periods of inflation in the future.
233. Alongside the State Pension there are a number of other age-related social 
security payments. These benefits do not appear to be well targeted to achieve 
their purposes. An example of this is the Winter Fuel Payments of £100–300 
(depending on age and whether the individual lives alone) are made to all 
over 65s, in theory, to help them pay their heating bills.319
234. Professor Hills told us that Winter Fuel Payments “are almost the least 
effective way of coping with fuel poverty.”320 Government fuel poverty 
statistics suggest that Winter Fuel Payments are not well targeted for those 
who experience fuel poverty.321 Single parents are substantially more likely to 
be in fuel poverty (26 per cent) than either single people over 60 or couples 
over 60 (fewer than 10 per cent of either group). Households where the oldest 
member is 16–24 are more likely to be in fuel poverty than any other age 
group. Similarly, households where the youngest member is under 15 (16–21 
per cent) are significantly more likely to be in fuel poverty than those where 
the youngest member is over 60 (eight per cent). Households where the 
youngest member was 11–15 had an average fuel poverty gap (the amount 
needed to exit fuel poverty gap) of £386 compared to households where the 
oldest member was over 75 which had an average fuel poverty gap of £262. 
Professor Hills suggested that the money from Winter Fuel Payments should 
be diverted to something that “made a difference to the people at risk of fuel 
poverty”. He indicated that “a permanent solution” involving the “insulation 
of their homes” was preferable.322
235. Across the UK older people can apply for an older person’s bus pass, but the 
age differs according to where in the UK someone lives. In London, Wales, 
Scotland and northern Ireland the free bus pass (and certain other travel 
concessions) begins at age 60 whilst for the rest of England it applies from the 
age of 65 and is scheduled to rise with State Pension age. Warwick Lightfoot, 
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319 HM Government, ‘Winter Fuel Payment’: https://www.gov.uk/winter-fuel-payment [accessed 29 
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321 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Annual Fuel Poverty Statistics Report, 2018 
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Head of Economics and Social Policy at Policy Exchange, questioned the 
fairness of bus passes for older people which allowed individuals in their 
early 60s to receive free transport whilst still working, when the funding for 
services for those who have serious difficulty in accessing transport like Dial-
a-Ride, was severely restricted.323 However, there is an environmental case to 
be made for incentivising less able older people to use public transport rather 
than a car for short, or medium range, journeys that younger people would 
be able to walk or cycle.
236. A further benefit that goes to older people is that they have access to a 
free television licence if they are over 75. A TV licence costs £154.50 per 
household.324 This cost is met out of the BBC’s budget. It is estimated that 
it will cost £745 million a year by 2021/22 which is equivalent to 20 per cent 
of the BBC’s current budget for programmes and services.325 The BBC is 
currently considering the future of the free TV licence. This Committee does 
not consider the method of financing the BBC to be a factor in determining 
the intergenerational equity of this benefit. The overall structure of the 
licence fee is beyond our remit. However, we note that it is inappropriate that 
the BBC should be tasked with funding the social policy goal of supporting 
older generations. If the Government wishes to subsidise the licence fee, the 
BBC should not carry the cost.
237. In our submission, free television licences for all over a certain age 
should be phased out. Those who can afford to pay for a television 
licence should do so. The poorest may be subsidised directly by the 
Government, if it so chooses.
238. Rory Meakin, Research Fellow at the TaxPayers’ Alliance, suggested that 
most of these age-related benefits should be means tested. He told us that 
the current terminology is insulting to older people in suggesting that they 
should spend their money in particular ways and that a more dignified 
solution would be for them to be given as an undirected credit to people 
on low incomes.326 Professor Hills warned against means testing these 
benefits. He informed us that reducing means testing had been an important 
principle of the Pensions Commission, as means testing caused negative 
disincentive effects when combined with taxes which affected people’s 
decisions on saving and earning. Warwick Lightfoot told us that means 
testing creates an administrative nuisance factor. An additional concern 
noted by Carys Roberts, Senior Economist at the IPPR, was that pension 
credit (a means tested age-related benefit) has a very low take up and the 
process of means testing “because of the structure of families … ends up 
being quite regressive.”327
239. Frank Field suggested that these age-related benefits should be treated as 
taxable income for the purposes of income tax as a way to create fairness 
between generations. He stated that the benefits received would “just be 
entered on our income tax forms.”328 However, as Steve Webb, former 
Minister for Pensions, told the House of Commons Work and Pensions 
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Committee “most people do not fill in tax returns.”329 Warwick Lightfoot 
told us that a prominent reason for recent changes to the older person’s tax 
regime was to ensure that as few older people fill out tax form as is possible.330
240. Professor Hills suggested that existing benefits could be “grandfathered” out 
of the system.331 This would mean that the age at which you receive the credit 
is raised but it is done in such a way that people’s immediate budgets are not 
upset. This is in some way a similar approach to the Government’s proposed 
future changes to the State Pension age, where it has announced the ages it 
will rise to well in advance of the time that individuals who would be affected 
by the change reach that age. Whilst this can be an effective approach, if 
done poorly or without sufficient notice it can have negative consequences 
for specific cohorts. This can be most clearly seen in the case of women born 
in the 1950s who have seen their State Pension age rise as part of government 
efforts to equalise men and women’s State Pension age. Any future changes 
must ensure that they do not hit the cohort which has already lost out most 
from other changes in the State Pension age.
241. The Government should seek to target existing age-related benefits 
better at individuals outside the workforce. Age thresholds should 
be raised. From 2026–28 when the State Pension age is due to rise 
to 67, free bus passes and Winter Fuel Payments should be available 
no sooner than five years after the State Pension age and age 
thresholds should be aligned across benefits. The difference should 
be maintained from then on as the State Pension age rises. There 
should be transitional protection so that individuals who currently 
receive these payments continue to receive them. This should ensure 
that the cohort of women who have been most severely affected 
by changes to the State Pension age would not suffer a double 
disadvantage from this subsequent change.
242. Alongside changing the age of applicability, the Government should 
investigate the feasibility of treating these benefits as taxable income 
for those above the tax threshold without requiring individuals who 
currently do not complete an income tax form having to fill out a 
form.
National Insurance
243. One area where the tax system explicitly advantages older people over people 
younger than the State Pension age is national Insurance Contributions. 
Employees over the State Pension age do not pay employee national Insurance 
Contributions. Frank Field suggested that this current situation was not fair. 
He stated the principle that a person who is working should be taxed in 
the same way as any other person working.332 Paul Johnson, Director at the 
IFS, described this situation as “hard to justify on any normal grounds.”333 
Professor Hills told us that there “was a logic to the system when most 
pensioners were poor” but that this is no longer the case.334
329 Oral evidence taken before the Work and Pensions Committee, 2 March 2016 (Session 2016–17), Q 41 
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244. John Glen MP, Economic Secretary to the Treasury and City Minister, told 
us that the reason employee national Insurance Contributions stopped at 
the State Pension age is because “national Insurance is a contribution made 
towards a contributory benefit. When you reach retirement age, you have made 
that contribution. Subsequently insisting on an additional tax when you have 
already reached your entitlement to that benefit does not seem to hold true.”335 
Professor Hills described this contributory benefit as “an accounting fiction” 
based on the idea that we pay in our working lives and receive benefits after 
retirement.336 However, as acknowledged at the beginning of this chapter, 
individuals do not pay in to fund their own benefits, they pay for the current 
older generation. Professor Hills told us that tax and spending contributions 
had not worked out evenly between generations, partly due to increased life 
expectancy not being reflected in higher State Pension ages, resulting in “a 
benefit for people born between 1945 and 1960.” Warwick Lightfoot warned 
that the idea of a contributory system is very popular, that people do not like 
it when there are changes in terms of what needs to be contributed and that 
the erosion of this contributory system was a source of irritation for some 
people.337
245. Paul Johnson suggested that the one way in which having a lower tax rate on 
people over the State Pension age could be justified would be to encourage 
employment. He told us that “65-year-old men are quite responsive to different 
tax rates.”338 Warwick Lightfoot stated that the international evidence shows 
that taxes like national Insurance Contributions affect people’s working 
and saving decisions and can remove people from the labour market.339 
John Glen MP argued that the current system “creates an incentive for 
people to work longer if they so wish.” As discussed throughout this report, 
government policy must support individuals remaining economically active 
for longer as part of a 100-year life.
246. Caroline Abrahams, Charity Director at Age UK, also made a fairness 
argument for not charging individuals over the State Pension age:
“What if you have been in a really well-paid job, you retire on a great 
pension and you can have a wonderful retirement to look forward to, as 
opposed to somebody else who has struggled all their lives financially, 
has not built up a good state pension record and is forced to work past 
the state pension age. Why should they lose out, relatively speaking, 
compared to somebody else? Is that the right group of people?”340
247. However, this argument relies on the idea that people who stay in work 
after the State Pension age are relatively less well off than those who retire 
at that point. The evidence we received from the researchers behind the 
Understanding Society survey suggested that this was not the case. They 
presented research showing that decisions to continue working after State 
Pension age “were not strongly associated with financial difficulty”.341 The 
evidence suggests that most individuals who work beyond the State Pension 
age choose to do so for their own benefit rather than being forced to by 
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their circumstances. It is also to society’s benefit that they continue to work, 
contributing to the economy and to the Exchequer through their work. 
On the other hand, the justification for keeping a sharp policy delineation 
between people receiving a State Pension and those who do not makes less 
sense when people are working longer. Old age should not be defined by the 
receipt of the State Pension.
248. The National Insurance system functions poorly. NICs do not pay for 
the State Pension even though they are used as a way to determine 
eligibility for it. They are not linked to any actual rules on the size of 
State Pension and the Government does not treat it as a future liability 
in the Whole of Government Accounts. There are strong arguments 
for the Government to consider greater alignment and the eventual 
merger of the NICs and income tax systems.
249. The reality of longer working lives should prompt the Government 
to rethink the National Insurance system. It is not fair that only 
individuals under the State Pension age pay this tax. Individuals 
over the State Pension age should contribute. Older people with lower 
incomes could be protected from this change by aligning the NICs 
threshold for this group with the income tax personal allowance.
Property taxes
250. One idea raised in the evidence we received was that the generational funding 
challenge could be met by increasing taxation on the wealth of older people 
in society. As property and pension wealth make up the majority of this 
wealth and pension income is already taxed, individuals with this view have 
chosen to focus on property taxes. Proponents of wealth taxes argue that 
property taxes can fulfil two functions in terms of intergenerational fairness. 
Property taxes could be a way of raising more revenue from generations with 
a larger amount of property wealth and could also have a behavioural effect 
by increasing the cost of living in more expensive property. This, it was 
argued, would have the effect of forcing some people to “downsize” or sell 
their family home in order to meet the costs of property taxation.
251. Although this taxation of wealth would have the once-off effect of contributing 
to the financing of spending for older generations, it would also have a long-
term effect on taxation through the lifecourse. Today’s younger generations 
would face the same costs of property taxation on any property that they are 
able to accumulate. To some degree this would reduce the extent to which it 
solves any intergenerational problem as it would be borrowing from younger 
people’s future. Younger generations who do not have the same problem of 
living in a larger cohort than the one they are financing the retirement of 
would end up paying for the cost of their retirement twice: once through 
paying in through the tax system during their working life and then again 
through wealth taxes in their later life.
252. The nature of the housing difficulties that younger generations face and the 
amount of property wealth that older generations have differ widely across the 
country. The average household in the north East has £44,000 in property 
wealth whilst in the South East they have £170,000.342 In the context of 
342 Office for national Statistics, ‘Wealth in Great Britain Wave 5: 2014 to 2016’: https://www.ons.gov.
uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/bulletins/
wealthingreatbritainwave5/2014to2016 [accessed 28 January 2019]
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property taxation, including stamp duty, there is a case for investigating 
regional taxation of property to match this regional inequality. This could 
still be administered by central government. The Government already 
applies different standards to London and the rest of the country in relation 
to some of its interventions in the housing market, such as Help-to-Buy or 
Lifetime ISAs. However, there is not enough data on the intergenerational 
effects of regionalisation to make useful recommendations at this time. As 
a result, in this chapter we have concentrated on issues that underlie the 
current national system of property taxation.
253. The OECD estimates that in 2017 the UK collected the second largest 
amount of property tax of any OECD country, with only France collecting 
more.343 It estimates that the UK takes 4.2 per cent of GDP in property 
taxes, a similar amount to the United States but less than the 4.4 per cent 
collected by France.344 The average for OECD countries is to take 1.9 per cent 
of GDP in property taxes. The two largest taxes on property in the UK are 
Council Tax and stamp duty. Of these two taxes, Council Tax is by far the 
larger, estimated to have raised £32.1 billion in 2017–18, whilst all property 
transaction taxes, including stamp duty, raised £13.6 billion.345
254. Council Tax, while being the UK’s largest property tax, was not designed as 
a property tax. This explains some of its apparent oddities. It was introduced 
to contribute towards local government services, as a replacement for the 
Community Charge (also known as the Poll Tax) which was a flat service 
charge to fund local councils. The Community Charge was seen as unfair as 
it levied tax on everybody whether they owned property or not and did not 
reflect the value of property. The Community Charge was itself a replacement 
for the Rates system which was also seen as unfair as it did not bear any 
relation to income or numbers in a household. Council Tax was created as 
a compromise between the two systems as a charge for services that varies 
by property value but with less variation than the previous rates system. In 
reality, Council Tax covers only a proportion of each local authority’s cost. If 
Council Tax was reclassified as a service charge rather than a property tax, 
then the UK would have levels of property taxation that are much closer to 
the OECD average.346 If Council Tax is treated as a property tax, then, in 
its current form it fares quite poorly at achieving the aims of proponents of 
property taxes.
255. Paul Johnson told us that the right way to think about Council Tax is as tax 
on the consumption of housing, but that a good tax on the consumption 
of housing “ought to be broadly proportional to the value of the property” 
whilst Council Tax “is regressive in the value of the property; it rises at only 
half the rate of the value of the property and it is capped. You can see that 
as a straightforward inequity in the sense that you have a lower proportional 
tax on more expensive properties.”347 Furthermore, he informed us that this 
difference has a particularly intergenerational effect as older generations 
tend to own more expensive properties and so benefit from being taxed 
343 OECD Data, ‘Tax on property’: https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-on-property.htm [accessed 28 January 
2019]
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less proportionately by Council Tax.348 However, whilst many older people 
owning properties are capital rich as a result of large increases in asset prices, 
some are income poor.
256. The Rt Hon The Lord Willetts highlighted the fact that some local authorities 
charge a lower rate of Council Tax on second properties as an additional 
unfairness and suggested that it should be redesigned.349 Professor Hills 
told us that Council Tax should be redesigned so that the rate charged was 
more closely related to the size and capital value of the property alongside 
additional protections for people who are asset-rich but income poor through 
a system of delayed payments. He showed us an example to highlight the 
problem with the current system of Council Tax:
“I looked last year at a flat in Kensington for sale for £300,000 and 
a house for sale a mile away for £30 million. The Council Tax in 
Kensington and Chelsea payable by the £30 million house was £24 a 
week higher than that for the £300,000 flat.”350
257. Rory Meakin disagreed with this approach, arguing that property values are 
high due to scarcity and that the “solution is not to tax the upside for the 
winners of that scarcity. Instead, it is to reduce the scarcity in the first place, 
i.e. build more houses.”351 Warwick Lightfoot agreed, stating that there is 
“a housing supply issue and we are not going to resolve it with a housing 
taxation solution.”352
258. Professor Hilber, Professor of Economic Geography at LSE, told us that an 
annual tax on property value could be very efficient and if done at the local 
level could encourage increased housing supply. He told us that:
“If it is done at the local level it has the added benefit that it provides tax 
incentives to local authorities to permit development. Right now, they 
face most of the costs of development at the local level and they face the 
nIMBY residents who do not like development, so it is understandable 
that they do not want to permit development, from which they have very 
little tax revenue.”353
259. Council Tax is an incoherent combination of a property tax and a 
service charge. If the Government decides it would like to continue to 
fund local authorities through a tax partly based on property value, 
then it might reform Council Tax so that it adheres to the following 
principles:
(1) A reformed tax should more closely mirror the value of the 
property than the existing Council Tax system.
(2) It should include a method for allowing individuals with low 
incomes but high asset values to delay payment until the 
property is next sold or transferred.
(3) Second homes should pay the full rate of local tax.
348 Ibid.
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260. Whilst the evidence we received was mixed on the desirability of reforming 
Council Tax, our witnesses were almost unanimous in support of reforming 
stamp duty. Stamp duty is seen as reducing the liquidity of the property 
market. By increasing transaction costs, it incentivises the “upsizing” of 
existing homes where people choose to invest in increasing the size of their 
existing home rather than paying stamp duty on purchasing a new home. 
This could decrease the number of smaller homes which are more suitable 
for first time buyers.
261. Paul Johnson told us that that governments liked stamp duty because it 
is easier to collect and that there has been “a big rebalancing away from 
Council Tax towards stamp duty over the last 20 years.” He suggested that 
you would expect an increase in stamp duty to decrease transactions and that 
is what has happened, although causation is harder to prove. The result of 
taxing transaction is that “housing will be misallocated between people and 
between generations.”354 Lord Willetts described stamp duty as a “classic 
bad tax” which impedes transactions and stops older people from trading 
down into smaller housing. He suggested that it should be reduced.355
262. Professor Hills told us that stamp duty means that property transactions 
are “gummed up by people who feel that it is too expensive to move and 
[decide] it is better to leave property empty or to not downsize”.356 The Rt 
Hon The Lord Forsyth, Chair of the House of Lords Economic Affairs 
Committee, told us that stamp duty in London has “brought some sections 
of the housing market to a complete dead stop.”357 He also stated that it was 
important to decrease stamp duty in order to reduce the burden for people 
who are downsizing.358 Professor Hilber presented his research which showed 
that stamp duty has a particular negative effect on short-distance moves 
and housing-related moves which could mean that attempts to downsize are 
particularly affected. He also warned that “Jobrelated mobility could also be 
negatively affected.”359 Rory Meakin told us that stamp duty is a “terrible 
tax” because it keeps older people in larger homes and prevents them from 
moving somewhere smaller.360 Carys Roberts summed this up neatly with 
her statement that she did not think she had “met an economist who thinks 
that stamp duty is a good tax.”361
263. John Glen MP, Economic Secretary to the Treasury and City Minister, 
told us that the Government had made substantial changes to stamp duty 
so that “23 per cent of people pay no stamp duty at all, while over half of 
transactions—51 per cent—are less than £2,500. The main intervention that 
we made was to remove stamp duty for first-time buyers up to £300,000, 
while first-time buyers up to £500,000 pay a lower 5 per cent on sums 
between £300,000 and £500,000.”362 Paul Broadhead, Head of Mortgage 
Policy at the Building Societies Association, suggested to us that this decision 
to reduce stamp duty for first time buyers “clearly has helped many people 
get on to the housing ladder.”363 However, John Glen argued that stamp duty 
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was not an important lever on all purchase decisions and did not have much 
effect on people’s decision to downsize:
“From the evidence in the reports from the national House Building 
Council in December 2017 and the International Longevity Centre in 
January 2016, the actual amount of stamp duty that they would pay—
£2,100 for a property of £230,000, in the example that I have given—is 
less than one-third of the estate agent’s fees. Most of the evidence from 
the national House Building Council is that it is other factors, such 
as maintenance costs and security, that determine people’s choice to 
downsize.”364
264. Whilst there are many other factors that affect an individual’s decision to 
downsize or upsize their property, it does not make sense to have a tax on 
transactions, introducing large amounts of friction into the housing market 
during a housing crisis.
265. Stamp duty has seriously distorted the housing market. The 
Government should review the effect of stamp duty on the liquidity of 
the housing market and consider how stamp duty could be reformed 
to improve the housing choices and availability for young families.
Inheritance Tax
266. Some advocates of wealth taxation support limiting intergenerational 
transfers as a way of meeting the costs of the generational challenge outlined 
above. However, others argue that as accumulated private capital naturally 
flows from one generation to the next, it is unclear in principle that reducing 
the amount that any part of a subsequent generation receives of the wealth 
of the previous generation improves intergenerational fairness. Inheritance 
Tax is the current instrument for diverting such intergenerational capital 
flows to the Treasury. Above the threshold it acts as a tax on the transfer of 
the assets of a deceased individual to any person or institution other than a 
charity. As most retained wealth is possessed in pensions and property, most 
inheritance is in property, as pension wealth is largely used to finance later 
life. It is applied at a 40 per cent rate over the Inheritance Tax threshold. The 
basic threshold is £325,000, this rises to £450,000 if a main home is being 
given to the deceased individual’s children or grandchildren. Any unused 
threshold can be passed on to a partner meaning that a couple can leave up 
to £900,000 tax free if this includes their main home and is being given to 
their children or grandchildren.365
267. Stamp duty data from 2017/18 finds that 1.8 per cent of properties sold 
in the UK were sold for over £1 million (up from 1.7 per cent in 2015/16) 
rising to 2.5 per cent in the South East (up from 2.1 per cent in 2015/16) and 
9.3 per cent in London (up from 7.9 per cent in 2015/16).366 This suggests 
that few children outside London currently pay Inheritance Tax solely 
on the basis of the value of a single property. However, the thresholds for 
Inheritance Tax have not been rising with inflation so in the coming years 
it is entirely possible that an increasing proportion of properties in London 
and some parts of the south east of England will attract Inheritance Tax 
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when their owners die. In addition, where inheritance is not given to a direct 
descendent, greater numbers will be caught more widely.
268. Inheritance Tax raised in 2017/18 £5.2 billion and that is set to rise to 
£6.9 billion in 2023–24.367 However, the growth in Inheritance Tax receipts is 
at a slower rate than the growth of inheritances as a whole.368 Internationally, 
there are a wide variety of policy choices on whether or how much to tax 
inheritance. new Zealand, Australia, Sweden and Canada have abolished 
their inheritance taxes whilst for Belgium, France and Japan, inheritance 
taxes make up a larger portion of tax revenues than it does in the UK.369 As 
life expectancy increases so does the age of those who receive inheritance. 
The likelihood of receiving an inheritance increases as individuals age, with 
those who are 55–64 the most likely to receive an inheritance and this is 
also the age group that receives the largest inheritances.370 Every generation 
at some point in life may hope to inherit or aspire to bequeath the fruits of 
a fulfilled working life. Even in the case of later life inheritances, resources 
received could help many individuals with support they will need in the latter 
part of the 100-year life.
269. Financial and other support that flows between generations is evidence of the 
strength of the intergenerational compact. For many families, Inheritance 
Tax is a source of concern. There are a range of views on Inheritance Tax. 
Just as with stamp duty, our witnesses thought that Inheritance Tax needed 
reform. Lord Willetts described Inheritance Tax as “a classic bad tax” due 
to it having “a very high rate that sounds very scary but with very few people 
paying it.”371 Carys Roberts from IPPR told us that it was easy to avoid if 
you are “wealthy, healthy and well advised”.372 Lord Willetts explained that 
anyone who had the capacity to give away their wealth more than seven years 
before their death “are not really paying much of the tax at all.”373 Rory 
Meakin from the TaxPayers’ Alliance suggested that Inheritance Tax was 
“phenomenally unpopular” because most families view it as a tax in the middle 
that gets in the way of transfers between generations.374 Warwick Lightfoot 
told us that the complexity of the current Inheritance Tax system meant 
many individuals face a bureaucratic burden to comply with the Inheritance 
Tax system even if they are not actually liable to pay it.375
270. An alternative approach to taxing the transfer of resources between 
generations is to have a capital receipts tax where gifts and inheritances are 
taxed as income received by the inheritor or giftee. This was the approach 
favoured by Lord Willetts376 and Carys Roberts.377 Carys Roberts told 
367 Budget 2018, p 96
368 Intergenerational Commission, Passing On: Options for reforming inheritance taxation (May 2018) p 14: 
https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2018/05/IC-inheritance-tax.pdf [accessed 29 
January 2019]
369 Passing On: Options for reforming inheritance taxation, p 11–12
370 Office for national Statistics, ‘Intergenerational transfers: the distribution of 
inheritances, gifts and loans, Great Britain: 2014 to 2016’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdf inances/incomeandwealth/articles/
intergenerationaltransfersthedistributionofinheritancesgiftsandloans/2018–10-30 [accessed 29 
January 2019]
371 Q 5 (Lord Willetts)
372 Q 181 (Carys Roberts)
373 Q 5 (Lord Willetts)
374 Q 181 (Rory Meakin)
375 Q 181 (Warwick Lightfoot)
376 Q 5 (Lord Willetts)
377 Q 181 (Carys Roberts)
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us that the advantage of this system would be that it “cannot be avoided 
through those arbitrary means any more.” She also suggested it would 
incentivise breaking up inheritances to be given to younger generations as 
the more inheritors there are, the less tax would be paid on the inheritance.378 
Warwick Lightfoot told us that the problem with this type of tax is that it 
would require a large amount of record keeping from individuals who would 
have to record the gifts they receive across their lifetime. He also suggested 
that this, as with Inheritance Tax, could affect people’s incentive to earn, as 
one of the reasons people work hard is to leave money to their children.379
271. Another alternative approach was put forward in a report commissioned 
by the Building Societies Association.380 It suggested that funding that was 
left for the specific reason of becoming a deposit on a home for a younger 
generation could be exempt from Inheritance Tax. However, this sort of 
idea, if not carefully implemented, may make the housing crisis worse. The 
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee’s inquiry into the housing 
market found that tax exemptions aimed at property increased prices by 
incentivising investment in property. It recommended that taxes should not 
have special exemptions built in to prioritise property. There may however be 
a case for a carefully targeted relief which solely benefits those seeking a first 
home with the size of the relief capped to prevent exploitation. This could 
help address the present exceptional circumstances without incentivising 
additional investment in property for investment’s sake.
272. Inheritance Tax is capricious and not currently fit for purpose. 
Consideration needs to be given to whether and how assets should 
be taxed on death or transfer in a way that ensures fairness between 
generations.
378 Ibid.
379 Q 181 (Warwick Lightfoot)
380 Building Societies Association, Intergenerational mortgages: Building on the Bank of Mum and 
Dad (november 2018) p 50: https://www.bsa.org.uk/BSA/files/da/da1a7288–7755-43db-9a5d-
69687ef84416.pdf [accessed 29 January 2019]
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
Looking forward and taking a lifecourse approach
1. There is a structural shift taking place, with younger generations not seeing 
the increase in living standards enjoyed by previous generations. At the 
same time older generations face a society that is not prepared for their 
numbers or their needs as they age. Many young people, their parents and 
their grandparents worry about younger people being able to afford a home 
and achieve a secure well-paying job. This is not due to older generations 
deliberately or selfishly profiting at their expense but is instead a result of 
the failure of successive governments to plan for the future and prepare for 
social, economic and technological change. (Paragraph 23)
Accounting for the future
Improving Government processes
2. The Government must think better about the long-term in order to tackle 
intergenerational fairness. It should create a fiscal rule that addresses the whole of the 
Government balance sheet, in addition to that focusing on its current spending deficit. 
It should also improve transparency and accounting of the spending review process 
by publishing the analytical assumptions behind each department’s initial requests at 
the start of the spending review to show its perception of the country’s needs over the 
course of the next spending period. There should also be an independent validation 
of these assumptions, for example by the National Audit Office. (Paragraph 43)
Data on intergenerational fairness
3. The UK Statistics Authority should prioritise improving generational statistics. This 
work should begin by the Office for National Statistics introducing a generational 
breakdown of the Effects of Tax and Benefits on Household Income data set and 
releasing a backdated time-series of this data. The Office for National Statistics 
should also investigate ways to improve the Wealth and Assets Survey’s coverage of 
gifts and inheritances as well as publishing a generational breakdown of the survey’s 
findings in each release. In addition, the Department for Work and Pensions should 
introduce a generational breakdown of the Households Below Average Income 
data set in its annual release and publish a backdated time-series of this data. 
(Paragraph 52)
4. The Treasury must do more to generate and publish data on intergenerational 
fairness. It can immediately begin by producing a distributional breakdown of the 
effects of each budget by age group using the static models it already has. It should 
invest in developing its capacity to model the generational effects of tax and benefits 
policies. (Paragraph 58)
5. The Government should create Intergenerational Impact Assessments for all draft 
legislation indicating how it will affect different generations. (Paragraph 59)
The housing challenge
Housing supply
6. The Government is not taking the action needed to ensure that there is a 
sufficient supply of affordable housing. In particular, action needs to be 
taken to substantially increase the supply of social housing. One means of 
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doing this is to ease the ability of local authorities to borrow to fund housing 
building. This lack of action on housing is primarily hurting younger 
generations. However, younger generations can be helped by building more 
housing which is accessible and adaptable for older generations as part of a 
wider increase in supply. (Paragraph 73)
The private rented sector
7. The Government’s proposed reforms do not create a regulatory framework 
that will provide private tenants the security they need. This particularly 
affects young people who are unable to buy and becomes a greater problem 
as they age. Change is needed so that renters who want a long-term secure 
tenancy can find one. (Paragraph 82)
Intergenerational transfer and financial products
8. Intergenerational transfers play an important role in housing affordability 
for many members of younger generations. There is a need for innovative, 
flexible products which can help address this issue. The Government and the 
Financial Conduct Authority have a key role to play in ensuring a regulatory 
framework that encourages new challenger entrants to these markets, who 
can shake up the existing playing field. (Paragraph 91)
Development of public sector land
9. The Government has failed to manage properly the land which it owns. It should 
invest in developing a central government capability to understand fully what land 
public bodies own, how public sector bodies use that land and where it can be disposed 
of. (Paragraph 97)
10. In order to increase housing supply, local authorities should be given a presumption 
to develop on land owned by public sector bodies. Local authorities should be 
empowered to ensure that development on public land takes place. (Paragraph 100)
The capacity of local authorities to deal with planning issues
11. The Government should give powers to local authorities to set their own planning 
fees up to cost. Local authorities should ensure that additional fees are retained by 
planning departments. (Paragraph 106)
12. The Government should issue guidance clarifying that extra care retirement 
communities fall within the C2 use class as they are capable of delivering high levels 
of care to older people and so should be treated as the same planning use class as care 
homes. (Paragraph 110)
Planning for each generation
13. The Government should issue planning guidance to recommend that local plans 
consider the needs of younger people alongside the existing specified demographics. 
(Paragraph 114)
14. The Government should ensure that local plans have specific policies to address the 
needs of younger and older people. If the new National Planning Policy Framework’s 
requirement that local authorities consider these issues does not achieve this, then the 
Government must take more direct action. (Paragraph 115)
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Educating generations for the 100-year life
Education in schools
15. The Government should ensure that young people are provided with sufficient 
education about housing and other practical finance matters before leaving school. 
The Government should make PSHE a statutory subject inspected by Ofsted. 
Increased housing and financial education within PSHE would be helpful. Local 
organisations should, where possible, be brought into schools to signpost young 
people to suitable financial education resources, including relevant advisory bodies. 
(Paragraph 126)
Further Education
16. The apprenticeship system is confused. It is not adequately serving young people or 
apprentices retraining later in life. Apprenticeships should develop skills for those 
who need them, including routes to technical and craft careers. Resources raised via 
the levy should not be used to rebadge training that would occur anyway. There is too 
little monitoring and too little focus on quality and outcomes. We note the number of 
changes in the system in recent years, but do not believe failed experiments should be 
used as a pretext for deferring effective reform. The Government must improve the 
quality of apprenticeships to deliver real skills for lifelong and fulfilling careers and 
ensure they are focussed on those young people, and re-trainers, who are not well 
served by other education routes. It must review and remove reported bureaucratic 
barriers to the provision of apprenticeships by employers. (Paragraph 135)
17. The Government should substantially increase funding for Further Education 
and vocational qualifications. Many students would be better served by pursuing 
vocational educational pathways. The current system of funding and access is 
inefficient, complex and risks perpetuating unfairness between those who access 
Higher Education and those who do not. We must rebalance the value attributed to 
Higher Education and Further Education. (Paragraph 136)
Higher Education
18. The qualifications that young people leave education with do not always 
match the needs of the labour market. Post 16 educational providers and the 
bodies that regulate them should seek to link educational outcomes more 
closely to the labour market. (Paragraph 142)
Lifelong learning
19. Lifelong learning is a cause for serious concern. We are concerned that 
existing policy is inadequate and will not meet the need for growth. Lifelong 
learning over the lifecourse will become more important as more people lead 
longer working lives. The Government is failing to grasp the scale of lifelong 
learning required to cater for people living longer and for technological 
change. (Paragraph 151)
20. The Government’s National Retraining Scheme should be extended and scaled up 
to prepare for the challenges of an ageing workforce and technological development. 
This should be targeted throughout the lifecourse and must adequately reach those 
who are not employees. (Paragraph 152)
21. The Government should consider new incentives to encourage people in lifelong 
learning. The National Retraining Scheme alone will not suffice. The Government 
should implement a cohesive lifelong learning strategy following on from the results 
of the review of post-18 education. (Paragraph 153)
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Working in the 100-year life
Pay progression
22. Slow pay progression is a particularly acute concern for young people. This 
is a real challenge, as slow pay progression can have serious consequences 
for progression through life. Business’ best practice for encouraging pay 
progression should be shared. Acting on the recommendations proposed for 
lifelong learning will aid progression through the lifecourse. (Paragraph 161)
Insecurity of the job market
23. Insecure employment is concentrated in the younger part of the age spectrum. 
While this may not be a problem if insecure work is performed alongside 
studies, it poses a problem when it accounts for a young person’s only source 
of employment. (Paragraph 166)
24. Denying workers the rights that come with worker status fails to protect them from 
exploitation and poor working conditions. This disproportionately affects younger 
people. There should be an assumption of the employment status of ‘worker’ by 
default, in order to make the rights and protections that come with this status 
enforceable, without interfering with the rights of those who genuinely wish for self-
employed status to adopt it. (Paragraph 170)
25. The timetable should be released for when the research commissioned into 
those workers with uncertain employment status will be published and when 
it will make a decision on bringing forward legislation. (Paragraph 173)
Flexible working and mid-life career reviews
26. The Government should work with employers to ensure that more jobs are advertised 
as flexible. The public sector is leading the way in flexible working. Wherever 
possible, public sector jobs should be advertised as flexible. (Paragraph 177)
27. Mid-life MoTs can play an important role in preparing people for a longer 
working life. Mid-life MoTs cannot be a one-off, discrete event, and are 
most effective when viewed as part of a process of good management. The 
Government’s efforts to encourage mid-life MoTs are in danger of missing 
those most in need of support, including individuals who work for employers 
that lack the capacity to provide mid-life MoTs and those outside the 
workforce. On the other hand, providing a single statutory MoT at a fixed 
age to every employee would lack flexibility and might lead to waste. If MoTs 
are to be introduced effectively, the Government needs to give a good deal 
more thought to how they should operate. (Paragraph 182)
Ageism
28. notwithstanding the increase in employment of older people, ageism remains 
a problem within British society and is affecting the ability of some people 
to continue working into later life, despite long-standing laws against age 
discrimination. Discrimination in recruitment is a particular problem. More 
should be done to recruit and retain older workers. (Paragraph 189)
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All-age communities as drivers of intergenerational fairness
The power of community actions
29. Community initiatives that bring generations together are an important way 
of cementing intergenerational bonds. These bonds provide support to both 
young and old members of communities where needed. (Paragraph 201)
Facilitating community activity
30. Local authorities should share intergenerational best practice and publish practical 
examples and information relating to community-run services and community 
assets. (Paragraph 210)
31. At all levels, government should be an enabler of community activity. Both central 
and local government should concentrate on permitting and facilitating community 
activity, rather than strictly policing when and where it takes place. (Paragraph 216)
32. The Government must ensure that there are long-term sources of funding available 
for community activity. (Paragraph 217)
Intergenerational taxation
Age-related benefits
33. The triple lock for the State Pension should be removed. The State Pension should 
be uprated in line with average earnings to ensure parity with working people. 
However, there should be protection against any unusually high periods of inflation 
in the future. (Paragraph 232)
34. In our submission, free television licences for all over a certain age should be 
phased out. Those who can afford to pay for a television licence should do so. 
The poorest may be subsidised directly by the Government, if it so chooses. 
(Paragraph 237)
35. The Government should seek to target existing age-related benefits better at 
individuals outside the workforce. Age thresholds should be raised. From 2026–28 
when the State Pension age is due to rise to 67, free bus passes and Winter Fuel 
Payments should be available no sooner than five years after the State Pension 
age and age thresholds should be aligned across benefits. The difference should be 
maintained from then on as the State Pension age rises. There should be transitional 
protection so that individuals who currently receive these payments continue to 
receive them. This should ensure that the cohort of women who have been most 
severely affected by changes to the State Pension age would not suffer a double 
disadvantage from this subsequent change. (Paragraph 241)
36. Alongside changing the age of applicability, the Government should investigate 
the feasibility of treating these benefits as taxable income for those above the tax 
threshold without requiring individuals who currently do not complete an income 
tax form having to fill out a form. (Paragraph 242)
National Insurance
37. The national Insurance system functions poorly. nICs do not pay for the 
State Pension even though they are used as a way to determine eligibility 
for it. They are not linked to any actual rules on the size of State Pension 
and the Government does not treat it as a future liability in the Whole of 
Government Accounts. There are strong arguments for the Government to 
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consider greater alignment and the eventual merger of the nICs and income 
tax systems. (Paragraph 248)
38. The reality of longer working lives should prompt the Government to rethink the 
National Insurance system. It is not fair that only individuals under the State Pension 
age pay this tax. Individuals over the State Pension age should contribute. Older 
people with lower incomes could be protected from this change by aligning the NICs 
threshold for this group with the income tax personal allowance. (Paragraph 249)
Property taxes
39. Council Tax is an incoherent combination of a property tax and a service charge. If 
the Government decides it would like to continue to fund local authorities through 
a tax partly based on property value, then it might reform Council Tax so that it 
adheres to the following principles: 
(1) A reformed tax should more closely mirror the value of the property than the 
existing Council Tax system. 
(2) It should include a method for allowing individuals with low incomes but high 
asset values to delay payment until the property is next sold or transferred. 
(3) Second homes should pay the full rate of local tax. (Paragraph 259)
40. Stamp duty has seriously distorted the housing market. The Government should 
review the effect of stamp duty on the liquidity of the housing market and consider 
how stamp duty could be reformed to improve the housing choices and availability 
for young families. (Paragraph 265)
Inheritance Tax
41. Inheritance Tax is capricious and not currently fit for purpose. Consideration 
needs to be given to whether and how assets should be taxed on death or 
transfer in a way that ensures fairness between generations. (Paragraph 272)
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APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE
The House of Lords Select Committee on Intergenerational Fairness and Provision 
was established on 9 May 2018 and asked to report by 31 March 2019.
The concept of intergenerational fairness is under strain. Younger people are not 
experiencing the income progression that successive generations since the Second 
World War have enjoyed. This has had an impact on home ownership, as house 
prices remain significantly out of step with average earnings. At the same time, we 
are living longer, creating additional costs for health and social care systems. For 
most of us that will mean working longer and retiring later. How should society 
respond to these challenges?
The Committee has decided to focus on issues of intergenerational fairness and 
provision across four key areas: jobs and the workplace, including in-work training 
and skills development; housing; the role of communities; and taxation.
In each case the Committee is seeking solutions which take account of the 
circumstances of all generations, recognising that decisions concerning older 
generations today will affect younger generations in a few years’ time. Key to 
the Committee’s considerations will be the motivation not to impoverish future 
generations.
The questions set out below are intended to provide a framework for those who 
wish to offer their views. You need not answer all these questions.
Information on how to submit evidence is set out below. If you have any questions 
or require adjustments to enable you to respond, please contact the Committee 
team: details also below.
It is helpful if opinions are supported by factual evidence where appropriate. 
Comparisons with practice in other countries are welcome.
The deadline for written evidence submissions is Monday 10 September 2018.
Questions
General
(1) Is the intergenerational settlement in the UK currently fair? Which 
generations are better off or worse off, and in which ways?
(2) What are the future prospects for different generations in the light of 
current economic forecasting?
Jobs and the workplace
(3) To what extent do different generations have a better or worse experience 
of the labour market?
(4) What needs to change to enable longer and fuller working lives for all? 
What role should employers play in providing solutions? What role can 
technology play?
(5) What are the barriers to greater in-work training and skills development 
for all generations?
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Housing
(6) To what extent is intergenerational fairness impaired by the UK housing 
market?
(7) What has driven the increase in the size of the private rented sector? 
Which generations are most affected by this and how?
(8) How can we ensure that the planning system provides for properties 
appropriate for all generations, including older people?
(9) How can the property wealth of older generations (parents and 
grandparents) be utilised to help younger generations (their children 
and grandchildren) access the property market? What would be the 
impact on intra-generational fairness of such schemes?
(10) To what extent are initiatives to encourage down-sizing or 
intergenerational home-sharing part of a viable solution to the housing 
shortage for younger generations?
Communities
(11) In what ways could more active communities help redress imbalances 
between generations? Are there opportunities for more non-state 
provided solutions to the challenges faced by an ageing society?
(12) To what extent are new technologies and social media isolating different 
generations from each other? How can technology be harnessed to 
promote active communities working to redress imbalances between 
generations?
Taxation
(13) To what extent does the tax system take account of fairness between the 
generations? What changes, if any, should be made to the tax system to 
achieve a fair intergenerational settlement?
(14) How does the Government’s practice of running public finances on a 
cash flow rather than on a balance sheet basis affect the intergenerational 
settlement?
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APPENDIX 4: NOTE OF COMMITTEE VISIT TO DONCASTER: 14 
NOVEMBER 2018
1. On 14 november, the Select Committee on Intergenerational Fairness and 
Provision visited Doncaster to see the work being done on intergenerational 
projects and services and to hear the views of local service providers and 
users. The Committee visited Doncaster Council and Swallowdale Extra 
Care facility, and participated in a discussion with staff, residents and 
apprentices from St Leger Homes of Doncaster.
2. Three members of the Committee were in attendance.381
3. Doncaster was chosen because of the borough’s Growing Together Strategy, 
which takes a lifecourse approach. The four-year plan represents considerable 
efforts by partners locally to improve the quality of life in the borough. St 
Leger Homes, an arms-length management organisation that manages 
21,000 social housing properties in Doncaster, had been cited in one of 
the Committee’s evidence sessions as an example of good intergenerational 
practice.
Doncaster’s ‘Growing Together Strategy’
4. The Committee began its visit with a meeting at Doncaster Council, where 
the Directors from Doncaster Council gave a presentation on their ‘Doncaster 
Growing Together’ (DGT) strategy, which covers living, working, caring 
and learning. The Committee met with:
• Mayor Ros Jones, Mayor of Doncaster
• Deputy Mayor Councillor Glyn Jones, Cabinet Member for Housing and 
Equalities
• Councillor nuala Fennelly, Lead Member for Children’s Services with a 
portfolio for Education and Skills
• Peter Dale, Director of Regeneration and Environment, Doncaster Council
• Damian Allen, Director of People, Doncaster Council
• Paul Tanney, Chief Executive, St Leger Homes of Doncaster
• Mark Douglas, Director of Children’s Social Care, Doncaster Children’s 
Services Trust
• Lee Tillman, Assistant Director for Strategy and Performance, Doncaster 
Council
• Kris Peach, Director of Extra Care, HousingandCare21
• Christian Foster, Head of Service, Strategy and Performance Unit, Doncaster 
Council
• Adam Goldsmith, Head of Strategic Housing, Doncaster Council
5. Mayor Ros Jones said that the Council was working to modernise and 
integrate services to direct them to the areas of greatest need, but Government 
grant cuts, rising demand for services and an increase in costs would see 
Doncaster Council face an estimated £21 million budget gap in 2019–20 
and a further £13 million in 2020–21. These difficulties, coupled with a 
381 Lord Bichard, Baroness Crawley and Lord True (Chairman).
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lack of certainty about central government funding beyond 2019–20, made 
financial planning difficult. Despite these challenges, several projects had 
been delivered, including securing a University Technical College, starting 
work on a new library and museum, and completing phase two of the Great 
Yorkshire Way. Work was continuing to join up health and social care and 
initiatives, such as the ‘Complex Lives Team’ to support people who are 
homeless, as well as schemes to ensure children get the best start in life.
6. The Directors spoke about the importance of quality of place, particularly 
the town centre as an economic driver and face of Doncaster. Due to local 
authority budget cuts, they stressed the necessity of prioritising both people 
and place. This included improving the look and feel of the town centre, to 
attract people in and encourage integration and community involvement. 
When asked about age segregation, the Committee were told that all areas 
had some age segregation, but that the extent of this segregation was 
contextual. It was suggested that in villages, people of different ages were 
more integrated, whilst across the borough (which, due to its large size, the 
Council thought of as the equivalent of a city) more integration between the 
ages was needed.
7. There was a large focus on community engagement and community-run 
services. Doncaster previously ran 24 council-owned libraries; now only four 
of these libraries were council-owned, and the rest were run by communities. 
St Leger Homes were giving Tenants and Residents Associations (TARAs) 
the skills to manage local community events themselves. There was a strong 
belief that people within the community knew the community better than 
people outside it, and that this local knowledge should be harnessed where 
possible.
8. The Committee heard that the renewal of Doncaster’s education and 
skills system was central to the Council’s commitment to inclusive growth, 
raising local ambition and bridging the gap between education and work. 
The Council’s vision for a learning city where lifelong education and 
culture engage and inspire was intergenerational in its approach. The 
‘One Doncaster’ partnership approach had been nominated as one of 20 
examples of Global Educational Change for its place-based transformation 
of learning. Directors of Doncaster Council spoke of the importance of this 
action being socially situated and socially embedded—speaking to a sense 
of belonging, identity and origin. Doncaster Council commissioned the 
Education and Skills Commission in 2016, and it was that commission that 
had recommended taking a longer term, demand-led view.
9. A particular focus was the skills gap, and the need for a much tighter alignment 
between school and the growing economy. The Commission recommended 
that careers advice needed to be aligned with skills developed in education, 
and that young people needed to understand what jobs were available to go 
into. The need to mitigate the loss of young people who move away to larger 
cities was also commented upon. This presented a problem for Doncaster 
because of the loss of skills. Part of the solution to this was a focus on skills 
and education, which could provide jobs within the area. Doncaster had a 
particularly strong business forum, which was recognised by the Education 
and Skills Commission. This was being harnessed intergenerationally 
through various initiatives to encourage aspirations and raise awareness of 
the infrastructure jobs available in Doncaster.
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10. In securing the University Technical College, Doncaster Council had 
focussed on a pervasive learning culture throughout life. The Committee 
heard that Doncaster is the location of a national College for High Speed 
Rail campus, which built on the borough’s heritage of rail in Doncaster 
for future generations. The importance of lifelong learning as a focus was 
stressed by the Council, as was the objective of returning to work after long-
term unemployment.
Swallowdale Extra Care facility
11. The Committee then travelled to the Doncaster Swallowdale Extra Care 
facility. The Committee was accompanied by three officers from Doncaster 
Council: Rachael Kenningham, Public Affairs Officer; Christian Foster, 
Strategy and Performance Head of Service; and Adam Goldsmith, the Head 
of Service, who leads the Doncaster Council house-building programme.
12. Once at the Extra Care facility, the Committee met staff and residents of the 
facility, including Joanne Gill, the Regional Manager, and Hilda Cook, the 
Housing and Care Manager. The Committee held an informal discussion 
about the facility’s purpose-built accessible housing, focussing on the 
maintenance of older people’s independence and the challenge of creating 
intergenerational practices within an Extra Care facility.
13. Part of this was achieved by branding the facility as a housing scheme, rather 
than a retirement or nursing home. There was a recognised ‘twin track’ 
approach of establishing such facilities alongside helping people stay in their 
own homes for longer. The staff told the Committee that adapting existing 
housing, through installing stair lifts and ground-floor level bathrooms, for 
example, was necessary in addition to providing Extra Care homes. The 
Committee asked about the affordability of the Extra Care facility and were 
told that it works in a similar way to downsizing to a smaller house: residents 
sold their own homes and used the proceeds to buy or rent a unit at the 
facility.
14. The stated aim of the Swallowdale Extra Care facility was to help people to 
retain their independence. There were seven similar Extra Care facilities run 
in the region, though more were planned in the next 18 months. Modelling 
the ageing population, the inevitable need for even more schemes was raised 
as an issue. However, there was a need to ensure quality of such services, not 
just quantity. The larger issue, it was felt, was the future staffing and funding 
of such services.
15. The Committee enquired about intergenerational contact between older 
residents and the wider community. They were told about local colleges 
coming to work with residents, and older residents sharing cooking skills 
with younger people. There was an emphasis on viewing the facility not as a 
retirement home, but rather as a community, where everyone has their own 
front door.
16. Looking ahead, the Committee was told about the potential to increase the 
sense of community through technology. In the future, it might be possible 
to integrate technology into the Extra Care facilities in order to help with the 
care of the residents and to provide regular updates to their relatives. The 
Committee raised the possible use of Extra Care centres to act as hubs for 
monitoring and supporting older people in their own homes. The potential 
wider advantages for district nursing were also mentioned.
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St Leger Homes of Doncaster
17. The Committee returned to Doncaster Council’s offices for a discussion with 
St Leger Homes of Doncaster. The St Leger Homes team gave presentations 
on their Young Person’s projects, engagement work, World of Work initiative 
and apprenticeship programmes. This included presentations from:
• Jane Davies, Head of Housing Management
• Stacey Lynn, Customer Involvement Officer
• Vikkii Chamberlain, People Development Manager
• Kevin Butler, World of Work Coordinator
18. The Committee then participated in an informal question and answer session 
with young and older tenants and apprentices at St Leger Homes.
19. It was noted that tighter alignment between educational skills and economic 
need could be achieved through better routes into apprenticeships. The 
Committee spoke to a group of young apprentices and participants on 
the St Leger Homes World of Work (WoW) programme. Competition for 
these programmes was intense, with over two hundred applications for 
six apprenticeships. St Leger Homes pays the living wage, rather than the 
apprenticeship minimum wage, which made these apprenticeships very 
attractive to young participants.
20. With regards to longer working lives and continuing in employment, the 
point was raised by young apprentices that in certain manual sectors, such 
as roofing and construction, it was difficult to keep working as you aged. 
There was a focus on retraining within the organisation and moving within 
the same sector into deployment and customer services. This was done at St 
Leger Homes through a route of ‘careers conversations’, in partnership with 
trade unions.
21. Some commented that young people did not feel prepared by school for 
the life issues that they need to face. Housing education was raised as an 
area of absence, particularly where and how to seek help, as well as issues 
of budgeting, and how to own or rent a home. It was suggested that schools 
might be the best body through which to provide this information, as 
otherwise young people relied on their parents. This might not be a bad 
thing in itself, but it could lead to differences in the quality of information 
and advice.
22. Homelessness among young people was raised as a pressing issue by the staff 
and tenants of St Leger Homes. It was felt that this issue was exacerbated by 
the introduction of Universal Credit, and by young people’s lack of awareness 
of what to do when in financial difficulty. This reinforced the need for better 
housing education within schools, and the provision of clear signposts in 
schools about how to access help. St Leger Homes had won a number of 
awards at the northern Housing Awards and were shortlisted at the UK 
Housing Awards for community involvement.
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APPENDIX 5: CONTACT GROUP FOR THE INQUIRY
1. The Select Committee on Intergenerational Fairness and Provision wanted 
to hear the views of the public throughout the inquiry, in particular those 
who may not typically be reached by a parliamentary Call for Evidence. A 
Contact Group was proposed to run alongside the evidence schedule of the 
Committee, create substantial and repeat engagement with the Committee 
and to reflect the different age groups that would be affected by our 
conclusions and recommendations. This engagement would help inform and 
strengthen these conclusions and recommendations. This is the first time 
that a Lords Committee has run a Contact Group, and we hope that this can 
set a precedent for future Lords Committees.
2. The Committee invited 14 members of the public from across the age groups, 
and across the country, to form the Contact Group. The Contact Group 
consisted of:
• Four representatives of the ‘younger’ age range, as coordinated by 
British Youth Council.
• Five representatives of a ‘middle’ age range, coordinated with Coram Family 
and Childcare Trust. Two of the ‘middle’ age range representatives were 
accompanied by a ‘volunteer coordinator’.
• Five representatives of the ‘older’ age range, as coordinated by the 
Centre for Ageing Better. Two of the ‘older’ age range representatives were 
accompanied by a ‘volunteer coordinator’.
3. The Contact Group were invited to two meetings at the Houses of Parliament 
on 31 October and 5 December 2018. On 31 October, participants discussed 
their experience of the issues covered by the inquiry. These included the 
concept of intergenerational fairness, housing, employment, communities 
and taxation. After this, the Contact Group were invited to conduct similar 
sessions in their own communities. The members of the Contact Group 
returned to Westminster on 5 December, where they were invited to feedback 
to members the points raised in the at-home sessions.
4. We heard from the members of the Contact Group about their concerns, 
and what they thought were the key issues for their own generation, and the 
other generations present in the room. We are grateful to them, and to the 
organisations involved. Below is a summary of the issues discussed.
5. The meeting on 31 October was attended by Baroness Blackstone, 
Viscount Chandos, Baroness Crawley, Baroness Greengross, Lord Hollick, 
Baroness Jenkin of Kennington, Lord True (Chairman), Baroness Thornhill 
and Baroness Tyler of Enfield.
6. The meeting on 5 December was attended by Lord Bichard, 
Baroness Blackstone, Viscount Chandos, Baroness Crawley, Baroness Jenkin 
of Kennington, Lord Price, Baroness Thornhill, Lord True (Chairman) and 
Baroness Tyler of Enfield.
Intergenerational fairness
7. On 31 October, Members of the Contact Group were asked whether they felt 
their generation was better or worse than other generations and why.
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8. The responses received showed a good deal of sympathy and understanding 
of the challenges each generation faced, with an overriding feeling that no one 
generation are better or worse off, but rather the pressures and difficulties 
are dramatically different across the generations. The younger participants 
did state that they felt their generation were generally worse off compared 
to other generations at their age due to what they perceived as a break in 
the generation-on-generation increase in standard of living. However, they 
recognised that there were new opportunities for themselves that other 
generations did not have. There was also a concern expressed amongst the 
older participants that they had ‘paid in’ to the intergenerational contract 
but didn’t feel that they were getting anything out of this system.
9. A notable recurring comment was that intergenerational contact is invaluable 
and makes a huge difference, but that such intergenerational contact was 
lessening. The participants in the ‘middle’ age ranges spoke of not seeing 
as much intergenerational contact as when they were younger, due to the 
transience of neighbourhoods. Opportunities for contact in the immediate 
vicinity of the neighbourhood had been diminished.
10. In the at-home communities sessions, this loss of intergenerational compact 
was echoed, along with the aversion to blame one generation for the situation 
of another. In interpreting ‘What is intergenerational fairness?’ the idea of 
parity of esteem and opportunity was raised numerous times. It was suggested 
that the greater isolation between young and old was due to a lack of facilities 
and activities. Within the older participants, there was an expressed concern 
that older people are stigmatised and made a scapegoat for the problems 
facing younger people, along with a recognition that younger people do face 
new problems, especially the inability to ‘move on’ and ‘get started’ with 
their lives.
11. When the participants fed back to the Committee on 5 December, they 
raised the issue that ‘intergenerational fairness’ was an ambiguous and 
relatively new term to most people. While there was an understanding of 
inequality within generations, taking a cross-generational approach to the 
issue of fairness was unfamiliar. For example, the younger participants 
reported back that it had not occurred to many of the young people they 
had spoken to that other generations faced unique difficulties and the wider 
issues affecting intergenerational fairness.
12. Concern about education and the preparedness of the younger generations 
was a theme that ran through participants’ feedback. From the middle age 
range, participants were worried that younger generations were not equipped 
for their future and that they would like to empower their children more 
and see more practical education. However, the younger participants were 
concerned that there were various stigmas raised against their generation as 
a result of this perceived ill-equipment for reality.
Housing
13. There was real anxiety about housing from all participants of the 
Contact Group. Across the age ranges, the main concern was the lack of 
affordable, suitable housing. At the first meeting on 31 October, the younger 
participants felt that they would not be able to buy a house in the next 
10 years. They said many of their peers were living at home and that many 
returned home after university. The phrase ‘beggars can’t be choosers’ was 
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expressed by these younger participants. The participants from the middle 
age range spoke of their own children, some of whom were aged 30, moving 
back in to their childhood homes. This impacted not just the children, but 
also the parents who they live with, whose lives are also altered. There was 
a concern that their children were putting off starting families because 
of the lack of certainty and security that comes with owning a property. 
The older participants felt that housing, in terms of buying, had been 
progressively worsening for each generation. There was a recognition from 
older participants that the impact of student debt on allowing saving for a 
deposit means buying is even harder for the current generation. The older 
participants suggested that more home sharing schemes were needed, that 
encourage more interesting approaches to alleviating housing issues.
14. In the at-home sessions, housing was felt to be the most important issue 
to the younger generation, for whom owning a house was felt to be an 
unattainable goal. This was due to both higher deposit rates and prices. 
Some cited university debts as making it harder to save for a deposit. The 
people in the middle age range felt that a lack of supply of both social housing 
and privately-owned housing was the main contributing factor. Once again, 
the issue of intergenerational overcrowding was brought up; because less 
people in younger generations were able to afford a home of their own, they 
were forced to stay with their parents. It was also commented upon that the 
Help to Buy scheme has helped those who can muster some deposit money, 
but for those that cannot, there is no provision. The older people spoken 
to repeated this issue of a lack of supply, but felt that this impacted older 
people as well as younger people. There was some frustration that people 
had a misconception about the availability and affordability of mortgages for 
the older generations. For example, people said that there was not enough 
housing with care schemes and a lot more of these or retirement villages were 
needed to enable them to live independently for longer. This was a particular 
concern for people with dementia.
15. Across the generations, the insecurity of the private rented sector was 
commented upon. The main issues were the high costs of renting, unreliable 
landlords causing dangerous living situations. In one group of older people 
spoken to, every person present was in the rental market and had experienced 
poor-quality support in accessing housing services. It was commonly felt that 
the renting situation as it stands led to uncertainty and insecurity. The cost 
of renting also meant that it was not feasible to save up for a deposit to buy a 
house. Another indirect effect that was commented upon by participants in 
both the middle and older age ranges was the rental sector contributing to 
transient communities as people moved in and out and then did not integrate 
in the community. This, in turn, contributed to the lack of intergenerational 
contact.
16. Participants also frequently discussed the intergenerational transfers of wealth 
in order to meet the cost of housing. Many families help younger generations 
with affording deposits, a situation that is not unique to the current younger 
generation. However, it was commented upon that many parents have to help 
with meeting rent payments and supporting children who move back home 
after university. Parents also commonly need to help with rental deposits, let 
alone housing deposits. This subsequently diminished parents’ savings, with 
the point also raised that many parents will put their savings into education 
and university for their child, which might result in an opportunity cost of 
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giving money for housing. For the participants who lived in social housing, 
who had never owned a house and therefore were not able to pass anything 
down to the next generation and do not have equity, there was real anxiety 
about their children’s future.
Employment
17. The participants from across the age ranges were asked about their opinions 
and experiences of the labour market. The younger participants commented 
upon the competitive nature of the jobs market for graduates and the 
mismatch between university education and the nature of the jobs market. 
They felt that their schools had pushed them towards university as the only 
viable route and weren’t equipped to advise them on apprenticeships. Higher 
Education is tied to the job market as the only good route, with little regard 
for alternative options. The feedback received from the younger people’s 
at-home sessions echoed this: it was felt that better jobs were needed to 
justify going to university and incurring large amounts of debt. The older 
participants were concerned about this situation for younger generations; 
they believed that young people now had to fulfil many criteria to obtain a 
job and were competing with a greater number of graduates.
18. Younger participants also spoke of the insufficiency of a degree in getting 
a job and the need for ‘extras’ to differentiate oneself from peers, such as 
internships, many of which were unpaid. This was also an area of concern for 
the older participants, who felt that in addition to posing a risk for younger 
generations, the older generations might wish to take on part-time jobs, but 
if a younger person was willing to do this unpaid, this pushed them out of 
the opportunity for this job.
19. The issue that the minimum wage was lower for 16 and 18 year olds than for 
over 25s was raised. Younger people felt that this was unfair, and that equal 
pay should be received for equal work; to suggest otherwise diminished the 
contribution that younger workers could make to their jobs.
20. For the participants in the middle and older age ranges, the longevity of 
working lives was a concern, particularly the issue of choice within this 
situation. They stated that staying in work and enjoying retirement depended 
on one’s health. They also expressed that they perceived older people staying 
in work for longer means a shortage of jobs for younger people, which will 
be compounded when job losses from automation are considered. The 
older participants felt that the concept of longer working lives needed more 
structure; some jobs are unsuitable for older people and there may not 
always be flexible opportunities for working longer. The older participants 
acknowledged the potential impact on the younger generation in terms of the 
positives of passing on knowledge and expertise.
21. Amongst younger participants, there were differing opinions on the so-
called ‘gig economy’. It was said that zero-hours contracts worked well for 
young people such as students who enjoyed the flexibility, however once 
these workers were no longer students and needed security it is no longer 
tenable and should not be a permanent job. It was stated that zero-hours 
contracts should be a ‘top up’, but for some it is a lifeline and in these latter 
cases there posed real insecurity. In a similar fashion, low-hours contracts 
were fed back by the middle age range participants as having similar worries. 
This issue linked back into the housing issue, as without job security it would 
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be extremely difficult to buy a house, or even save up enough to put down a 
rental deposit.
Communities
22. Participants were asked about their experiences of ‘communities’ and 
what the term meant to them. More specifically, they were asked whether 
this included people from different generations and what effect they felt 
technological developments had on their sense of community. Across all 
age groups, the great value in intergenerational contact was commented 
upon. Participants told the Committee of numerous examples of positive 
intergenerational contact. In one instance, a local community centre ran a 
group session with older women and teenage boys. The women taught the 
boys how to cook a meal, while the boys taught the women how to play video 
games. There was a desire from all ages to engage with other generations 
more and the potential to tackle loneliness and negative age stereotypes 
through this contact was expressed.
23. The younger participants reported the potential for intergenerational 
community contact provided by social media. This provided a platform 
for both older and younger people to inform and help each other, as well 
as learn from each other. It was suggested that social media was a way of 
connecting with extended family, in a similar fashion to multigenerational 
housing. The participants from the middle age range also felt that technology 
connects different generations, but also connects people within the same 
generation who might share a communal space. Participants spoke of their 
neighbourhood WhatsApp groups, for example, which allowed them to 
connect to their neighbours.
24. It was felt across the age ranges, however, that technological connection was 
not a substitute, but rather a supplement to physical communal spaces. The 
participants from across the middle and older age ranges commented on 
the fact that lots of communities lack the physical spaces within which to 
hold community events. They fed back that many older people and young 
mothers alike felt isolated from the community. Within the group of older 
participants at the first meeting on 31 October, opinions varied significantly 
as to whether young people wanted to be involved. There was a desire for 
physical community spaces not just to function as youth centres. Older people 
commented that they used to have dance halls and youth clubs, but that these 
spaces had since disappeared. There was a suggestion by participants from 
the older generation that schools might do more to bridge the gap and that 
this environment would be suitable because it could combat social isolation. 
However, participants from the middle age range commented that schools 
are under pressure to meet targets and expectations, so often do not have 
sufficient time, funds or staffing to facilitate such activities.
Taxation and benefits
25. Across the age ranges, it was felt that there was a respect for people who 
had paid into the State Pension and so deserved to reap the benefits of this. 
In fact, it was explicitly stated at one table that there was no resentment 
towards older people and that younger generations did indeed respect their 
situation. In line with the idea of the intergenerational compact, the younger 
participants said that they expected to pay in and receive their pension, as 
the older generations said that they had paid tax all their working life, so 
when they retire should have enough money to live comfortably.
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26. The need for creativity in how those at the lower end of the income and wealth 
spectrum are helped was stressed, particularly in relation to how benefits 
were taxed. Indeed, across the middle and older groups of participants, there 
was an anxiety that those in work should be better off than those on benefits, 
and that ‘carrots not sticks’ were needed to incentivise employment.
27. One creative idea that was suggested by one of the older groups was tapered 
taxation to help all age groups. This would mean that younger people paid 
lower tax; a middle group paid higher; older groups paid lower and those 
staying on in work past the State Pension age would pay no taxation or 
employee national Insurance Contributions. Another suggestion was borne 
from the resounding sentiment that one generation did not want to take 
perks from one demographic and give to another; it was suggested that large 
companies should make a proper contribution to society by paying greater tax 
and not evading tax. There was a stated concern not to discourage employers 
from doing business in the UK, but that they felt big businesses were not 
paying enough. A final suggestion was suggested by one participant to use 
‘local currencies’ to help build and sustain local communities. This might 
take the form of reduced business rates for buildings that made their space 
available for community services for a certain number of hours a week. This 
could also be extended on a personal level.
28. In their feedback, the participants from the middle age range expressed a 
concern that the student loan repayment scheme needed to be looked at, as 
current interest rates were too high.
29. The older participants all wanted to ensure that they could help the younger 
generations with the struggles they face but weren’t sure what they were 
willing to give up or sacrifice in order to do so. They felt that some of the 
‘perks’ they received could be done away with, such as the free TV licence, 
whereas bus passes are a vital lifeline for many older people.
Messages to the Minister
30. The final session of the Contact Group was held on 5 December 2018. 
The Committee’s evidence sessions were held on 11 and 18 December, 
where it heard from Ministers from four government departments. The 
Contact Group participants were invited to ask people at the at-home sessions 
what their three key messages to the Ministers would be. The participants 
themselves were then asked the same question at the end of the session on 
5 December. The following answers were recorded (similar messages have 
been grouped together.)
31. The younger participants wanted to pass along a message that politicians 
and those in power should hear and listen to the voice of younger people. 
They wanted to know what methods they were using to engage with young 
people and those who are too young to vote. They also felt that they would 
never own their home and so wanted to know what the government were 
doing to increase the chance of home ownership for young people. They 
also sought to know what the government was doing to try and ensure there 
is a viable job market for young graduates and those who had not gone to 
university. They wished to know what the government was doing to improve 
realistic career guidance.
32. The participants from the middle age ranges wanted the government to 
invest in social mobility, starting with jobs, specifically better training and 
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more protected contracts. They also wanted Ministers to deal with the 
disconnection in communities by funding community groups. There was 
a desire for local leaders to be empowered with funding and resources such 
as training, and to build ‘people’ centres, rather than solely retirement 
communities, or areas just for young people. Working mothers from the 
middle age range said they wanted to see more flexibility and opportunities 
to work from home. They felt getting back into work that was stimulating 
but also fitted with their caring commitments was vital and would provide 
working role models for the next generation. Training, reskilling and 
increasing people’s confidence would help with this.
33. The older participants wanted to see better planning of local communities to 
decrease age segregation. They believed the housing needs of all generations 
should be met in one vicinity and that this would have positive knock-on effects 
for intergenerational contact and community activity. Older generations also 
wished to make their anxieties about a reduced pension known; there was 
a great sense of unfairness around the government diminishing people’s 
pensions that they had paid into all their working lives.
34. The older participants particularly raised the point that they wished to see a 
more permissive environment for local communities to organise activities. In 
the present situation, such activity was often hindered by local authorities, 
who in turn were restricted by national government. When this point was 
raised on 5 December, the other age groups indicated strong support for this 
suggestion, which reflected the productive discussion around communities 
and resounding desire for greater community activity.
35. All groups raised the message of increased affordable housing supply. 
There was a desire that this should be accompanied by the appropriate 
infrastructure. The older groups raised the necessity of increased specialised 
housing stock, such as Extra Care facilities.
36. Across all groups, there was a keen desire for the private rented sector to see 
some reform, particularly being made more secure and less expensive. The 
younger participants wanted guidance on renting and lower deposits, where 
home owning wasn’t an option. The participants from the middle age range 
wanted to see the private rented sector made more secure and less expensive. 
The older participants wanted to highlight issues around the rental market 
to Ministers. They proposed a cap on rents.
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APPENDIX 6: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAT Association of Accounting Technicians
ACA Association of Consulting Actuaries
AOC Association of Colleges
APPG All-Party Parliamentary Group
ARCO Associated Retirement Community Operators
AST Assured Shorthold Tenancy
BEIS Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
BYC British Youth Council
CBI Confederation of British Industries
Cebr Centre for Economics and Business Research
CEP Centre for Economic Performance
CIPD Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development
DAS Digital Apprenticeship Service
DCMS Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
DfE Department for Education
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
EHRC Equality and Human Rights Commission
FCA Financial Conduct Authority
FE Further Education
FSB Federation of Small Businesses
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HBAI Households Below Average Income data set
HE Higher Education
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
HMT HM Treasury
HRA Housing Revenue Accounts
HRP Household Representative Person
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
IfG Institute for Government
IFS Institute for Fiscal Studies
ILC-UK International Longevity Centre-UK
IPPR Institute for Public Policy Research
LGA Local Government Association
LSE London School of Economics 
MHCLG Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
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nAO national Audit Office
nGO non-Governmental Organisation
nHS national Health Service
nICs national Insurance Contributions
nRS national Retraining Scheme
OBR Office for Budget Responsibility 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OnS Office for national Statistics 
PEnSIM Pension simulation model
PSHE Personal, Social and Health Education
RPI Retail Price Index
RTPI Royal Town Planning Institute
SME Small and medium-sized enterprises
SMF Social Market Foundation
STEM Science, technology, engineering and mathematics
TUC Trades Union Congress
UCAS Universities and Colleges Admissions Service
VAT Value Added Tax
WAS Wealth and Assets Survey
WoW World of Work programme
